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Abstract
This thesis aims to investigate EU peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina, focusing on
the ways in which EU actors engage with local cultural actors and vice versa. Given
that, in the liberal peacebuilding tradition, civil society has been considered a key actor
in the public sphere, peacebuilding actors have tended to neglect seemingly more
marginal actors and their subtle ways of impacting on the peacebuilding process.
However, this thesis contends that processes of interaction are not always direct and
visible, but centre on discourse clusters, which I frame as imaginary ‘spaces of agency’.
Through the creation of meanings within a space of agency and its translation into other
imaginary spaces, actors develop the power to impact upon the peacebuilding process,
often in coded ways and therefore invisible in the public sphere, as peacebuilding
actors, including the EU, have created it. A typology of the modes of interaction and
possible responses between spaces helps understand the complexities and nuances of
peacebuilding interaction.
The thesis uses this framework to analyse several exemplary spaces of agency of the
EU, rooting them in institutional discourses with specific reference to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Based on this, I investigate a number of responses to those spaces on the
part of local cultural actors, as well as how the latter contribute to the emergence of
alternative localised spaces, where the EU’s spaces fail to connect to the everyday
dimensions of peace. I suggest that this represents a way in which local actors try to
claim the ownership of peacebuilding back in subtle ways. This also points to the ability
of actors that have traditionally been excluded from the peacebuilding project to
contextualise abstract and distant processes into what matters locally, as well as their
capacity to reject and resist when the EU’s spaces remain irrelevant for local
peacebuilding imaginations.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
In 2011, Dubioza Kolektiv, a rather popular music band from Sarajevo,
produced a new single, entitled “Euro Song”, in which they sing “I’m sick of being
European just on EuroSong”. This is a telling statement if one considers the decreasing
popularity of the European Union (EU) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). As the Early
Warning Quarterly Report from July / September 2008 of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) reflects, between March and September 2008 the
general approval of the EU’s work in BiH had decreased from 46.1% to 42.1%, while
the general acquiescence to EU membership had declined significantly as well.2
From the perspective of the EU and other actors engaged in post–conflict
peacebuilding in BiH, the situation seems to be getting worse. It looks like the
international community has not been able to create sustainable peace, while its
popularity is in steady decline. Furthermore there is an increasing dissatisfaction among
the people with the work of the international community and the lack of engagement by
local people in the peacebuilding project. Bosnians, in turn, are increasingly
disappointed by the failure of international peacebuilders to improve the quality of their
lives, to create employment, and provide a stable foundation on which peace can
develop. At the same time, the international community feels that local elites are unable
to bring about constitutional reform with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) a major
obstacle. Indeed, the Constitution introduced by Dayton has been reinforcing ethnic
divisions and has led to further fragmentation of the political structure in BiH – mainly
between Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation. The situation looks hardly any
better in the social realm with people increasingly disappointed by the peacebuilding
process and sick of talking about it. Given that the EU used to be one of the few actors
on which big hopes were placed, its decreasing popularity is particularly disappointing
for all. Apart from its recent success in the context of visa liberalisation, the EU’s
engagement in BiH has failed to produce many of the results it had envisaged earlier in
the peacebuilding process. Although there seems to be much talk about future
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Development Programme, Early Warning System, Annual
Report 2008, 2008. Available at
http://www.undp.ba/upload/publications/EWS%20Annual%202008%20E%20-%20web%20edition.pdf
(accessed 23 May 2011).
2membership of BiH in the EU as the only way to solve the countries problems,3 this
seems to be very far off for the Bosnian people at the moment. This results in further
frustration vis-à-vis the EU and the ways in which it is conceived in BiH.
This is the background against which this thesis takes an interest in examining
the reasons for which the EU has remained distant from local imaginations of peace and
peacebuilding. It also investigates the reasons for which it seems to have failed to
connect to such local imaginations despite its high ambitions of European integration
and the associated, mostly implicit, peacebuilding efforts. The investigation conducted
in this thesis ties in with debates about international and local ownership of
peacebuilding as well as the connections and their hybridisation.4 In this context, it has
to be said that the original goal of this thesis was to examine the direct relationship and
patterns of interaction between EU actors and local actors, i.e. those actors situated in an
everyday context. However, repeated fieldwork in BiH showed that a big issue in the
peacebuilding process more generally, but also specifically with respect to the EU’s
work, is that there is hardly any direct interaction between international agencies (such
as the EU) and local grassroots actors. Furthermore, there is often some degree of
reluctance of the latter to talk about the EU in detail. Its policies do not seem to connect
to their goals, values, or ambitions.
Therefore, what this thesis aims to look at is how those actors are still
influencing the EU and vice versa, not in a very obvious or direct way, but in a much
more subtle and hidden manner. The EU and local grassroots actors may not talk to
each other, at least not frequently, but they talk about similar things, similar topics,
albeit in very different ways. The ways in which they are talking and interacting is
therefore centred on a specific issue or subject field. Therefore, the interaction between
EU and local cultural actors, i.e. actors that are situated in an everyday context in BiH
and channel their associated experiences, views and discourses into creative processes,
is all but obvious. However it helps us understand a lot about the successes and the
failures of the EU’s peacebuilding- and state-building ambitions. In fact, what seems to
happen is that the EU is quite influential in some fields, while in other fields, there is
3 Marco Mantovanelli, World Bank BiH, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 07/03/11.
4 Cf. Oliver Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds.), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to
Post-Liberalism, Palgrave, forthcoming 2011.
3hardly any impact on local dynamics, or a rather negative one that obstructs the original
goals of the EU’s mission. The other way round, some of the EU’s efforts are perceived
as supportive among the local population (the visa liberalisation process, for instance),
while others are considered obstacles to local ambitions and imaginations, and are
therefore resisted. This casts light on a tension between EU institutions and norms as
against the contextual agency of local cultural actors to respond to and transform the
former.
Interestingly enough, the ways in which both the EU as an institution and the
vast majority of academics have conceptualised peacebuilding engagement, not only by
the EU, but also the international community in general, represents a belief in the
visibility of power as well as relying on an actor-centred notion of agency. Mac Ginty
has problematised this through what he calls the “liberal peace ‘silo’”, referring to the
assumption that there are chains of interaction between leading states, international
organisations and institutions, reaching down to governments, ministries,
municipalities, NGOs and so forth.5 The silo assumed that the direction of interaction is
mainly downwards, while ideas and resources are believed to trickle down from top-
level actors via national and sub-national policy agents to finally reach communities and
individuals.6 This means there is an assumption that the main actors in control of the
peacebuilding process are the institutions in power. In BiH, these are often believed to
be the institutions of the international community. It has therefore long been assumed
that local actors or the people on the ground are nothing more than recipients of what is
being imposed on them by seemingly more powerful actors. Even more critical accounts
of peacebuilding have focused their criticism on the ways in which institutions govern
their subjects, often referring to “biopolitics” and associated discourses.7
Against this background, it has often been neglected that the peacebuilding
subjects are not just passive victims, but they may act as the creators of their own
history, thus exercising their agency, although this is not always visible in the public
sphere. In this context, Richmond has reminded us of the ability of local populations to
make a difference in their everyday context, which has been depoliticised and indeed
5 Roger Mac Ginty, International peacebuilding and local resistance: hybrid forms of peace, New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p.32f.
6 Ibid.
7 Cf. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaité, European Union Peacebuilding and Policing, New York:
Routledge, 2006.
4also often romanticised, partly because neither policymakers nor academics found ways
of accessing this rather complex sphere.8 At the same time, an academic discourse is
gradually emerging that is taking account of the importance of the everyday context of
peace, its political nature as well as its central role in social life.9 However, this is not to
reduce ‘everyday life’ to a notion of primitive localness, but to view it in the trajectory
between “the particular and the universal, the local and the global.”10 It has now also
been recognised as a sphere in which people find security11 and (maybe as a result of
this) voice their agency, which tends to be subtle and barely visible in public, but is full
of content and substance, both of which the technical nature of peacebuilding operations
have failed to connect to. In this context, Mac Ginty’s definition of the ‘local’
conceptualises it as follows:
…’local actors’ refers to all levels within the state subject to a liberal peace
intervention, national government, municipalities, political parties, militant groups, NGOs
and civil society, businesses, communities, and individuals. All these actors have the
ability to hybridise the liberal peace, convinced of the merits of the internationally
sponsored peacebuilding programme.12
Against this background, the local will be considered as what is concerned with
‘everyday social reality’, reflecting the competing visions of peace within this reality. In
this context, Richmond has claimed that:
[t]he local can be thought in terms of everyday social reality. This includes customary
processes and institutions, as well as indigenous forms of knowledge, traditional
authorities, elders, chiefs, communities, tribes, and religious groups. Of course, it also
includes the life of modernity, and the impact of liberal state institutions and markets.13
Here, the local is not viewed in necessary opposition to international actors, such
as the EU, but as a broad range of actors in various segments of society and connected
to the international system. At the same time, internationals can become locals, once
they start connecting to everyday social reality rather than speaking from an ‘ivory
8 Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, New York: Routledge, 2011.
9 Cf. Alison M.S. Watson, “Agency and the Everyday Activist”, in Oliver Richmond and Audra Mitchell
(eds.), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism, Palgrave, forthcoming.
10 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of everyday life, vol.3; translated by Gregory Elliott; with a preface by Michel
Trebitsch, London: Verso, 2008, p.16.
11 Ibid.
12 Mac Ginty, International peacebuilding and local resistance: hybrid forms of peace, op. cit., p.84.
13 Oliver P. Richmond, ”De-romanticising the local, de-mystifying the international: hybridity in Timor
Leste and the Solomon Islands”, The Pacific Review, vol.24, no.1, 2011, pp.115-136.
5tower’, or from an ‘air-conditioned room’.14 In that respect, the spaces of agency of the
EU and local cultural actors presented in this thesis should not be read as necessarily
oppositional, but rather as in situations of mutual constitution and hybridisation. The
thesis therefore builds on what Pugh et al. have called a “new ‘geometry of power’” that
feeds local needs into the policy process rather than seeing the local as isolated from the
institutional.15
An approach that takes into account the subtle agency of local actors in turn
requires a broad notion of agency in a certain structural context, which accounts for the
multiple ways in which power can play out. This requires a rethinking of our
conceptualisations of agency after the “visual turn” towards a much more subtle
analysis of the ways in which actors communicate and interact through imaginary
spaces and spheres, which in turn represent the structural foundation of action, but are at
the same time subject to continuous challenge. Against the background of an often
invisible and romanticised “local”16, this thesis aims to restore political agency to the
seemingly powerless, situated within the structures of imaginary spaces. Interestingly
enough, the assumption that ‘ordinary people’ cannot make a difference to the
peacebuilding process seems to be a fairly common one in BiH, not only among the
peacebuilders, but also in more general social discourses. Yet, as the work of numerous
music groups, youth centres, cultural initiatives and arts festivals illustrates, there is a
high degree of mobilisation and implicit political agendas to be found in such places.
Often people are not aware of this agency, and this is certainly not very well explored
by actors such as the EU, which lacks the institutional structures to be able to engage
with dynamics beyond the political, public sphere. Problematically, the EU is
constrained to focus on what is visible, public and formally political, at the same time
missing out on those alternative, fruitful discourses situated in an everyday life context
which have the potential to create a locally sustainable peace and to constantly re-
negotiate it in the trajectories between the particular and the universal, as outlined
above.
14 Cf. Emmanuel Terray, “Le climatiseur et la veranda“, in G. Balandier (ed.), Afrique plurielle, Afrique
actuelle: Hommage à Georges Balandier, Paris: Karthala, 1986.
15 Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner, “Conclusion: The Political Economy of Peacebuilding
– Whose Peace? Where Next?”, in Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner (eds.), Whose peace?
Critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008, pp.390-397, p.391.
16 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of everyday life, vol.3, op. cit., p.16.
6This is the context in which this thesis situates its notion of “spaces of agency”
as a way in which interaction between different actors in peacebuilding contexts can be
investigated taking account of the complexities of power and agency within a specific
structural environment. To do so, chapter 2 investigates how social agency in the public
sphere has been conceptualised academically, finding that peacebuilding actors have
promoted a narrow version of “civil society”, often relating to the corresponding
academic literature, and made it a central actor in the public sphere. This derives from a
liberal tradition of thought and has resulted in rather limiting notions of agency,
excluding actors that are not traditionally thought of as ‘civil’ actors in the public realm,
often because they are neither professional nor visible in that arena. Although such
actors may be key to understanding complex social dynamics, they hardly ever appear
as holders of agency, neither in the policy-world, nor in the related academic discourses.
Chapter 3 gives a historical overview of the conflict and peacebuilding context
of BiH, looking at the ways in which the international community has developed its
approaches over time, before more specifically investigating the EU’s policies of
member state-building as they have developed in interaction with the major actors of the
peacebuilding community in BiH. Discussing the extent to which the EU can be
considered a peacebuilding actor in the first place, the chapter is particularly interested
in how the EU has conceptualised local agency in BiH, which seems to have followed
the academic discourses as outlined in the preceding chapter, in terms of focusing on
civil society as the principal instrument for transforming the public sphere, and, in its
professionalised version, one of the central partners for the EU to work with.
These chapters form the background against which chapter 4 introduces a
theoretical framework with the help of which the interaction of EU actors and local
cultural actors can be investigated in detail. To do so, the chapter develops the concept
of “spaces of agency”, which frames interactions around discursive spaces, the
meanings of which are constantly open to challenge and resistance. “Spaces of agency”
therefore represent clusters of discourses on which different actors work to voice their
own needs and interests in subtle, possibly coded, ways. This means that different actors
may not necessarily interact directly, but through the creation of meanings within an
imaginary space. As a result, different peacebuilding spaces are crystallising, which are
not fixed, but transversal and fluid, while actors’ ability to translate meanings between
7spaces can be viewed as a manifestation of agency in the peacebuilding context.
Outlining the notion of ‘peacebuilding agency’, the chapter investigates the
infrastructures of such spaces, how they are shaped by structural properties – actors’
needs, structures of representation, power and identity – as well as their agency to
transcend those structural constraints and to challenge existing spatial structures. In that
sense, the concept of ‘spaces of agency’ offers a way in which the structure-agency
debate can be re-thought through a focus on complex discourse clusters rather than
exclusively on an allegedly homogenous mass of publicly visible actors.
The chapter further introduces a typology of responses between spaces, the
quality of which is nuanced and ranges from acceptance to resistance. The methodology
used for this investigation is based on participatory research techniques combined with
“institutional ethnography”. The chapter will outline the latter in detail in its ability to
investigate the impact that discourses clustering within a space of agency have on
people’s everyday lives. The chapter will then argue that this also works in opposite
direction in terms of providing a way in which two–way processes and their impacts on
each other (i.e. from space to space) can be framed through the discourses they
exchange and the impact they thereby have upon each other. As the chapter will
explain, participatory research techniques will help understand various discourses, both
on the part of the EU and of local cultural actors, in their interaction in the
peacebuilding context.
Chapter 5 then uses the “spaces of agency” concept to shed light on some
selected spaces that are mainly shaped by the EU in its engagement in BiH, namely the
civil society, democratisation, regional cooperation, human rights, institutions/control,
state and politics, travel and future spaces. The chapter investigates EU discourses as
they can be found in such spaces, analysing them according to their infrastructures,
processes of (self–) representation, audiences and dynamics.
This is the basis on which chapter 6 examines selected local responses to these
spaces, particularly focusing on local cultural actors in a broad understanding, i.e. actors
situated in an everyday context and channelling their subjectivities into creative
processes. Their responses to what has been outlined in chapter 5 are indeed quite
diverse and help explain why some of the EU’s spaces have managed to connect better
to local spaces than others. At the same time, such responses are not merely reactive,
8but they come with a huge creative potential, reflecting the quality of agency of specific
actors, as diverse as those may be.
Therefore, chapter 7 investigates a number of spaces that local cultural actors
own and use, i.e. the social relationships, freedom, travel and past space. Those spaces
of agency point to the ability of local actors–often portrayed as victims– to become
authors of their own history and to challenge, modify or resist what is being imposed on
them. This also reflects the extent to which the EU’s institutional peace has partly been
rejected, while cultural actors have focused on alternative spaces where they find better
ways of articulating certain needs and interests.
The analysis conducted in this thesis may not be common to the discipline of
International Relations, with the focus on the politics of cultural activities representing
an exploratory approach to conceptualising the political nature of peace and
peacebuilding. Yet this approach helps understand not only the quality of interaction
between different peacebuilding actors, but it also sheds light on the broader question of
peacebuilding legitimacy. If we agree with Berman who suggests that legitimacy is a
never-completed process in need of continuous recreation by taking account of the
constantly newly emerging configurations of a power regime, the spaces of agency
concept takes account of the fluidity of (de-)legitimisation processes as they emerge in
the ever-changing interaction between spaces.17 The concept also allows to consider the
fact that legitimacy is not a static concept, but rather implies contested power struggles
between highly diverse actors,18 The fluidity of spaces of agency therefore reflects the
extent to which complex power struggles shape the degree of legitimacy of certain
peacebuilding spaces through their (in)ability to connect to spaces that matter locally.
These spaces may indeed represent the symbolic locations where local legitimacy
develops and emerges due to the ability of their discourses to connect the institutional to
the everyday as well as establishing contextualised meanings of abstract norms.
17 Nathaniel Berman, “Intervention in a “Divided World”: Axes of Legitimacy”, in Hilary Charlesworth
and Jean-Marc Coicaud, (eds.) Fault lines of international legitimacy, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010, p.136.
18 Anders Uhlin, “Democratic Legitimacy of Transnational Actors: Mapping Out the Conceptual
Terrain”, in Eva Erman and Anders Uhlin (eds.) Legitimacy Beyond the State? Re-examining the
Democratic Credentials of Transnational Actors, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p.22.
9At this stage, I need to briefly comment on my epistemology and bias as a
researcher. To investigate selected spaces of agency, I have not only consulted written
sources, but I have also undertaken fieldwork. This involved three trips to Brussels, and
five stays of different length (between a week and two months respectively) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, mainly based in Sarajevo, with shorter stays in Banja Luka, Mostar,
Srebrenica, Travnik, Pale, Zenica, Trebinje, Konjic and Tuzla. I conducted all
interviews myself in English, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, French and German, some over
the phone, but most of them in person. The language in which interviews were
conducted certainly made a difference as to what my interviewees communicated. With
improving language skills over time, the information I got access to, not only in
interviews, but also in daily life, changed considerably and became increasingly
insightful with respect to informal discourses, resistance beyond the public realm and
social life more generally. I am aware of my own biases, spending most of my time in
Sarajevo and in mostly urban areas, therefore being part of certain networks more than
of others, which is why I consider myself to be part of this research process and its
outputs. To a certain extent, I tried to gain access to actors in BiH through multiple
entry points to ensure that I would hear a diversity of voices instead of just one
narrative, asking myself the question as to what would be my own responsibility in
terms of whose voices I hear and whose voices I do not hear and represent. Yet since
this is not a technical problem that can ever be solved, this thesis should not be read as a
representation neither of the EU, nor of Bosnian society. It is rather to point at the
complex processes of interaction in the peacebuilding context with the help of specific
examples, to show how hidden agency becomes powerful agency that is capable of
transforming the structural boundaries of action, often in disguised and coded ways, and
how this gradually modifying what we understand as a “EU peace” or a “liberal peace”
in terms of challenging the associated spaces of agency and translating specific
meanings into them. Therefore, the main aim of the thesis is to investigate the varied
dynamics and fluidities of peacebuilding, its hidden mechanisms of power and agency
as well as the processes through which it has been claimed back locally. Such processes
often take place beyond the traditional spheres of peacebuilding (understood as “the
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public”, “civil society,” or the formal political process) and have been neglected in the
literature so far, which is the gap that this thesis aims to fill.
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Chapter 2: Agency, Civil Society and Culture in the
Public Sphere of Peacebuilding
Civil Society: The Location of ‘Civilised’ Social Agency?
How is a specific version of peace created, and especially, by whom? Who has
the right and the ability to speak on behalf of the grassroots and how do external actors
gain access to this? This certainly raises the question of agency, i.e. which actors are
believed to be capable of making a difference in cooperating with the international
community? In both academic and policy-oriented discourses, social agency is often
ascribed to an organised version of society. A narrow definition of civil society seems to
have become the standard lens to frame social agency.
Civil society is a notion that has a long tradition of thought in various
disciplines, such as Sociology, Political Science, International Relations and
Development Studies, and has therefore to be seen as a nexus between academic
discourse and political practice. However, Paffenholz and Spurk point out that, due to
the long history of the development of the concept, there is no commonly-agreed upon
definition, neither in terms of what the term civil society actually means, nor who its
representing actors are, nor in which sectors they can be situated.19 Yet, it becomes
obvious that the idea of civil society as a separate sphere from both the state and the
market has developed, with an emphasis on civility, in Western thought from the 18th
century on.20 Providing a language and a code of acceptable moral behaviour at the
time,21 the idea of civil society has not only been used as an analytical tool for
understanding societal dynamics. The concept has always been heavily influenced by
the normative background of the respective thinker’s historical and social context,
hence reflecting ideas of what was considered as ‘civil’ in social life. According to
Seligman, this connects with ideas derived from Protestantism and the Scottish
Enlightenment by bringing in the notion of universal principles with a clear focus on
19 Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, “Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding“, Social
Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, no.36, October 2006, p.2.
20 John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann, “Contests over Civil Society: Introductory Perspectives”, pp.1-25,
in John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann (eds.) Civil society: a reader in history, theory and global politics,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.3.
21 John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann, op. cit., p.4.
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the individual as a social actor.22 In that sense, the ability to speak has been closely
linked to a normative underpinning in relation to civility. Being able to represent society
has therefore been a question of responding to the respective civil norms of that society
– their content certainly being contested.
Both Montesquieu and Kant, as important Enlightenment thinkers of civil
society, put emphasis on the aspect of civility as the predominant feature of civil
society. While the former believed civil society to be the sphere in which relations
between citizens could be dealt with and regulated,23 the latter considered it “as a
cosmopolitan sphere of law and justice.”24 This is, to a large extent, in line with Locke’s
argument defining civil society as a condition opposed to the state of nature and
regulated by laws and codes of moral behaviour.25 In Locke’s writings, the normative
dimension of the concept civility becomes particularly obvious by its connection to
religion. In that sense, civil society serves as a tool through which the individual can
achieve his own and God’s goals, namely the promotion of the rights of all members of
civil society.26 Developing from those strands of Enlightenment thinking, civil society
came to be considered a vital element of “civilised” political life. This was later taken
up by Tocqueville, who emphasised the role of independent associations as institutions
in which democracy could be learned by means of socialisation in terms of establishing
values such as tolerance or trust.27 Civil society did not only respond to the normative
requirements of organised social life, but it also provided a way in which the role of an
otherwise fragmented social complex could be conceptualised in a public space. This
ties in with Cox’s argument that, in the European tradition of thinking, civil society
came to be equated with the bourgeoisie. It thus represented the specific interests of this
very social class at the expense of the common good and the vast majority of citizens.28
22 Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, New York: The Free Press, 1992.
23 Cf. Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, op. cit., p.4.
24 John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann, op. cit., p.93.
25 Ibid., p.30.
26 Zbigniew Rau “Introduction”, in Rau, Zbigniew (ed.), The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, pp.1-23, p.8.
27 Cf. Paffenholz and Spurk, op. cit., p.4.
28 Robert W. Cox, “Civil society at the turn of the millenium: prospects for an alternative world order”,
Review of International Studies, vol.25, 1999, pp. 3–28, pp.5, 6.
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In contrast to Marxist and Gramscian discourses on civil society, which pointed
to the possibility of resistance to an existing order,29 Habermas embeds the concept in a
liberal idea of the public sphere. According to him, communication structures are
developed in the public sphere through the connecting networks of civil society.30 Using
an institutional approach, Habermas claims that civil society is:
composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations,
organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate
in the private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions in amplified form to
the public sphere.31
Habermas’ approach rests on a definition of human beings as democratic beings
that can interact in a pluralistic society based on an institutional core that facilitates
mutual communication.32 This reflects the belief in the ability of civil society
organisations to connect the private and the public arenas, and thus making an important
contribution to the political life of a society. In this context, it is worth looking at
Arendt’s notions of public and private. What she understands as the traditionally private
sphere, is a context shaped by people’s wants and needs, while the polis, or the political
and public context, has been assumed to represent the realm of freedom.33 However,
Arendt does not view “the social” as a neutral connector between those two spheres,
rather she argues that the former has changed the meaning of those arenas and has
assumed new patterns of behaviour:
It is decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action, which
formerly was excluded from the household. Instead, society expects from each of its
members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of
which tend to “normalize” its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous
action or outstanding achievement.34
29 Cf. Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations”, Millennium, vol. 12, no.2,
1983, pp. 162-175 and Cox, “Civil society at the turn of the millenium: prospects for an alternative world
order”, op. cit. p.25.
30 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy; translated [from the German] by William Rehg., Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p.359.
31 Ibid., p.367.
32 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society?“, The British Journal of
Sociology, Vol.49, no.2, 1998, pp. 210-233, pp.212 ff.
33 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p.29.
34 Ibid., pp.37, 38..
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In this vein, Arendt shows that society – and this may well be read as civil
society – is not necessarily a neutral force that represents the common good in the
political arena, but it follows its own rules and logics of (normalising) behaviour.
Arendt then goes on to argue that the conquering of the public realm by the social has
not only changed the former, but also the latter.35 Along those lines, one could argue
that the tendency of the social to deploy its “normalising” qualities has extended to the
public realm, which is then shaped by the current norms and values of (civil) society
and vice versa. If we claim that, indeed, civil society has become one of the central
agents within the public realm, this tells us a lot about the disciplinary potential of
specific forms of social relations. To a certain extent, this ties in with Foucault’s
approach to civil society, which looks at power dilemmas and the degree of domination
inherent in social structures.36 According to Foucault, civil society needs to be seen in
its historical context and thought about from the perspective of the local sphere, i.e.
from a bottom-up perspective.37 It can therefore be viewed as both the subject and agent
of various power structures as they inhabit the social sphere. This mode of thinking,
again, points to questions of agency, structure and power.
Generally, what has hardly ever been challenged is the idea that the central
manifestation of social agency is civil society. In this context, Meyer and Jepperson
remind us that “the modern actor” is a cultural construction of agency as it derives from
the cultural, legal and religious context of the West.38 Meyer and Jepperson claim that:
[t]he liberal model legitimates an actor (as self or an interest) as an abstract, rather
unsubstantial, entity in social space. It also constructs a standardized agent who
manages, elaborates, and standardizes that self, employing the latest cultural
recipes39
One may argue that the notion of autonomous agency is deeply rooted in liberal
thought, which has tended to emphasise the connection between agency and democracy
in terms of assuming that the most central actors in the public sphere are those that are
35 Ibid., p.43.
36 Bent Flyvbjerg, op. cit., pp.219 ff.
37 Ibid., p.227.
38 John W. Meyer. and Ronald L. Jepperson, “The “Actors” of Modern Society: The Cultural
Construction of Social Agency”, Sociological Theory, vol.18, no.1, 2000, pp.100-120, pp.101, 108.
39 John W. Meyer. and Ronald L. Jepperson, op. cit, p.109.
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part of liberal and democratic structures.40 Yet, this approach fails to view agency as
situated within a structural and relational environment, and it implies that civil society is
able to create the ideal conditions for democracy and, therefore, represents the central
location of agency in the public sphere.41
Against this background, civil society can be considered an incorporation of
liberal notions of agency in that it represents rationalised action as well as the
production of standardised agency, sometimes even control. In this context, it is
interesting to observe how civil society has gradually lost its connotation of freedom
(from the state) and has further been seen as (self–) limiting.42 This ties in with recent
debates with respect to development and participation, which have challenged the
assumption that participation is desirable by nature.43 On the contrary, it has been
contended that “participation can result in political co-option,”44 not only serving as an
instrument of power for diverse local actors, but also representing external interests in
terms of presenting those interests as based on local or community needs.45
Chandhoke has pointed out that, rather then representing independence and
emancipation from the political sphere in terms of voicing interests beyond the political,
civil society represents power struggles as they take place in the arena of the state and
the grassroots. Those dyamics in turn work according to the logics of the political
sphere.46 Referring to the work of Goffman, Kothari suggests:
The ‘front-stage’ is where performances are enacted in order for people to create
impressions in public life. The ‘back-stage’, on the other hand, is where unrehearsed
performances take place, those that are not intended for public consumption. Back-
stage performances constitute the dramas of everyday life and represent the work
that goes into the making of a front-stage performance.47
40 Cf. John Christman and Joel Anderson (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
41 Cf. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, Massachusetts: MIT, 1992.
42 Cf. Neera Chandhoke,"The 'Civil’ and the ’ Political’ in Civil Society", Democratization, vol. 8, no.2,
2001, pp.1-24, pp.1ff.
43 See Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds.), Participation: The New Tyranny?, London: Zed Books, 2001.
44 Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, “The Case for Participation as Tyranny”, in Cooke and Kothari,
Participation: The New Tyranny?, op. cit., pp.1-15, p.6.
45 David Mosse, “’People’s Knowledge’, Participation and Patronage: Operations and Representations in
Rural Development”, in Cooke and Kothari, Participation: The New Tyranny?, op. cit., pp.16-35, p.22.
46 Neera Chandhoke, op. cit., p.8.
47 Uma Kothari, “Power, Knowledge and Social Control in Participatory Development”, in Cooke and
Kothari, Participation: The New Tyranny?, op. cit., pp.139-152, pp.148f; referring to Erving Goffman,
“The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life”, in Charles Lemert and Ann Branaman (eds.), The Goffman
Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.
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However, the EU’s tendency (and indeed the tendency of numerous liberal
peacebuilding institutions) to merely focus on the front stage of public life reflects the
extent to which our understanding of agency has been restricted to a specific arena as
well as to a certain group of civil society actors, assuming that those will help connect
the social with the political and ‘civilise’ the latter.
Civil Society, Civility and Liberal Peacebuilding Agency?
Despite its inherent tensions, the development of the liberal peacebuilding
discourse has tended to put emphasis on the democratic potential inherent in civil
society developments. This is particularly evident in the context of Eastern Europe
where the transition to democratic structures and free market economies was ascribed to
the emergence of civil society and the liberal-democratic benefits of that.48 Rau
underlines that civil society has come to be defined by the following elements: an
individualist philosophy, the market as space for voluntary action, as well as pluralism
in terms of maintaining a competitive spirit in society.49 Thus, civil society comes to
serve as a countermovement to totalitarianism in Eastern European countries. Based on
the liberal notion that frames civil society as a force moving towards an open and
democratic form of society, neo-liberals have tried to free the concept from the state.
This is based on the assumption that a “proper” state (including a “proper” market) can
only be created with the help of a “proper” civil society, while at the same time
dichotomising state and (civil) society.50 In that sense, from a liberal perspective,
democracy, as the desired form of governance, has come to depend on civil society as a
sphere that counterbalances the power of the state.51 Again, this mirrors the extent to
which concepts of civil society have become associated with democratic and civic
values; thereby being constructed as the counterpart to totalitarian and patrimonial
48 Cf. Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, op. cit., p.5.
49 Zbigniew Rau, op. cit., pp. 4, 5.
50 Björn Beckman, “The Liberation of Civil Society: Neo-Liberal Ideology and Political Theory“, Review
of African Political Economy, no.58, 1993, pp. 20-33.
51 Kasfir, Nelson, “The conventional notion of civil society: a critique”, Commonwealth & Comparative
Politics, vol.36, no.2, 1998, pp.1-20, p.1.
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political systems as well as capable of making “progress” possible.52 This is in line with
Elias’s argument as to how Western society has gradually become “civilised” during the
course of history by increasingly exercising self-constraints as a reaction to growing
complexities in social structures.53 In that sense, ‘civilised agency’ has increasingly
been conflated with the organisational capacities of an actor, as well as its ability to
engage professionally in the spheres of politics and the market.
This is supported by Perez-Diaz’s call for a differentiation between civil and
uncivil voices in society,54 which brings back the debate about the idea of civility in
civil society as well as in social capital structures and dynamics, and hence mirrors the
normative dimension of those concepts. Evers, for instance, alludes to various forms of
incivility that he identifies in social interactions, such as a lack of mutual respect and
destructive behaviour.55 In this context, Dowley and Silver point out that ethnic
polarisation can be clearly reflected in social capital, which is especially the case in
post-communist countries, and, more generally, in societies in transition.56 They argue
that negative social capital can also be an obstacle to democratisation, especially if the
majority group(s) in a nation-building process are exclusive towards national
minorities.57 Barnes agrees, claiming that civil society can be “a factor in war as well as
a force for peace,” depending on how it is organised.58 This implies that action has to be
presented in a certain way to be recognised as agency in the peacebuilding context.
Only if actors dispose of professional internal structures that enable them to engage with
the bigger peacebuilding actors can their agency be recognised by the latter in the
peacebuilding context. Local agencies need to be visible in the public sphere, be able to
move within its boundaries and engage in their associated discourses if they hope to
52 Catherine Barnes, “Weaving the Web: Civil-Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building
Peace”, in Paul Van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema and Juliette Verhoeven (eds.), People
Building Peace II: Successful Stories Of Civil Society, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005, pp.7-24, p.8.
53 Elias Norbert, The civilizing process: The history of manners, and State formation and civilization,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, pp.47, 446.
54 Victor Perez-Diaz, "From Civil War to Civil Society: Social Capital in Spain from the 1930s to the
1990s”, in Robert D. Putnam (ed.), Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in
Contemporary Society, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002.
55 Adalbert Evers, “Observations on uncivility – Points of reference to blind spots in third sector
research.” A comment to the keynote address of Victor Pérez-Diaz at the ISTR / EMES World-Congress
at Barcelona July, 8 – 11, 2008.
56 Kathleen M. Dowley and Brian D Silver, “Social Capital, Ethnicity and Support for Democracy in the
Post Communist States”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol.54, no.4, 2002, pp.505-527.
57 Ibid., p.525.
58 Catherine Barnes, op. cit., p.9.
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represent meaningful agency from the perspectives of the larger peacebuilding
organisations such as the EU. This in turn requires not only specific strategies as they
relate to public diplomacy and certain media strategies, but also specific internal
structures, i.e. sub-departments that are able to cope with the complex demands donors
and sub-contractors may have on them. Yet if actors are unable or unwilling to situate
their actions in this organisational context, they are less likely to be recognised as
central peacebuilding actors, particularly from an EU point of view.
In this context, speaking about BiH more specifically, Belloni has suggested that
civil society mainly serves as a buzzword to externally–driven peacebuilding ambitions,
while implying that (‘uncivilised’) Bosnians have to undergo a civilisation process in
order to become trustworthy peacebuilding actors.59
Linking the necessity of framing peacebuilding agency in professional frames to
be recognised as valid partners to larger organisations and donors, to the instrumental
value of civil society actors, Kaldor suggests that the importance of civil society is
related to the centrality of the global sphere since 1989, with global civil society serving
as an answer to war and a vehicle for overcoming the gap between local civil societies
and the “uncivil” part of the world.60 She argues that, in its neo-liberal version, civil
society has been defined as laissez-faire politics and, equally, as a substitute for
supposedly negative state politics.61 Here, Howell and Pearce point to the increasing
Americanisation of the debate, in which civil society has become linked to ideas such as
liberty, equality, individuality and democracy.62 From a similar point of view,
Paffenholz and Spurk point to the historical nature of civil society concepts, arguing
that:
civil society has been an almost purely Western concept, historically tied
to the political emancipation of citizens from former feudalistic ties,
monarchy and the state during the 18th and 19th century.63
59 Roberto Belloni, “Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Journal of Peace
Research, vol.38, no.2, 2001, pp.163-180.
60 Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p.144.
61 Ibid., p.9.
62 Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce, Civil Society & Development. A Critical Exploration, Boulder, Colo;
London: L. Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp.43f.
63 Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, op. cit., p.4.
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Yet, despite the connectedness of the civil society discourse to Western
philosophical and political thought, civil society has come to be considered as
incorporating universalistic principles,64 with clear, even though contested, ideas about
what counts as “civil” or “uncivil” behaviour. According to Shils, this goes back to
Adam Ferguson’s reading of civil society, in which he celebrates a form of society
cultivating arts and letters as opposed to barbarous societies without such qualities.65
Against this background, Shils defines civil society as follows:
A civil society is a society of civility in the conduct of the members of the
society towards each other. Civility enters into conduct between individuals
and between individuals and the state; it regulates the conduct of
individuals towards society. It likewise regulates the relations of
collectivities towards each other, the relations between collectivities and
the state and the relations of individuals within the state.66
Consequently, as Lynch suggests, the neo-liberal approach to civil society with
its focus on civil, in terms of regulated and controlled behaviour, has led to neo-liberal
techniques of governance by neglecting the respective historical and social context of
the development of the concept.67 Liberalism has then, according to Hall and
Trentmann, used concepts of civil society as a product for exportation into colonies
where societies were constructed to become civil societies in the Western sense, as was
the case under British colonial rule in India.68 Indeed, numerous scholars have
suggested that this exportation of the civil society concept - based on the assumption
that its normative claims are universally valid - has marginalised indigenous and
traditional groups that are not part of this framework.69 In that sense, in liberal and neo-
liberal thought, civil society has increasingly been considered a legitimate actor in the
public sphere, thus serving as one of the main interlocutors for peacebuilding actors. It
has been assumed that a professionalised civil society can be controlled, governed and
“normalised,” while at the same time serving as a convenient partner for peacebuilders
to transform societies in a controlled way. The notion of civility has then served as a
64 Mary Kaldor, op. cit., p.16.
65 Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society”, Government and Opposition lecture delivered at the
Athenaeum Club on 22 January 1991, p.5.
66 Ibid., p.4.
67 Cecilia Lynch, “Reflexivity in Research on Civil Society: Constructivist Perspectives”, International
Studies Review, vol.10, 2008, pp.708-721.
68 John A. Hall and Frank Trentmann, op. cit., p.13.
69 Cf. Nelson Kasfir, op. cit.
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tool to narrow the definition of civil society, imposing a normative frame on it and
legitimising the exclusion of certain actors from that framework.
The following section will show how concepts of civil society have become part
of the liberal peacebuilding framework and how this has been used to develop
universalist approaches to dealing with conflict.
Peacebuilding and Civil Society
The Peacebuilding Framework
After the end of the Cold War, most conflicts were no longer viewed as taking
place between sovereign entities, but were rather seen to be based on ethnic conflicts
revolving around identities and needs, and which could not solely be explained by
reference to national power.70 These new kinds of conflicts turned out to be intractable
and deep-rooted, involving many actors from different levels.71 Due to the failure of
traditional approaches to peacemaking and peacekeeping, there was a need to develop a
new approach to dealing with the changed nature of conflict. It was against this
background that peacebuilding was introduced as a highly structured model for
addressing conflict. The techniques used for peacebuilding operations draw heavily on
conflict resolution tools that were developed as a reaction to the growing complexities
of conflict in the 1990s. This was accompanied by the inclusion of individual and social
features in approaches to dealing with conflict, as well as those connected to the need to
democratise peace negotiations and agreements vis-à-vis democratic publics.72
Emphasis came to be placed on relationships, social networks and individual
psychological processes that are supposed to be transformable by tools such as problem-
solving workshops, reconciliatory processes and dialogue projects.73 Since approaches
70 John W Burton, Global Conflict. The Domestic Sources of International Crisis, Brighton: Wheatsheaf,
1984, p.6.
71 Edward E. Azar, “Protracted International Conflicts: 10 Propositions”, in Edward E. Azar and John W
Burton (eds.), International Conflict Resolution, Brighton : Wheatsheaf, 1986, p.29.
72 Karin Aggestam, “Two-Track Diplomacy: Negotiations Between Israel and the PLO Through Open
and Secret Channels”, in Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne (eds.), Diplomacy. Vol III, London:
Sage, 2004, pp.203-227, p.210.
73 See, for instance, Ronald J. Fisher, “Social-Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict Analysis
and Reconciliation”, in Ho-Won Jeong (ed.), Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Processes and Structure,
Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999; Edward E Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and
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based on individual and social processes that are intended to address the very roots of a
conflict require an engagement with actors below the state level, civil society actors and
particularly non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are believed to be the
implementers of the conflict resolution agenda par excellence.74 This is linked to the
belief that solutions to contemporary conflicts require changes in economic, political
and social systems, with civil society actors being considered as capable of achieving
this.75 Indeed, Van Tongeren et al. point out that
in order to effectively prevent and resolve the violent conflicts of today,
all stakeholders, from the grassroots to the international levels, need to be
included in developing and implementing such strategies throughout the
entire conflict cycle.76
One of the central documents that attempts a definition of peacebuilding was
Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace in 1992.77 Not only does this document delineate the
boundaries between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but it also outlines
the latter as a long-term approach to working in post-conflict settings by addressing the
very root causes of violence and serving as “action to identify and support structures
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into
conflict.”78 This is based on the assumption that empowerment of the poor and
marginalised, coupled with the democratisation of the respective society in conflict, will
eventually lead to sustainable peace.79 Cousens describes the approach to conflict
outlined in Agenda for Peace as a linear one, given that peacebuilding is defined as a
post-conflict activity, and assumes that once conflict is overcome, international
assistance is a key factor to successful long-term settlement.80 In that sense, Doyle and
Sambanis suggest that the identification of the root causes of conflict, coupled with
Cases, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990; Andrew Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation. After the Violence,
Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner, 2001.
74 Oliver P. Richmond, Maintaining Order, Making Peace, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, 2002.
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international and local capacities, create the political space required for peacebuilding.81
The idea of not only managing, but rather resolving and transforming peace, as it has
been taken up by Agenda for Peace, is informed by Galtung’s idea of creating “positive
peace,” as opposed to “negative peace” that is characterised by the mere absence of
violence, yet has persisting structural and cultural violence.82 Lederach’s pyramid
model has certainly heavily influenced the ways in which both theorists and
practitioners view peacebuilding strategies, i.e. strategies of building “positive peace,”
by providing an analytical tool for looking at different levels of society.83 According to
this model, society can be broken down into the top-leadership level, the middle-range
leadership level and the grassroots-leadership level, all of which come to play an
important role in peacebuilding missions.84 Although paying attention to all of those
levels, Lederach shows a particular interest in grassroots dynamics with his idea of
building peace constituencies as a citizen-based form of peacemaking based on local
cultural resources.85 Boulding has taken this further with her book on Cultures of Peace,
in which she calls for the use of local capacities for peace in order to create a general
social climate of peacefulness.86 The need to include local people in conflict resolution
and peacebuilding via participatory governance was also voiced in the Carnegie Report
on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict.87 From this perspective, peacebuilding missions
claim the need for change and intervention into society in order to create structural,
bottom-up changes conducive to the emergence of sustainable peace.
Against this background, liberal ideas have been criticised for treating
peacebuilding as an “enormous experiment in social engineering” based on political and
economic liberalisation.88 Mac Ginty suggests that the liberal peace is exported in a
highly standardised form that is based on Western ideas, such as Disarmament,
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84 Ibid., esp. p.39.
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Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), civil
society capacity-building and marketisation,89 which Richmond refers to as the
“neoliberal marketisation of peace.”90
Peacebuilding concepts in both the policy world and academia have led to a
focus on societal rather than on state-centred approaches to creating peace. Civil society
has thus served as a concept that could be easily integrated into the liberal
peacebuilding framework, since its liberal tradition refers to the minimisation of
violence through the notion of civility as outlined above.91 At the same time, what
becomes obvious is that civil society has been represented as a clearly delimitable
element of the peacebuilding context, an independent tool of conflict transformation
that could be used to direct, govern and control the liberal peacebuilding process.
Against this background, the following section will show how the concept of civil
society came to be integrated within the liberal peacebuilding framework.
The Agency of Civil Society in the Liberal Peacebuilding Framework
The decade after the release of Agenda for Peace witnessed a quick increase in
the emergence of numerous non-state actors in conflict-ridden countries. The
combination of civil society and peacebuilding lent itself as a practicable tool for
international actors involved in peace missions, given that both concepts implicitly
assume universality of liberal values and the desirability of democratisation.92 Howell
and Pearce outline how the civil society discourse has emerged from the development
context and how it has come to act as an important tool for donors, such as the World
Bank, despite having an ambivalent relationship with the concept.93 It was in the 1980s
that the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) came to develop mechanisms of
cooperation with civil society actors, and which were institutionalised by the World
Bank’s creation of an NGO Unit in 1989 that had the aim of making the state more
effective by using civil society actors for specific policy purposes. In contrast, the
89 Roger Mac Ginty, “Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace”, Cooperation and Conflict,
vol.43, 2008, pp.139-163, p.144.
90 Oliver P Richmond, “The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding”, The
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91 Cf. Mary Kaldor, op. cit., pp. 3, 6.
92 Cf. Jude Howell and Jenny Pearce, op. cit,. p.23.
93 The following is drawn from Howell and Pearce pp.95 ff.
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UNDP has been more at ease with civil society, basing their approaches on community-
policies already in place the 1980s and, later on, focusing on NGO partnerships in order
to implement their policies.
In order to empower local communities and to build peace constituencies, NGOs
were given priority in this field. Using NGOs as policy partners started to become
fashionable amongst donors engaged in conflict zones, not least because they were
considered as having advantages regarding programme implementation compared with
other actors. NGOs have often been considered to be able to deliver social services and
welfare.94 As a general trend, donors came to emphasise the need for local ownership as
a way to strengthen local capacities for peace via co-operations and partnerships with
NGOs.95 In this context, Richmond argues that the idea of creating a “civil peace” that
aims to bypass state sovereignty has been conducive to a focus on NGOs in
peacebuilding.96 Indeed, the latter are increasingly viewed as crucial actors in crisis
situations and complex emergencies.97 This is not least due to their ability to
professionalise their strategies and policies as envisaged by a plethora of donors.
The growing donor emphasis on peacebuilding via civil society programmes is
mainly due to the influence of the conflict resolution toolkit, as it has been outlined
above. This is related to the perception that peacebuilding has to deal with relationships,
mechanisms, processes, institutions and authorities with the aim of developing local
capacities in order to improve and heal relationships at various levels.98 To have an
impact on social relationships, peacebuilders need to gain access to the local sphere,99
with civil society serving as a gateway to that sphere. In this context, Kaldor points to
the representative functions of civil society actors as they can serve as a medium
through which social contracts between individuals and the centres of power can be
94 Ibid., p.91.
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negotiated.100 This, in turn, reflects the degree to which civil society actors are
increasingly considered to be legitimate actors in peacebuilding missions. Local
ownership is a recurring phrase when it comes to implementing peace programmes in
various settings.101 This approach coincides with Edwards’s model of civil society as
the “good society” that represents the public sphere.102 Against this background, Doyle
and Sambanis call for an involvement of local actors specifically for higher-order
peacebuilding, arguing that:
The higher up we move in the spectrum of peace, the less we need
muscular third-party assistance and the more we need specialized peace
operations with a developed civilian component. Furthermore, enhancing
local capacities is more important for higher-order peacebuilding than for
lower-order peacebuilding, while reducing the depth of hostility factors is
more important for successful lower-order peacebuilding.103
The centrality of civil society involvement in peacebuilding operations is not
least a result of the realisation that various struggles for peace, which had focused on
negotiations at the elite level, did not manage to create sustainable peace. On this basis,
Yordán claims that the failure of the Dayton Peace Agreement in BiH is due to the fact
that it ignores grassroots potentials such as inter-ethnic dialogue and social
empowerment.104 As an alternative approach, the author suggests the inclusion of local
civil society and local needs, arguing that “the state and the international community
must pay attention to the demands of Bosnian citizens and act on their proposals, voiced
by the means of civil organizations or elections.”105 Doyle and Sambanis argue for the
definition of peacebuilding to be a “process of developing the indigenous capacities for
self-governance.”106
Yet Stewart observes that civil society and the state have become dichotomised
by both peacebuilding actors and donors, with the former being assumed to be able to
cure the ills caused by ethnic conflict and the state.107 Not only does such reasoning
100 Mary Kaldor, op. cit., pp.44, 45.
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neglect the fact that the functioning of civil society cannot be considered in isolation of
the state on which it is dependent,108 but it also develops a rather romantic image of
civil society actors, as a result of their plurality and civil values.109 This ties in with
discussions about which civil society actors are included and, more specifically, which
donors make those choices. In that sense, as Howell and Pearce argue, “civil society
becomes a technical instrument for the implementation of donor agendas.”110 At the
same time, as Young points out, civil society is often assumed to represent some form
of unity, while inherent cleavages and exclusionary tendencies tend to be ignored:111
there is a tendency to harmonise groups into a particular social order that fits the
interests of the dominant actors.112 Jenkins confirms this, arguing that the aid
community has taken up the idea of civil society “and fashioned it to suit its own unique
culture and purposes.”113 As a result of this and the fact that peace is subcontracted
mainly to NGOs, Richmond suggests that bottom-up peacebuilding techniques have
come to represent an international rather than local consensus.114
Despite the realisation that NGOs are only one element of civil society among
many,115 those organisations have become the cornerstones of international
peacebuilding and the main recipients of resources directed at conflict zones. This, in
turn, causes a conflation between NGOs and civil society actors in general, whereby the
former are believed to be representative of local society in general and thus able to
increase popular participation in development.116 Against this background, Pouligny
suggests that whenever external actors do not find Western civil society structures in the
society they engage in, then they tend to create those groups or, alternatively, try to find
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collectivities that can easily be labelled as such.117 Since NGOs generally come closest
to Western ideas of civility, Duffield suggests that those organisations have come to
reflect “the international predominance of neo-liberal thinking.”118 In this respect, the
contemporary neo-liberal discourse has tried to selectively combine elements from
different philosophical approaches to civil society and homogenised those elements into
a discourse that provides a definition for what can be considered “normal” and “civil” in
the neo-liberal framework.119 Yet, as Pugh suggests, although peacebuilding actors have
tried to transform civil society to make it compatible with their normative framework, it
is impossible to create trust and positive relationships in civil society from an external
stance.120 This is the background against which Duffield argues that NGOs embody “a
liberal problematic of power,” in terms of representing a liberal technology of
governing people.121
Through this approach, in which aid agencies create civil society according to
their own images and standards, and thus conflate society with civil society, subordinate
and uncomfortable groups are often seemingly disempowered.122 For instance, Croissant
et al. suggest that civil society has to have clear boundaries, only including those groups
that identify themselves with liberal values, peacefulness and tolerance.123 This leads to
large-scale exclusions of various local actors who are not compatible with the liberal
peace framework, while peacebuilders build new societies that include only the chosen
few civil society actors that conform to their preferences.124 Similarly, the
Westernisation of peacebuilding processes is illustrated by the fact that Northern NGOs
have, as it seems, gained predominance over local ones, and hence have the power to
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speak on behalf of the people on the ground.125 The connectedness of civil society
building to power is also problematised by Arato, who claims that the reconstruction of
civil society can be viewed “as a cover for a hidden motivation, namely the seizure of
state power.”126 According to Richmond, civil society actors in liberal peacebuilding
missions are only free to the degree to which they still remain within the liberal
framework and do not deviate from the standardised assumptions of the latter, while
uncomfortable local voices are marginalised.127 As far as the case of the EU is
concerned, Finke shows that civil society has become a central concept in the idea of
deliberative democracy – a process that is based on the input of various groups.128 Yet
at the same time it becomes clear that only those groups that are compatible with the
EU’s normative framework are included in EU deliberations. Given that the EU is,
amongst others, concerned with the liberalisation of economies, it has, according to
Arato, tended to reduce civil society to economic society and has focused on integrating
groups who are compatible with the neo-liberal marketisation model.129 Batliwala has
problematised the instrumentalisation of civil society according to donor preferences,
suggesting that global actors, such as Northern NGOs working in conflict zones, have
come to be identified as grassroots actors, associated with specific values and
policies.130 This is in line with Paffenholz’s and Spurk’s observation that civil society
makes attitude change possible and is hence a central element to peacebuilding as long
as it is “civil” in its values and characteristics.131
To recap: liberal peacebuilding is dependent on what it defines as professional
civil society actors, while it tends to exclude uncomfortable and supposedly “uncivil”
voices. The conceptualisation of agency is therefore mono-dimensional and focused on
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a narrow set of actors. The success after civil society discourse within the peacebuilding
context is due to a number of reasons.
First, although attention is given to local societies and local ownership, many
international peacebuilders’ notions of civil society tends to be selective and
romanticising. In order to keep control over more comfortable and easy-to-deal-with
voices, bottom-up mechanisms are institutionalised, but from the top-down, so that the
liberal-international can keep control over what it considers as (local) civil society. In
that sense, liberal peacebuilding is dependent on assimilating the local into its
framework instead of adapting the liberal peace to local settings and circumstances.
Civil society partnerships can be governed best given that they tend to follow liberal
prescriptions and norms instead of following their own goals and norms.
Second, civil society is often considered an independent factor in post-conflict
situations. This is based on the assumption that it can help transform a war-torn society
and, therefore, be a neutral partner through whom the international community can
implement their agendas. Civil society can, according to this discourse, help
“normalise” disrupted social structures, the creators of which in turn are deprived of
agency in an internationally created public sphere. Civil society tends to be portrayed as
a technical and more or less neutral tool in the imagination of many peacebuilding
actors, deprived of cultural particularities, but happy to adapt to the requirements of
peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Yet, the unwillingness to engage in the
cultural nuances of civil society or its dynamics and fluidities has been one of the main
points of criticism of liberal peacebuilding. Against this background, the following
section will shed light on the role of culture and the degree to which dominant actors
have tended to neglect the cultural context of peacebuilding as well as the potential of
culture to serve as a platform for agency.
Peacebuilding and Local Culture
The Degradation of Local Culture in Peacebuilding and Civil Society Programmes
As Richmond has suggested, liberal peacebuilding is based on the assumption
that there are universal values, which, once under threat, legitimise intervention by
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outside actors.132 As a result of this, there is a general lack of cultural awareness and
sensitivity for local dynamics in peacebuilding missions. Rather, various peacebuilding
actors assume that the inherent values and goals of their projects are necessary for
transforming a post-conflict context according to a certain set of rules. Richmond refers
to the culture-welfare paradox, arguing that there is a belief that peacebuilding can
occur without engagement in either of these areas.133 Whenever culture is taken into
account at all, this tends to be a rhetorical device to make peacebuilding policies appear
more legitimate.134 This, in turn, means that an engagement with local civil society and
its cultures is marginal at best.135 In this context, Deveaux criticises liberalism’s
exclusion of cultural groups and calls for a consideration of social practices and
places.136 Yet, civil society has come to be viewed as a tool of peacebuilding, and this is
based on the assumption that it is homogenous and constructed in opposition to what the
liberal peace considers as “backward” or “traditional”.137 This approach neglects the
degree to which society constitutes itself in the context of a specific culture and
considers “organizations formed along ethnic, kin, or clan principles as equivalent to
tradition and backwardness,” even though those may play an important role in achieving
social justice and equality.138 There seems to be an increasing awareness among donors
about this problem, given that the promotion of certain civil society actors and the
exclusion of others creates parallel societies and reduces the impact of peacebuilding
policies due to their failure to connect to society more broadly. Not only is there now a
tendency to increasingly fund economic actors, such as small and medium-sized
enterprises,139 but donor reports increasingly reflect an awareness of the potential lack
of representativeness of professionalised civil society actors. The UNDP, for instance,
recently produced a report entitled The Silent Majority Speaks, aimed at reaching
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beyond those actors who are vocal in the public sphere.140 This ties in with Fisher’s
observation that NGOs tend to embrace Western values and often consider local
conditions to be a problem that needs to be solved.141 In this context, Gray points to the
limits of importing the Western model of market socialism to post-communist states,142
while Rau describes the (re-)emergence of civil society in those countries as bound to
their respective historical and social circumstances.143 Hann argues that civil society is
generally not a useful category for describing societies in Eastern Europe as such an
approach is based on “errors in western diagnoses of the social conditions of late
socialist societies.”144 Indeed, since societal interests in many Eastern European
countries have historically been subordinated to the state, the concept of civil society in
that region is lacking in substantial value.145 Thus Seligman argues that:
[d]enied both civil and political rights during forty years of state
socialism, civil society is, for many in contemporary Eastern and East-
Central Europe, simply a model of civil and political citizenship that
never existed.146
By neglecting those and other local dynamics that can partly be attributed to the
respective cultural background, Pouligny suggests that peacebuilders have failed to
build on local existing resources and knowledge.147 Local culture is often referred to as
“backwards” and “traditional,” rather than seen as a foundation from which
peacebuilding can unfold.148
Yet, if we talk about local culture, what do we understand by it? What is it that
is missing in contemporary peacebuilding policies?
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Culture as an Ethnographic Concept
Culture has been defined in various ways and remains a highly contested
concept. Only recently has it become a core concept in the social sciences, with the
“Cultural Turn” acknowledging that it may represent a site of politics and power.149
Since culture is neither testable nor concretely tangible, it is impossible to draw a clear-
cut boundary around what it is. Yet although it cannot be defined, we still have to be
aware of the impact it has on people’s lives and vice versa.
It is generally observable that culture has increasingly become democratised in
terms of moving away from an idea of “high culture” towards anthropological ideas in
which culture includes daily life.150 Smith argues that culture is conducive to the
construction of identities to the same degree to which it is “a dialogic process through
which meanings are established and transformed.”151 This goes hand in hand with
Geertz’s interpretation of culture as various webs of significance that allow for a thick
description of people’s lives.152 This approach to culture has to take relationality into
account as “relationships among individuals within groups, among groups, and between
ideas and perspectives.”153 Yet such an ethnographic approach does not try to portray
culture as something discrete, stable or constant, but rather demonstrates that:
ideas and practices of globalizing modernity are appropriated and
reembedded in locally situated practices, giving rise to a plethora of
modernities through the assemblage of diverse cultural elements.154
Such a situational approach to local culture allows for the consideration of
locality as relational and contextual, expressed in “certain kinds of agency, sociality and
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reproducibility.”155 This is in line with Hann’s argument, calling for a more inclusive
usage of civil society, taking everyday experiences, beliefs and values of social life into
account.156 Indeed, a more ethnographic and inclusive usage of local culture – yet
without implying normative judgements about which culture is “more progressive” or
“backward” – would give the notion of civil society a new take and represent a major
challenge for peacebuilding operations. However, such an approach has so far been
neglected. Therefore, Said suggests that “only recently have Westerners become aware
that what they have to say about the history and the cultures of ‘subordinate’ peoples is
challengeable by the people themselves.”157
According to Haugerud, many development agency reports naturalise,
romanticise or homogenise the local.158 This is equally criticised by Badie who suggests
that the international community has developed pressures for a unified civil society
according to externals’ preferences,159 while societies are not only politically, but also
culturally, much more complex than what is often assumed. At the same time,
peacebuilding actors have assumed that local cultures are unsuitable for neo-liberal
strategies, so that the latter have come to be neglected and romanticised in their
diversity.160 Therefore, Mac Ginty calls for recognition of alternative and indigenous
approaches to peacebuilding, taking into consideration that peace is plural rather than
singular.161 This neglects the contested and fragmented nature of (local) culture – not
only of the local subjects of peacebuilding, but equally of the local of peacebuilding
actors themselves, such as the EU.
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Some Issues in Relation to Culture
As suggested above, taking local culture into consideration within the
framework of peacebuilding operations does not mean that it is easy to identify what the
“cultural” element within society is, given that it cannot be separated from social life of
which it is an essential part. Pouligny proposes that “the idea of ‘community’ contains
highly variable forms of organisation and mediation,” which makes it difficult to
recognise distinct elements of the cultural and social fabric.162 Deveaux confirms this,
arguing that conflicts over the legitimacy of customs and norms are quite common in
societies and are very likely to be related to interests, benefits and power.163 Haugerud
asserts that the local is constructed and potentially contradictory, so that each image of
representation only reflects a partial and subjective truth.164 This alludes to the slippery
nature of culture and its representation as a matter of social discourses and institutional
practices.165 Similar observations have led researchers, such as Kuran, to raise the issue
of “preference falsification,” defining culture as a sphere of power struggles and as a
potential “misrepresentation of desires under perceived social pressures.”166 The variety
of competing claims to represent local culture can then raise questions about whose
voices are heard and who may define “the community” or “the local” in development
and peacebuilding approaches.167 Again, this mirrors the complexity of local culture that
is produced by a variety of competing, conflictive and mutually reinforcing processes,
while “local subjects engage in the social activities of production, representation, and
reproduction,”168 which in turn brings in issues of authenticity: is authenticity possible
at all, or is it not rather a cultural construct of the West in itself, as part of a search for
authentic culture?169 Briggs asks what it is that constructs authenticity in discourses that
“invent” cultural traditions and how discursive authority is established when traditions
162 Béatrice Pouligny, op. cit., p.507.
163 Monique Deveaux, op. cit., p.784.
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are “invented”.170 This is linked to the question of whether there can be one single
source of cultural authenticity at all, or whether local culture is informed by various
sources of agency.171 Especially within groups, as Hobsbawm suggests, the invention of
traditions has served as a means for creating group cohesion, for legitimising
institutions and authority as well as for socialising people by inculcating beliefs and
values.172 This relates to Spencer’s observation that the creation of discrete cultures is a
political act173 and is connected to Haugerud’s perception that NGOs use local culture
as their source of legitimisation by claiming to represent the local.174 Such a strategy
(possibly deliberately) fails to take account of the complexity of local processes and the
variety of local voices, with processes of indigenisation being constituted by both
homogenising and heterogenising tendencies.175
Despite the complexities inherent in the local sphere, both domestic and
international actors in conflict zones tend to romanticise local cultures by ascribing
authenticity to one strand, instrumentalising a specific cultural discourse that fits into
their objectives.176 For this purpose, international peacebuilding discourses often
imagine culture as something discrete, bonded and unique.177 While researchers have
warned of dichotomising the local and the international, Spencer points out that the
interaction between those two spheres creates a new culture by fusing elements of
both.178 Hughes shows that authenticity can serve as a means of getting preferred access
to the local sphere for local elites in that national actors try to wrest power from
international actors through their claims to authentically represent their community.179
This, in turn, shows how identity is formed along the lines of people’s sense of locality
in competition with, in opposition to, and in line with international approaches to
170 Charles L. Briggs, “The Politics of Discursive Authority in Research on the "Invention of Tradition"“,
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peacebuilding.180 Due to those complex processes of identity and culture formation,
especially under the presence of various local and international peacebuilding actors, it
is hard, if not impossible, to define what local culture really is. Any definition would
certainly have to take processes of hybridity into account, which are often linked to an
instrumental way of using culture on both local and international sides. In these
processes, authenticity dissolves and becomes impossible. Yet, at the same time, this
points to the potential of culture to serve as a platform of agency. Actors decide from
their perspective and position in society which forms of identity and culture they
consider as their own as well as how they represent and imagine themselves. This
depends on what people’s idea of their cultural self actually is181 and to what extent
people want a custom preserved.182 This relates to questions of how cultures are
narrated, and for whose purposes, how groups present themselves and how that relates
to privileges and access to resources. The need to know local cultures and their logic is
thus an indispensable prerequisite in order to avoid failures in institution- and
peacebuilding processes from the onset. Such an understanding would require structures
that allow for genuine local participation in peacebuilding missions.183 At the same
time, it is important to be aware of the fluidities of culture, its dynamic nature and its
tendency to not necessarily conform to normative concepts such as state, city, or
community. This is due to its multidimensional character as well as to its relation to
identity, instrumentality, emotion and so forth.
Conclusion
This chapter has claimed that a professionalised version of civil society has been
considered a central actor in the public sphere. It has outlined the degree to which the
idea of civility has been woven into Western thinking about civil society and how this
180 Cf. Arjun Appadurai, op. cit., p.306.
181 Jevgenia Viktorova, “The Promise of Ethnography. Capturing the ‘local’ in violent conflict and
peacebuilding”, CPCS working paper, University of St Andrews, 2008, p.13, http://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/The%20Promise%20of%20Ethnography.pdf (accessed 02/06/11).
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has been taken up by the liberal peacebuilding framework in its attempts to transform
societies in a particular way. In that sense, a public sphere has been created that favours
a romanticised version of civil society as its main agent, assuming that peacebuilding
actors can use the support of civil society actors to implement their agendas of
transformation.
Civil society has equally served as a gateway for instilling certain values into
local societies, which are often considered as homogenous units that can be transformed
and/or co-opted by the peacebuilding framework. Societies are thus believed to be able
and willing to become Western, often individualistic, civil societies. At the same time,
local culture is taken into account rhetorically at best, while the “local” is often viewed
as backward and in need of social and cultural change. There seems to be a focus on
exporting Western values into conflict zones, with NGOs being given preference over
more diverse forms of social organisation. This, in turn, leads to a conflation of the
concept of civil society with society more generally, implying that civil society is an
actor that can be clearly delineated from other spheres of government and, thus,
encouraging the development of specific tools of engagement with civil society as a
gateway to the “local.” Yet, despite a growing awareness that civil society is not in all
cases legitimate nor representative of the society in question, only a small amount of
literature has been written about alternative forms of social organisation. This partly
relates to the fact that civil society represents an organised and accessible domain for
academics to research, as well as for policy-makers to work with, while more
fragmented, ad hoc collectivities are hard to research due to their lack of visibility in the
public sphere. Their ways of organising and internal logics often differ considerably
from those that Western civil society is familiar with, so their voices often remain
unheard – both in academia and in the world of policy. This can be attributed to a
tendency to look at what is visible and organised at the expense of what is subtle and
fragmented. Culture, both in the sense of everyday culture and high culture, can be
considered such a marker of subtle, fragmented existence that is hard to research, while
it still represents a crucial factor in the ways in which people view peacebuilding as well
as how it can be implemented locally. Against this background, it becomes clear that the
concept of agency in peacebuilding has often been simplified and reduced to one-
dimensional notions of civil society. Civil society has then been believed to reinforce
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peacebuilding frameworks and structures, based on the assumption of a professionalised
and normalising cultural background, while the nuances of power and agency have been
neglected. In addition, agency seems to have been isolated from its structural
environment in that it has been assumed that agency emerges from a white canvas rather
than from situational interaction with other actors. This is related to an implicit
assumption that identities are stable and coherent across subject fields, referring to who
a certain actor is in relation to the self, rather than to its interactive dynamics with its
environment. This is why we need to investigate more clearly how agency comes into
being, how it plays out in the peacebuilding context- even beyond what is visible and
what it means for the form of peace that is being created. This, in turn, requires a deeper
look into the processes during the course of which different actors, and here I mean
actors within and outside the civil society framework, subtly influence peacebuilding
operations through its different subfields.
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Chapter 3: A (Hi)story of the International
Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina
To give an overview of the context in which this thesis situates its approach, the
following section will focus on the involvement of the international community in BiH
throughout recent history. For this purpose, it will first look at international actors
engaged in the country before the war in 1992-5. Second, it will explore their strategies
of intervention during the war. Third, it will investigate the post-war peacebuilding
activities of the international community as they have developed in response to its
engagement in the Western Balkans.
While the first part focuses on international actors other than the European
Community (EC, later EU), the second part highlights the central role of the EC/EU in
Bosnian history to investigate how the EU’s approach to peacebuilding has developed
in cooperation and competition with other actors in the field as well as converging with,
or diverging from, the work of other actors within the international community.
Following an analysis of concrete EC/EU involvement in the Western Balkans in its
historical context, the EU’s normative principles and its specific approach to dealing
with local (civil) society will be explored. A brief assessment of EU peacebuilding will
conclude the chapter. This will shed light on the processes through which the EU has
been developing its priorities and values in its engagement in BiH as well as focusing
on civil society as an agent that the EU has considered key to engaging in the public
sphere.
The International Community in Bosnia (non-EC/EU)
Pre-War Engagement
BiH has a long history of international involvement and cannot be seen in isolation from
either its neighbours nor from various great powers on a global level. 184 Bosnian culture
184 For a general history of Bosnia, see Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, London: Pan, 2002 and
Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996. For a
more detailed cultural analysis, see Ivan Lovrenović, Bosnia: A Cultural History, New York, New York
University Press, 2001.
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and society have therefore always been hybrids of Eastern and Western influences,
shaped by the rule of different empires (Ottoman, Habsburg) and the associated flows of
migrants.185 Sahović points to the different elements that those influences brought to the 
country, suggesting that Turkish rule was mainly shaped by a tendency of withdrawal
from public life and repression, although this became more relaxed in the later stages of
Ottoman rule.186 In contrast, the Habsburg Empire was characterised by its ambitions to
modernise and ‘civilise’, while struggles emerged with respect to national identity and
the predominant ethnic nationalism.187 Sahović concludes that this concoction – viewed 
in relation to industrialisation processes in the 20th century that pushed society towards
a pattern of individualist social solidarity, and to the complex ruptures in Bosnian
history – led to a high degree of fatalism in society.188 Both World War I and II count as
such ruptures in terms of creating a climate of insecurity and a fear of external influence
among the population. Indeed, after the Serbs and Croats had been competing for
control over the country during the First World War, the First Yugoslav State was
established, which was marked by a strong dependence on, and pressure from,
Moscow.189 Again, World War II unwillingly involved Bosnia in the affairs of the
greater regional powers, with the country being annexed by the Croat fascist
Independent State of Croatia and the population suffering from atrocities committed by
the ustasha. At the same time, European countries exerted political pressure on
Yugoslavia when Germany and Italy invaded in 1941.
The fact that the country was tired of foreign dominance and governance became
evident when, after the emergence of Socialist Yugoslavia, Tito broke with Russia in
1948 to develop his own distinct model of socialism. In the context of the Cold War,
185 Lovrenović reflects on the constant influx of different powers and cultures on Bosnia (the Ottomans, 
Habsburgs, Spanish Jews, Slavs) looking at various spheres of life, such as literature, arts, intellectual and
philosophical strands of thinking etc. Due to the variety of influences, the author describes Bosnian
culture as a traditionally tolerant way of life: “To be Bosnian was to have a feeling for otherness.” See
Ivan Lovrenović, op. cit., p.209. Kostić tends to put emphasis on internal and external factors that have 
been a burden on the unity of Bosnia and the social consequences of this. See Roland Kostić, Ambivalent
Peace. External Peacebuilding, Threatened Identity and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Report/ Department of Peace and Conflict Research 78, Uppsala: 2007. Cviic points to the insecurity
created by the presence of various empires in the Balkans. See Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans,
London: Pinter, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995.
186 Dženan Sahović, Socio-Cultural Viability of International Intervention in War-Torn Societies. A Case
Study of Bosnia Herzegovina, Coronet Books Inc, 2008, p.133.
187 Ibid., p.133.
188 Ibid., p.133.
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this meant the expulsion from the Soviet Bloc, whereas Western powers started
considering Yugoslavia as a potential ally to be instrumentalised for their goals. This
represented the beginning of the provision of military and economic aid from the West,
and established a link to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through the
Balkan Pact with Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in 1953.190
Although, before and after the war, Yugoslavia was still an agrarian society,
based on egalitarian village communities and working classes submissive to state
power, the 1960s were shaped by market-oriented reforms and integration into the
international division of labour.191 It was thus part of global and regional economies and
developed its role in a bigger context. The World Bank started to get involved in the
region, which was deemed as strategically important in the balance of power game, so
the first World Bank loans were given out in 1951.192 Generally, during his rule and
particularly in the 1970s, Tito received a lot of support from Western states, which kept
the system going. At the same time, this strategy, appreciated by some, accused of its
repressive features by others, served to uphold the Western alliance. It was in 1981 that
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became deeply involved in Yugoslav politics,
approving the biggest IMF loan ever in order to tie the country more closely to the
Western financial system as well as attaching conditions relating to the creation of
market socialism and facilitating import liberalisations.193 Not only did those reforms
lead to the fragmentation of the country’s economic and political structures in terms of
countering the egalitarian features inherent in the centrally organised economic system,
but the constitution passed in 1974 had already reinforced centrifugal tendencies by
arranging for economic modernisation and political decentralisation. Combined with the
reforms imposed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), this led to a deep
transformation of societal structures. It was particularly in the 1980s that Yugoslavia
had to face huge obligations to Western donors, with the IMF calling for radical fiscal
190 Ibid., p.28.
191 Carl-Ulrik Schierup, “Memorandum for Modernity? Socialist Modernisers, Retraditionalisation and
the Rise of Ethnic Nationalism”, in Carl-Ulrik Schierup (ed.), Scramble for the Balkans: Nationalism,
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38.
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measures, while Western countries exerted pressure for further liberalisation and
decentralisation. This resulted in a growing gap between richer and poorer regions and
therefore undermined the development or maintenance of a common Yugoslav
identity.194 According to Likić-Brborić, this led to the macroeconomic transformation 
crisis in 1991/2, a period of privatisation with high restructuring costs and
unemployment,195 which can, amongst others, be viewed as one factor for the
accumulation of social grievances and finally the outbreak of fighting in Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The International Community During the War
When the war spilled over from Slovenia and Croatia to BiH in 1992, the international
community lacked a coherent position. Glenny points to the extent to which the
conflicting parties played the various actors of the international community off against
each other, claiming that the high extent of violence in the conflict was due to the
incoherent position of various European states which were not able to find a common
position.196
Generally, the role of the international community during the war can be seen as
a rather ambivalent one, shaped by two opposing tendencies. On the one hand, Cox
argues that the “dissolution of Yugoslavia posed the first substantial threat to European
public order in the post-Cold War era,” with European states – particularly those
struggling with centrifugal tendencies and a heterogeneous social structure themselves –
being afraid of the spill-over effects associated with ethnic separatism throughout the
Balkans and the possibility of the creation of an Islamic state within Europe.197 On the
other hand, the West’s geo-strategic interest in the Balkans had decreased after the end
of the Cold War,198 while “the complexity and localised nature of the conflict was a
194 Thanos Veremis, “The Balkans in transition and the great powers”, Eur View, vol.7, 2008, pp.121-128,
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major disincentive for close international engagement.”199 As a result, the interest of the
international community in the conflict was rather weak at the outbreak of the war, but
gradually increased when its proportions could no longer be easily assessed and
represented a potential danger to the stability of the wider region. This was
accompanied by increasing public pressure, particularly when the media started to
report the humanitarian consequences of the conflict. Various strategies for possible
international involvement were developed over the duration of the conflict with the EU
assuming a central role that will be explored in detail below.
It was mainly the United Nations (UN) that were criticised for the failure to put
an ending to open violence. Apart from the fact that its peacekeeping force, the United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), hardly managed to control Sarajevo airport,
and was a rather weak and powerless body, UN sanctions imposed on the conflicting
parties turned out to be inefficient, failing to have a substantial impact on the war and
even strengthening Milosević’s position, while weakening the Serbian opposition.200
Equally, NATO air presence did not prevent major incidents of violence, such as the
massacre of Srebrenica in 1995, which Malcolm refers to as the blackest moment of UN
involvement in Bosnia and a humanitarian disaster.201 Generally, international
engagement was hampered by tensions between the different external parties, with
major disagreements emerging between the UN and European countries,202 as well as
among European countries themselves. In this context, Glenny accuses the German
government of showing sympathy for Croatia and Slovenia in terms of selectively
recognising or encouraging parties’ actions, which in turn raises issues of moral
responsibility.203
Several attempts to find ceasefire agreements were made, but they were broken
as that they did not manage to respond to the demands of all parties involved. US
President Carter, for instance, had brokered an agreement in 1995, but this was
breached by the Serbs’ bombardment of Sarajevo so that the UN granted NATO
permission to launch an air strike in response. This reflects the extent to which the West
tended to treat the symptoms of the war rather than deal with its causes – treating the
199 Marcus Cox, op. cit., p.6.
200 Misha Glenny, op. cit., p.211.
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202 Marcus Cox, op. cit., p.6.
203 Misha Glenny, op. cit., pp.112, 188.
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conflict as a military rather than a political issue.204 It was only due to a high degree of
pressure from the United States (U.S.) that a final ceasefire was achieved in 1995,
resulting in the signing of the DPA, becoming the foundation upon which the
subsequent peace process was based.
International Approaches to Peacebuilding
Although the Dayton Peace Agreement was only achieved under pressure from the
West, and mainly the U.S., it was the first agreement signed by the leaders of all
conflicting parties and was successful in bringing about an end to direct violence and
fighting. The agreement equally served as the constitution for the new Bosnian state and
determined the political structure of the latter by dividing Bosnia into two entities,
namely the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (subdivided into ten cantons) and the
Republika Srpska, as well as the self-governing Brčko District. Not only did this create 
some degree of institutional confusion due to the necessity of different constitutional
arrangements for each entity and the federal state, but it also decentralised and
weakened the latter considerably, given that this seemed to be the only way to get the
conflicting parties to agree. In addition, due to their political arrangements that made
representation a question of ethnicity, the Dayton Peace Accords institutionalised ethnic
divisions. Meanwhile, the very roots of the conflict, such as the fears of the ‘other’
ethnicity – fuelled by politicians – coupled with a climate of economic and political
insecurity, remained unresolved.205 At the same time, Dayton served as a tool for
peacebuilding actors to implement various elements of the liberal peace, such as the free
market, the rule of law and democracy, which the international community took
responsibility of.206 The latter, represented by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)
and comprising 55 countries, assigned the main responsibility to the Office of the High
Representative (OHR) as the principal agency supervising the implementation of
Dayton, as well as to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
204 Noel Malcolm, op. cit., p.242.
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as the main supervisor of the democratisation agenda. This complemented the role of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in
1993 and tied in with the work of other international actors, such as the Implementation
Force (IFOR) as the main peacekeeping agency, the EU, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNDP, the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) and others. As the basis of the ensuing state-building agenda, those
international agencies took over sovereignty functions to govern Bosnia in a trusteeship-
style way207 with various parallel systems of governance.208
The peace agreement did not only consolidate international involvement in the
country, but equally became the basis for the integration of non-state actors in service
provision. Bartlett argues that the initial approach of international organisations after the
war was the idea of a “welfare mix” as a form of public and private service provision in
parallel, whereby many tasks were outsourced to NGOs, which partly led to inequalities
in resource distribution across the country.209 The elections supervised by the OSCE in
1996 turned out to be equally problematic. Failing to empower the moderates as hoped,
it strengthened nationalist parties and thus reflected the insecurity felt by people in the
war-torn country.210 This is mainly due to the fact that since the signing of the DPA,
ethnicity had become the main criterion of representation on all levels211 and was an
easily instrumentalisable tool for politicians to gain power by stoking fears among the
population and evoking wartime memories.
There emerged a realisation that, despite the presence of international actors, the
peacebuilding project seemed to be derailing and not going according to the ideas that
the peacebuilding actors had originally had in mind. This was often a result of cooption
of the peacebuilding project by local political leaders, so the international community
started to change its overall strategy. The OHR, which had until 1997 mainly focused
on the implementation of the DPA framework, subsequently started to engage in nation-
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building efforts with an increasing number of interventions into local politics.212 This
was made possible through the so-called Bonn Powers, which to this day allow the
OHR to veto legislation and to remove politicians from office should they appear to be
obstructing the overarching Dayton peace project.213 The increased power of the High
Representative has, however, been received with mixed feelings on the ground,
particularly under Paddy Ashdown, who used the Bonn Powers frequently to dismiss a
high number of local politicians. A particularly problematic incident took place in 2000
when the OHR rewrote legislation in Republika Srpska to reduce unemployment
benefits, which, in turn, reflects the market-oriented philosophy of the institution.214 It
equally mirrors the extent to which the free market, as opposed to the socialist system,
is viewed as a place for reconciliation within the neo-liberal project.215 In this context,
the IFIs have increasingly been pushing for market liberalisation and the privatisation of
formerly state-owned enterprises.
In contrast to that, the OSCE has adopted a less economically-oriented approach,
concentrating on the pillars of democratisation, education, human rights and security
cooperation.216 The organisation has been trying to shift their strategy towards
grassroots approaches, particularly with their electoral programme designed to support
those opposition parties it sees as most promising, while identifying “potential
transitional parties which could contribute to creating enough of an opening in the
political environment for more grass-roots alternatives to emerge.”217 A number of
organisations and donors, such as the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) or the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
(SIDA), have pursued minority return programmes to push reconciliation on a local
level. However, most of those programmes failed due to the high degree of physical and
economic insecurity experienced by minorities in areas where they no longer feel
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welcome.218 Even in areas in which refugee return was high, this did not always
represent sustainable reconciliation in the long run, since people often only returned to
sell their houses and then moved on to an area where they would not be a minority.
Belloni, however, refers to Prijedor as one of the more successful examples of refugee
return as a result of moderate local forces and the facilitation of the process by
international activism.219
There are still many other issues that trouble Bosnian society and that have not
been resolved by the international community despite their rather high ambitions.220
Unemployment remains high, although there are no clear figures available due to
difficulties relating to the quantification of the size of the grey and black markets. Even
though the World Bank and other agencies have addressed this, job creation is limited
and poverty remains a big issue in BiH, and particularly in RS, mainly due to the lack of
a social welfare system that is accessible to all.221 Schools are still ethnically divided so
that contact between different ethnic groups is impeded from an early stage. Moreover,
issues often instrumentalised by politicians to mobilise public support are related to
unresolved problems with respect to property rights and social mobility within BiH.
Finally, the fact that public trust in political institutions and actors is very low and
organised crime remains a big problem, contributes to a climate of fear and human
insecurity. Thus, public discourses about a possible resurgence of violence have been
intensifying, it seems, in the last few years. Not only among the population, but also
within the international community, there seems to be a growing fear of renewed
violence as a result of the failure of peacebuilding policies. The latter have, according to
Belloni, had an emphasis on stability and the preservation of the status quo, and have
thus not managed to respond to the challenges in social, economic and political
spheres.222
218 Ibid., p.29.
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222 Roberto Belloni, State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, London; New York:
Routledge, 2007, p.5.
48
This is not to argue that the international community (certainly only to the extent
that one can speak of a community with its partially competing approaches) is not aware
of those problems. Indeed, many reports and institutional documentation show
awareness of them, but they tend to shy away from the difficulties associated with
tackling those rather socially sensitive problems. As a result, one can observe a
tendency to subcontract those tasks to NGOs, which have created a new political space
in the country – a competitive, market-like sphere – where organisations compete for
international funding. Organisational forms active in BiH range from ad hoc social
movements to internationally-directed NGOs, with the latter having much better access
to resources due to their privileged access to funding and closeness to the policy
agendas of various international actors. Indeed, numerous NGOs have become
instruments for the implementation of donors’ agendas and can thus not be considered
in isolation of financially strong donors outside BiH, the IFIs, the UN, EU, Western
foundations, and regional actors. On the other hand, the degree to which those NGOs
are (not) free to deviate from the policies of their donors varies depending on a number
of factors, such as the conditions imposed by the respective donor, the standing of the
NGO itself, its strategies of circumventing donor requirements in subtle ways, the
general peacebuilding environment and so forth.
Against the background of the involvement of the international community in
post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following paragraph will outline the EU’s approach
to peacebuilding, which has come to take on considerable relevance for politics and
society in the country. It has been suggested that, despite its potential to develop its own
distinct approach to peacebuilding, the EU has tended to replicate what is referred to as
the (neo–) liberal peace and, despite a more ambitious goals, it has often reproduced the
failures of the international community more generally.223
223 Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler, "The Emerging EU Peacebuilding
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EC/EU Engagement in BiH
The European Community in Pre-War Yugoslavia
It was not only during and after the war that the European Community (EC) started to
engage in the Western Balkans. Due to geo-strategic concerns about negative spillovers
from geographically close countries, European states had already become involved in
Yugoslav politics in the mid-70s. Cviic points to the considerable financial clout of the
EU in the region as a result of the “relationship with communist-ruled Eastern Europe
ever since its recognition by the Soviet Union.”224 The relationship between the EC and
Yugoslavia got even closer when Tito’s regime was granted Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) concessions to move towards market liberalising reforms.225
A further step towards cooperation with the former Yugoslav countries was the
creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Although
the bank is not an institution within the EC/EU framework, its goals were closely
related to the EC’s interests in the region, namely the restructuring of Eastern Europe
and its integration into Western European financial structures. The bank introduced the
idea of conditional lending to BiH, but was still much more relaxed in the application of
conditionalities than the EU’s follow-on projects such as Pologne Hongarie Assistance
à la Reconstruction des Economies (PHARE) – a regional programme mainly focused
on development assistance – or Community Assistance to Reconstruction, Development
and Stabilisation (CARDS), which put emphasis on political reconstruction and reform.
However, issues that were later on taken up by the EU in BiH had been addressed by
the EBRD already, such as multiparty democracy, pluralism, and market economics.226
This was complemented by the approach of the Council of Europe Development Bank
(CEDB) through the provision of long-term loans for social projects related to issues of
refugees, displaced persons, social housing, job creation as well as environmental and
educational projects.227 Such programmes were also, even though rather indirectly,
believed to have a conflict-preventing dimension in terms of addressing social issues
and linking them to financial incentive systems. However, they largely failed to connect
224 Christopher Cviic, op. cit., p.107.
225 Ibid., p.110.
226 Cf. William Bartlett, op. cit., p.174.
227 Ibid., p.174.
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to a society shaped by its distinct socialist past and complex political structures,
reflecting the degree to which EU engagement in the Western Balkans has always been
driven – to a greater or lesser extent – by concerns centring on the goals of the EU itself,
such as stability and security. At the same time, the focus on the EC’s own interests
created a certain distance to the society in which those policy programmes were
implemented, so Schierup claims that EC assistance and the associated conditionalities
even represented a factor leading to conflict in terms of creating ”abnormality” by
exacerbating poverty and violence through structural adjustment programmes.228 This
has to be seen in connection with the approaches of other international actors, and most
notably the IFIs, which were pushing for reforms of the market system. In the light of
the EU’s attempts to democratise the Western Balkans in general, Schierup further
argues that “if elections are held in conditions of ‘abnormality’, they are likely to
reproduce and legitimise current authoritarian power structures,” while the introduction
of free markets can worsen poverty and unemployment, thus reinforcing conflict lines in
society.229 The breakout of the war can, thus, not be viewed in isolation from the
policies of transformation in the region, which the EU has been pursuing in competition
and cooperation with other actors in the field.
The EU During the War
In contrast to the attitude of the international community in general, the EC had made
clear from the outbreak of the war in Slovenia that it was going to adopt a high-profile
role with the ambition to even outplay the UN and other regional actors.230 This resulted
in the Brioni Accords, mainly negotiated by EC diplomats and initiating a ceasefire,
which, however, did not mark an end to the conflict in the region. Similarly, despite its
228 Carl-Ulrik Schierup, “The Spectre of Balkanism: Globalisation, Fragmentation, and the Enigma of
Reconstruction in Post-Communist Society”, in Carl-Ulrik Schierup (ed.), Scramble for the Balkans:
Nationalism, Globalism and the Political Economy of Reconstruction, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999,
pp.1-31, p.18.
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Conflict, New York: W.W. Norton, 2000.
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ambitions, the EC’s involvement in the Bosnian war cannot be considered a purely
beneficial one, particularly against the background that the war persisted for three years
without the EC being able to bring about a solution or at least a ceasefire to stop the
fighting and violence.
The main problem, as it is often argued, was the EU’s lack of a coherent
position. Some accuse the EU of exacerbating the repercussions of the conflict by
selectively supporting actors and failing to develop a clear strategy of ending the war.
This is linked to the criticism that in 1992, the EC started becoming part of the conflict
by recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, which became a major issue
in the succeeding fighting. When the war reached BiH, culminating in the siege of
Sarajevo in 1992, the EC called for a referendum for self-determination as an attempt to
bring more clarity into the rather troublesome political situation in the Western Balkans.
Not only did this referendum fail to calm the situation – instead it increased social
polarity – but even the Vance-Owen Plan, which envisaged a decentralised Bosnian
state based on strong provinces, did not find consensus on the ground, being rejected by
the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosniaks rejected a later approach, the Owen-Stoltenberg
proposal, which envisaged a union of the three ethno-national republics, because they
perceived it as too generous to the Bosnian Serbs. So, the proposal, too, failed to win
broad support among the population. These approaches, albeit well intended, mirror the
lack of communication between the EC, or the international community in general, and
local conflicting parties in the very early stages of peacemaking. Therefore, the failure
of those proposals can be traced back to the fact that they did not respond to the needs
and positions of all parties involved, while the suggested settlements tended to be based
on an institutional approach similar to the ways in which the EC experienced and
created its own history. The Bosnian war, however, made it clear that such solutions did
not necessarily work in a different context.
EU Post-Conflict Involvement in Bosnia
It took several years until the war could be ended through the signing of the DPA,
establishing the basis for post-conflict international intervention in BiH and vaguely
defining the role of the EU in the bigger peacebuilding project. Not only did it establish
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the constitutional framework for the Bosnian state, but it also established corresponding
institutions, such as the OHR and the European Union Special Representative (EUSR).
Direct EC involvement after Dayton started in 1996 with the provision of non-
humanitarian assistance through the PHARE programme and the EU support
programme for the rebuilding of Bosnia, Croatia and FYROM (Macedonia) (OBNOVA)
providing for trade preferences with the EU. Both programmes aimed at the provision
of emergency aid and represented an important step towards the construction of a liberal
state through various measures of institution-building. It was in 1997 that the EU’s
regional approach to peacebuilding concretely established political and economic
conditionality with the aim of infrastructure reconstruction and institution-building, in
cooperation with other international actors engaged in BiH.
From then on, the EU increasingly put emphasis on reconstructing the Bosnian
state with the aim of eventually making it compatible with EU standards. Institution-
building, economic reform, social cohesion and development became the cornerstones
of the EU’s involvement in the Western Balkans between 1998 and 2000.231 The
connectedness of the EU’s peacebuilding efforts to the harmonisation with the acquis
and eventual accession became evident in the EU’s subsequent proposal of initiating a
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for South-Eastern Europe in 1999, which
was officially endorsed a year later. This represented the period in which the EU mainly
engaged with the political elites of the country, since they were assumed to be the
central actors in the fields of engagement outlined above, a tendency that is, to a large
extent, still prevailing today. At the same time, the EU tried to make sure not to lose
control over the state-building process. When CARDS was launched in 2001 to promote
political reconstruction and reform, a huge political space was opened for further
conditions to be defined by the EU. Those conditions were mostly general, and hence
open to interpretation, in order to give the European Commission232 the possibility to
adjust according to context over time and space. However, some policy areas remained
free from conditionalities, such as financial assistance programmes, civil society,
education, and significant parts of institution-building that were supposed to be treated
231 European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006”,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/bosnia_country_strategy_en.p
df (accessed 03/06/11).
232 From here onwards also referred to as the “Commission”.
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with greater flexibility.233 In that respect, the CARDS approach represented a tool for
the Commission to experiment with different ways of bringing BiH towards the acquis.
In addition to its incentive systems, the EU has embarked on local trusteeship
projects taking over governance functions on the local and communal level; for
instance, appointing a European Union Administrator in Mostar. This project turned out
to be a failure in that it managed neither to establish a joint city administration nor to
establish an adequate refugee return mechanism to counter the ethnic division of the
city.234 Again, this reflects a lack of communication with the Bosnian people who had
rather high expectations to EU policies, yet came to be disappointed by the EU’s failure
to bring about visible results.
Generally, all these approaches can be seen in relation to the physical proximity
of the Western Balkans to the EU’s borders, which means that, for the EU, the Balkans
are “as much a domestic as a foreign policy issue.”235 This also explains the increasing
degree of EU involvement, partly to secure the security within the EU by stabilising its
peripheries and border regions. Indeed, the 2003 Security Strategy of the Council of the
European Union represents an attempt to create a stable and secure neighbourhood.236
This is particularly evident in the following statement of the Council of the European
Union: “Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling
the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of
dealing with organised crime within the EU.”237 Again, it becomes obvious how much
EU peacebuilding goes back to the EU’s own goals rather than to concerns for Bosnian
society.
To deepen the EU’s involvement in the Western Balkans, the Thessaloniki
Summit (2003) confirmed the SAP as an official policy for the Western Balkans. The
EU emphasised the strategic importance of the region moving closer to the EU and its
standards with respect to democracy, institutional capacities, the rule of law and
economic development, all of which were considered as necessary preconditions for the
233 William Bartlett, op. cit., p.201.
234 Marcus Cox, op. cit., p.19.
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creation of a stable neighbourhood.238 The Thessaloniki Summit was followed by the
Commission’s Feasibility Study to define 16 priority areas in need of improvement,
with the Commission concluding that negotiations should start once BiH would have
made progress on those priority areas.239 The main conditions underlined in this study
relate to the compliance with the standards set by the international community in Bosnia
(e.g. the ICTY, Council of Europe), the building of effective state institutions, the fight
against organised crime, the creation of a single economic space as well as media
reform.240 This is in line with the most common prescriptions of the (neo-)liberal peace
that aim to build an effective state supported by a free market, but at the same time
shows little consideration for the challenges that non-EU countries might face. In BiH,
this relates particularly to the socialist past of the region, combined with a rather
decentralised political system, which changes considerably the ways in which
peacebuilding policies translate into the context of implementation. Yet, deploying a
variety of peace- and state-building tools to facilitate eventual accession, the
Commission approved the first European Partnership for BiH in 2004.241 This
represents another soft-power tool by the EU to bring potential membership candidates
in line with the acquis and is, in combination with the SAP, a powerful mechanism for
the transformation of countries ambitious to become membership candidates, even
though it is less binding than the application of conditionalities.
The fact that, despite following the general lines of the international community
in BiH, the EU has developed an approach to peacebuilding that is somewhat different
from the UN’s and NATO’s became evident with the replacement of the Stabilisation
Force (SFOR) by the European Union Force (EUFOR) in 2004, which represented a
move towards a broader security focus. This is related to the development of the
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as the military component of EU
engagement in its neighbourhood.242 In contrast to SFOR, EUFOR was designed to
respond to increased security challenges beyond hard-core state security, such as
238 cf.
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weapons smuggling, religious extremism or war criminality.243 The EUFOR mission
has also shown concern with “providing a safe and secure environment,”244 with a
favourable security framework being considered as the precondition for the creation of
sustainable peace. At the same time, this reflects a new division of labour between
NATO and the EU, with the latter taking responsibility for police reform, border and
internal security.245 It symbolised another step towards the opening of negotiations for a
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) on the road to EU membership, which
was initialled in 2007.
The Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), signed in 2008, was then
considered to be the final facilitator of BiH’s move towards becoming a candidate for
EU membership. The IPA aims to give targeted assistance to the reform of specific
sectors, mainly related to transition assistance and institution-building, as well as
regional and cross-border cooperation.246 It can therefore be considered as a tool to be
implemented by the EU in BiH to eventually help the country become a candidate for
membership, adopting similar norms and standards as the current EU member states.
For that purpose, the European Union has a strong presence in BiH. Apart from its
security presence in the form of EUFOR, as outlined above, the European Union Police
Mission (EUPM), launched in 2003, has played a dominant role in the attempt to reform
of the ethnically divided police forces of the country. The integration into one single
police force has, in turn, been made a cornerstone and condition for further accession
negotiations in the framework of the SAA, while the EUPM was assigned the task of
facilitating this process.247 More generally speaking, the Commission can be viewed as
a key player, influencing police reform mainly through the SAP as a “framework for the
delivery of assistance to and the imposition of conditionality,” with police reform being
a major element of EU accession negotiations.248 Here, the EUPM reflects the EU’s
rather “state-centric law-and-order approach” by using the police force as an engine for
243 International Crisis Group, “EUFOR: Changing Bosnia’s Security Arrangements”, Europe Briefing
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democratisation and the rule of law to move BiH further towards EU membership.249
The aim of creating a European-like state supported by a society of which ‘problematic’
elements have been removed, is equally evident in this approach, aspiring to remove
any war-related relicts.
On a more abstract level, the mandate of the EUSR complements the push
towards the acquis in terms of coordinating policy processes and institutional
mechanisms on the ground to deter potential ‘spoilers’ of the peacebuilding process.250
In his double-hatted function that makes him the High Representative at the same time,
the EUSR can exercise considerable power through his capacity to network and
coordinate various institutions and actors involved in Bosnian politics, peacebuilding,
and statebuilding. He is, therefore, in the position to shape the direction in which the
country is going, mainly on an institutional level, but also on a societal, economic and
political level. At the same time, the physical proximity of the EUSR and the OHR251
explains why the approach of the EUSR differs considerably from the one of the
Commission, but is much more comparable to the work of the High Representative.
The Underlying Normative Principles of EU Peacebuilding in Bosnia
When talking about EU peacebuilding, the question arises to what extent the EU can be
considered to be a peacebuilding actor at all. The EU has a long and contested history of
peace and peacebuilding, particularly in relation to its internal developments and
processes.252 In this context, peacebuilding refers to the comprehensive package of
measures, often designed and implemented by international actors in post-conflict
zones.253 Tocci has put emphasis on the EU’s policies in relation to conflict resolution
and transformation through specific forms of engagement with civil society actors in
249 Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaité, “Power / Knowledge in International Peacebuilding: The
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(post-)conflict zones.254 This, however, remains vague and raises the question as to
whether the EU as a peacebuilding actor is mainly a theoretical abstraction, with such
discourses being established in academic circles, or whether peace can be seen as a
central goal of the EU and its policies, specifically in its very neighbourhood. In this
context, EU documents seem to give evidence for the latter, for instance when the
Council of the European Union claims that:
[t]he European Union remained a leading contributor to peace and stability across the globe. Its
wide array of instruments allowed it to effectively map the risks, the rising tensions and fragile
situations, and apply adequate tools to respond to them.255
In addition, the Lisbon Treaty specifically emphasises the importance for the EU to
engage in the field of peacebuilding in the context of its external relations to:
[…] preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki
Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external
borders.256
On the other hand, an EU official has argued that the EU is not really engaged in peace
and peacebuilding, the latter being considered a secondary goal, which can only be
found between the lines of its approaches. In this context, the EU is viewed as capable
of supporting and assisting with major challenges occurring specifically in post-conflict
countries, rather than acting as a peacebuilding actor in the first place.257
Specifically in the Western Balkans, the question of whether the EU engages in
peacebuilding, or rather member-state building in its own interest, or both, is highly
relevant, given that its perception among the people influences how EU policies are
communicated to the people and actors in the region. Is the EU presenting itself as a
peace actor or as focused on enlargement and the implementation of its own
conditionalities? This has to be seen against a background in which EU enlargement is
not just a technical dimension of EU policy, but relates to the fears and hopes of the
people in the region, particularly with respect to visa issues and economic expectations.
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The Commission remains vague in addressing this issue, claiming that “[w]e are a
family of democratic European countries committed to working together for peace and
freedom, prosperity and social justice.”258 However, whether those values, including
peace, are in the first place viewed as values to preserve for the current members of the
EU by creating a ‘friendly’ neighbourhood, or whether these norms are also designed to
meet the needs of the neighbours per se, remains unclear. The SAP claims to put
peacebuilding first, with the Council of the European Union claiming that its main aim
is to promote peace and reconciliation by using regional cooperation, the promotion of
good neighbourly relations and good governance as the main incentives and engines to
do so.259 In contrast, the Commission’s Progress Reports on the Western Balkans reflect
a much lower concern with peacebuilding in favour of an emphasis on thematic issues
ranging from human rights issues to economic liberalisation, border security to the fight
against criminality and corruption.260 This, in turn, mirrors the Commission’s self-
understanding as a technical body rather than a political one261 whose concern is with
implementing the acquis rather than politicising the nature of peace and peacebuilding.
The fact that different EU bodies have different emphases on the importance of
peacebuilding vis-à-vis other policies, such as the creation of a stable neighbourhood,
reflects the problems associated with classifying the EU as a single, coherent actor.
There are very clearly differences and conflicts between the approaches and ideas of the
different institutional sub-bodies that are meant to be complementing each other. This,
in turn, does not mean that there are no common ideas and threads running through
policies of the European Union with regards to the Western Balkans. Specifically, when
taking a bottom-up perspective, the EU is often perceived as one single actor. This
perception is mainly shaped by the Commission’s communications, given that it
represents the most visible actor in BiH. As a result, one can argue that, despite being
composed of a number of diverse institutions, actors and ideas, on the ground the EU as
is often referred to as a unitary actor – this is mainly due to the way it tends to present
itself. In fact, most documents and policy reports, mainly published by, funded by or in
258 European Commission, Understanding Enlargement. The European Union’s enlargement policy,
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cooperation with the Commission, refer to the European Union as a unitary actor with
certain values and standards, which BiH is supposed to adopt. Against this background
and despite its inherent plurality of visions, one can speak of some common features
running through EU policies. The norms that shape the EU’s attitude towards
peacebuilding are continuously developed and can therefore never be clearly delineated.
It has been argued that such values are emerging in a nascent EU Peacebuilding
Framework (EUPF), which reassembles norms merging towards a normative
development of an EU foreign policy.262 The different EU agencies can then be seen as
harmonising in their pursuit of becoming a force for good.263
As a result, the EU’s post-conflict engagement in BiH has to be seen in the context of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established with the
Maastricht Treaty. Its main goals range from strengthening the security of the EU to
international co-operation to the promotion of the EU’s core values, such as democracy,
the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.264 In this context,
Bono points to the CFSP’s nature as “a set of legal rules, institutional structures, and
financial, human, and knowledge-based resources, influenced by competing norms and
interests, that allow Member States to partly coordinate their foreign, security, and
defence policies.”265 The search for peace in the former Yugoslav states can be viewed
as a first test of a still embryonic CFSP,266 with peacebuilding experiences in the region
contributing to the further development of EU peacebuilding strategies in other
neighbouring countries.
Against this background, the policy approaches outlined above mirror the extent
to which the EU has developed its own normative version of peace and peacebuilding in
the region. This is not only based on the post-war experience of its members, but also
on an attempt to mimic the peacebuilding project of the UN and the IFIs that relies
heavily on the idea of imposing specific forms of governance and institutions to govern
and of adjusting those who deviate from this blueprint. On the one hand, this is reflected
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by the strong focus on institutions in terms of building-mechanisms that represent a
concoction of what is understood as Western European ways of dealing with social
conflict and negotiation. On the other hand, there is a strong reliance on the use of
conditionalities when it comes to negotiations about membership-candidate status. In
this context, the Commission puts specific emphasis on the promotion of the rule of
law, democratic and stable institutions and the transformation of the formerly socialist
economic system into a market economy. At the same time, the failure of some reforms
and the need to adjust others to local particularities have been conducive to the use of
rather flexible conditions, depending on the country’s progress within the SAP.267 With
this approach, the EU is trying to gradually manoeuvre BiH towards a specific political
and economic structure by using the carrot of membership as its main incentive for
people, particularly local elites, to cooperate with EU institutions and requirements.
This very clearly mirrors the Commission’s strategy to integrate Bosnia-Herzegovina
“into the economic and political mainstream of Europe” with the help of the SAP.268
Again, the EU’s ambitions to transform the countries of the Balkans in terms of making
them suitable and secure candidates for EU membership is the central goal of the EU,
which tends to measure its own power against its ability to do so. 269
The liberal colouring of this approach is evident in such policies, implying that
Europeanisation, i.e. the resolution of the conflict through European standards, values
and institutions, necessarily means progress in terms of becoming liberal, or even neo-
liberal.270 The EU hopes “that increasingly transparent economic liberalization will
itself eventually remedy the early abuse, by opening up competition and squeezing out
those entrepreneurs who have no managerial talents beyond extortion.”271 This
approach, fusing liberal with neo-liberal policies, reflects the belief in the EU’s ability
to bring about reconciliation with its peacebuilding and statebuilding framework, which
is closely related to the notion of the possibility of conflict resolution and of
267 European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006”, op. cit., p.4.
268 Ibid.
269 Cf. EPC Working Paper No.31, “The Balkans in Europe: containment or transformation? Twelve ideas
for action”, Task Force EU Integration & Citizenship Programme, June 2008. Rapporteur: Rosa Balfour,
p.15.
270 For a more nuanced discussion on the topic of Europeanisation, see for instance Heinz-Jürgen Axt,
“Cyprus: Conflict Resolution through Europeanization? Most Recent Experiences and Perspectives”, The
Cyprus Review, vol.21, no.2, 2009, pp.69-89. See also Alun Jones and Julian Clark, “Europeanisation
and Discourse Building: The European Commission, European Narratives and European Neighbourhood
Policy”, Geopolitics, vol.13, no.3, 2008, pp.545-571.
271 Elizabeth Pond, op. cit., p.254.
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transforming the structural roots of conflict.272 The normative agenda of the EU
becomes clear in that it builds on its own history of reconciliation through economic
and political integration, from the basis of which its peacebuilding framework, the
EUPF, is gradually emerging.273 This is not to argue that this framework is a coherent
and stable construction, but rather to claim that the way in which national policies of
member states merge and produce something new cannot be separated from the EU’s
history. A fragmented approach slowly emerges, which tends to comply with the central
components of the liberal peace, aiming at the creation of liberal, ‘peaceful’ states in the
European neighbourhood. Ideas about how this can be achieved are still disputed within
the EU and tend to be deployed competitively, particularly when EU members have
their own actors and strategies in the respective region or country. At the same time, the
EUPF competes with institutions such as the UN or the IFIs, while equally representing
a continuation or even extension of their policies. Juncos argues that in the search of its
distinctive peacebuilding framework in Bosnia-Herzegovina, “the EU is building a new
identity as a regional normative power,” mainly understanding its own role as a civilian
power in the Western Balkans.274
EU Engagement on a Sub-National Level
It becomes obvious that the EU’s approaches, as they have been outlined above, place
heavy emphasis on institution–building and the technical implementation of reforms for
which it relies on cooperation with political elites. However, an awareness has gradually
developed of the need to integrate non-state actors with the peacebuilding project. This
is mainly related to the need to win legitimacy for broader structural reforms in a
peacebuilding context as well as to get support when it comes to implementing projects.
Here, the EUPF ties in with the rather confused approaches of non-state actors in the
field of peacebuilding, while it is mainly NGOs that are funded and consulted by the
Commission. In this context, it has to be mentioned that the EU has adopted a rather
institutionalised approach to working with civil society. Indeed civil society represents
an important cornerstone in the EUPF, which views the total of non-state actors as an
272 Nathalie Tocci, op. cit., p.3.
273 Oliver Richmond et al., op. cit.
274 Ana E. Juncos, op. cit., p.94.
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institution that can be used as transformational instruments for peacebuilding. The
Commission particularly emphasises the importance of dialogue with civil society with
respect to democratisation and reconciliation.275 It was in the framework of CARDS and
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) that the EU first
put emphasis on the need to strengthen civil society actors as an important dimension of
its peacebuilding mission.276 In pursuit of the idea of local ownership, the EU has
promoted public campaigns, such as “Put u Evropu zavisi od vas” (“The way into
Europe depends on you”), which, however, did not manage to overcome resistance to
EU electoral laws in parliament (1999) and mirrors the extent to which European
symbolism has sometimes been overestimated.277 On the one hand, the EU has realised
that local ownership is needed to create and maintain the legitimacy of the
peacebuilding process – at least in rhetorical terms. On the other hand, it can be
observed that the concept of ownership has often failed to transcend a rather superficial
approach in which processes are only handed over to locals if the latter are expected to
support, rather than undermine, the EU’s policies.
Making the effort to consult a wide range of civil society actors, the
Commission’s 2005 mapping study is indicative of an aspiration of engaging with civil
society on a deeper level,278 while IPA defines the financial framework which outlines
the priorities of civil society approaches.279 Not only does IPA support selected non-
state actors, but it also provides for a dialogue between civil society and government, as
well as with the EU itself. It does this by creating institutional mechanisms that are
conducive to the inclusion of societal actors in high-level politics to address a variety of
issues.280 The IPA places emphasis on “building civil society capacity to act as a
275 cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 5 March
2008, “Western Balkans: enhancing the European perspective”, 2008.
276 Iavor Rangelov and Marika Theros, “Maintaining the Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Coherence
and Complementarity of EU Institutions and Civil Society in the Field of Transitional Justice”, Working
Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt), November 2007, p.15.
277 Kimberley Coles, op. cit., p.262.
278European Commission, “Mapping Study of Non-State Actors (NSA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, 2005,
http://www.europa.ba/?akcija=clanak&CID=33&jezik=2&LID=52 (accessed 21/07/09).
279 cf. “Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document
(MIPD) 2009-2011. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” http://www.europa.ba/files/docs/en/ipa/BiHMIPD2009-
2011AnnexMainEN.pdf (accessed 20/06/09).
280 Cf. “Project Fiche – IPA Annual Action Programme 2007 for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Improving the
development and capacity of Social Dialogue and Social Partners (SP) Project. Capacity building of Civil
Society to take part in policy dialogue”, Sarajevo, 2007, p.3,
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watchdog and partner of the government” as well as encouraging the NGO sector to get
involved in reform politics.281 However, due to the lack of a coherent institutional
framework in which civil society can be dealt with, the EU has started to focus on the
creation of such a framework to empower the further development of civil society for
which an Agreement was signed in 2007 by the Council of Ministers.282 Yet since this
agreement failed to produce any significant policy changes, the EU gradually shifted
responsibility of reform towards the state by emphasising the role of the State Office for
Cooperation with Civil Society when it comes to coordinating EU civil society
programmes.283 These developments are clearly related to the insight that the EU, as a
huge institutional apparatus, is dependent on the support of actors that are closer to local
communities in order to appear less distant and paralysed, while, at the same time, it
faces institutional limits when it comes to dealing with local society by itself. The
Council of the European Union therefore states that, for its own benefit, the EU needs to
“improve cooperation with non-state actors including NGOs/CSOs by enhancing
dialogue and improving information-sharing and cooperation in the field.”284 This is
implemented in practice through dialogue forums, festivals, debates and conferences
organised by the EU and that have the clear goal of using civil society as a means of
bringing BiH closer to EU membership.285 In 2008, for instance, the Commission
supported a Football Festival in Foča that was to bring together young people from 
different countries and communities within Bosnia-Herzegovina to teach them fair play
and conflict resolution on a sports level.286 Similarly, the Commission organised a
concert on the occasion of “Europe Day.” Bringing together the international
community, local authorities and grassroots organisations, this concert served as a
means to communicate the centrality of moving towards Europe and to show the extent
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/bosnia_and_herzegovina/ipa/44_capacity_building_of_civil_society_
en.pdf (accessed 21/07/09).
281 Iavor Rangelov and Marika Theros, op. cit., p.16.
282 Goran Žeravčić, “Analysis of Institutional Cooperation between Governmental and Non-
Governmental Sectors in BiH”, Sarajevo: Kronauer Consulting, 2008, p.83.
283 Ibid., p.86.
284 Council of the European Union, “Annual Report on EU activities in the framework of conflict
prevention, including implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts”, op.
cit., p.5.
285 cf. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Enlargement
Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009”, Brussels, 2008, p.8.
286 http://www.europa.ba/?akcija=vijesti&akcija2=pregled&jezik=2&ID=242 (accessed 09/08/09).
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of the EU’s presence in the country.287 Moreover, the EU delegation to Bosnia-
Herzegovina regularly holds public debates in different parts of the country to discuss
issues related to the EU integration process and to communicate the implications of this
to the various stakeholders in the process.288 Again, the tendency to engage with civil
society in an instrumental way can hardly be overlooked given that the EU uses its
variety of policy tools and financial power for the legitimisation of its very goals in the
region. In that respect, the Commission argues that:
[i]ncreased participation of civil society organisations in the reforms undertaken in the
enlargement countries is a strong determinant for the pace and quality of the accession
process, as well as in attaining public support for accession.289
This is the background against which one can read the introduction of a new
Civil Society Facility in 2008 to enhance capacity-building among local actors. In
addition, civil society activities are funded through EIDHR, which in turn points to the
assumed contribution of civil society to the democratisation agenda.
The future development of the IPA is equally reflective of the importance of
including local actors in the further design of the accession process. It defines civil
society as “employer's organisations, trade unions, associations of local self-
governments as well as non-governmental organisations etc.,”290 yet a number of
competing definitions in different policy documents mirror the lack of clearness in the
EU about what is meant by civil society.291 At the same time, this leads to an exclusion
of civil society actors when they cannot be framed in the EU’s terms or when they are
too difficult to deal with.
287 http://www.europa.ba/?akcija=vijesti&akcija2=pregled&jezik=2&ID=237 (Accessed 09/08/09).
288 http://www.europa.ba/?akcija=vijesti&akcija2=pregled&jezik=2&ID=236 (accessed 09/08/09).
289 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, op. cit., p.10.
290 “Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document
(MIPD) 2009-2011 Bosnia and Herzegovina”, op. cit., Annex 4.
291 The Commission’s mapping study of non-state actors, for instance, does not talk about civil society,
but about non-state actors, defined as “Non-Governmental Organisations/Community Based
Organisations (NGO/CBO) and their representative platforms in different sectors, social partners (trade
unions, employers associations), private sector associations and business organisations, associations of
churches and confessional movements, universities, cultural associations, media”. See European
Commission, “Mapping Study of Non-State Actors (NSA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, op. cit. This lack of
clearness in terms of defining civil society is clearly recognised by the Economic and Social Committee
referring to the various strands of thinking about civil society. Cf. Opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee on “The role and contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe”,
Brussels, 1999.
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Generally, it becomes evident that the EU has big ambitions in the Western
Balkans, and in BiH in particular. Due to the geographic proximity of the region to the
EU, the EUPF has to be considered in the context of the EU’s own security and stability
interests, with the SAA process forming an essential part of the ESDP and CSFP.
Against this background, a number of instruments are being developed, "including an
institutional framework, political engagement, security presence and various forms of
assistance.”292 This illustrates the importance of the Western Balkans as the EU’s ‘next
frontier’,293 reflecting the extent to which peacebuilding and reconciliation in the region
represent major challenges for the EU’s foreign policy.
The EU and Culture
As a result, culture only plays a marginal role in peacebuilding efforts, if at all,
and is kept backstage despite the fact that it is, as an artist suggested, important for
people’s identities.294 The EU itself, as it seems, is not very engaged in the contents of
this field, which has been a major problem particularly in earlier stages of European
integration, where ‘culture’ – a naturally content-based area – has been treated mainly
as a socio-economic market of cultural goods.295 Similarly, in the context of
enlargement, culture continues to play a strategic and structural rather than content-
based role for the European Union:
It is essential that the cultural sector contribute to, and play a role in, broader European
political developments. The cultural sector is an important employer in its own right and
there is, in addition, a clear link between investment in culture and economic development
(…).296
292 Council of the European Union, “Annual Report on EU activities in the framework of conflict
prevention, including implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts”, op.
cit., p.21.
293 Graham Avery, “Foreword”, in EPC Working Paper No.31: “The Balkans in Europe: containment or
transformation? Twelve ideas for action”, Task Force EU Integration & Citizenship Programme, June
2008, Rapporteur: Rosa Balfour, p.7.
294 Aida Bucalović, Center for Interdisciplinary Research of Visual Culture of the International Forum 
Bosnia, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 21/04/10.
295 Nina Obuljen, “Assessing the Impact of EU Enlargement on Cultural Policies in Countries in
Transition”, Cultural Transitions in Southeastern Europe, Collection of Papers from the Course on
‘Managing Cultural Transitions: Southeastern Europe’, 2004, pp.123-141, p.129.
296 European Parliament and Council, “Decision No 1855/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2006 establishing the Culture Programme (2007 to 2013)", Brussels, 2006, p.1.
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In this context, Gordon suggests that the EU tends to view culture as an “engine for
social and economic innovation” 297 and thus as a tool to structure economic processes
rather than as a space of artistic expressions per se. This is associated with a view of
culture as a strategic area of engagement, through which certain policies can be
legitimised.298 In that sense, not only civil society, but also its associated cultural values
become peacebuilding tools through which societies are assumed to be transformable
according to the norms and values of the EU. This in turn neglects the ability of the
cultural sphere(s) to serve as platforms of resistance to local actors and portrays culture
as part of the formal political, public realm.
Having said that, in recent years, the EU seems to gradually be changing its attitude
towards culture. Whilst retaining the instrumental view of culture, in the light of its
potentials to create employment and to legitimise certain forms of political cooperation,
the Commission is now increasingly emphasising the need to engage with the cultural
sector and its role in the EU’s foreign policy more specifically.299 In this context, the
importance of public diplomacy to enhance the legitimacy of EU policies locally has
been emphasised.300 At the same time, although this means that funding for cultural
activities has been scheduled to increase, the growing attention to cultural activities has
not automatically led to a critical rethinking of the EU’s underlying concepts and
strategies. On the one hand, the Commission touches upon the political nature of
culture, but does not explain how this might lead to a deeper understanding of the
context in which the EU operates.301 To the contrary, rather than using culture, in both
its everyday and elite understanding, as a way of understanding the diverse meanings of
peacebuilding in its local implementation, the EU views intercultural dialogue as a tool
297 Christopher Gordon, “Culture and the European Union in a Global Context”, The Journal of Arts
Management, Law, and Society, vol.37, no.1, 2007, pp.11-30, p.14.
298 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European
agenda for culture in a globalizing world”, Brussels, 2007.
299 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European
agenda for culture in a globalizing world”, Brussels, 2007.
300 Ibid. This also came out of a confidential personal conversation. Confidential source, Personal
Interview, Sarajevo, 29/04/10.301 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European
agenda for culture in a globalizing world”, Brussels, 2007.
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to promote knowledge about itself in the world.302 In terms of developing a culturally-
sensitive approach to engagement with third countries, the EU remains rather vague,
basing its approaches on existing policies and conventions.303
A conference organised by the Slovenian presidency in 2008 tried to concretise the role
of culture in the EU’s foreign policies in terms of particularly focusing on the
challenges encountered in the context of Eastern Europe.304 In this conference, culture
was outlined as a tool to improve structures of governance and promote dialogue within
and between societies.305 However, the extent to which this has translated into policy
practice has been limited, and culture is often still seen as incompatible with the EU’s
standards and guidelines.306 In that sense, the engagement with the cultural sector in
BiH has been less on a level of continuous dialogue, but has rather taken place through
the funding of certain cultural activities. The EU therefore considers the integration of
BiH into the Commission’s Culture Programme 2007-2013 a major cornerstone in its
engagement with cultural actors in the country.307 The extent to which this will lead to
more mutual engagement of the EU and local cultural actors yet remains to be seen.
Assessment
Against the background of the broader international peacebuilding project, an overview
of the EU’s involvement in BiH shows that, on the part of the EU, there are ambitions
to make a positive impact on politics and society in the country. Indeed, the EU’s
peacebuilding approaches aim to promote reconciliation as well as political and
economic development in the Western Balkans. However, it is questionable to what
extent the EU’s policies emanate from a concern about the well-being of the subjects of
its policies. Rather, it can be noted that the overall motivation of engaging in
peacebuilding in a variety of ways has its origins in the EU’s concerns about its own
302 Ibid.
303 Cf. Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on the promotion of cultural diversity and
intercultural dialogue in the external relations of the Union and its Member States. 2905th Education,
Youth and Culture Council meeting, Brussels, 2008.
304 Slovenian Presidency of the EU, "Slovenian Presidency Declaration based on the recommendations of
the conference "New Paradigms, New Models - Culture in the EU External Relations", Ljubljana, 13-14
May 2008."
305 Ibid.
306 Confidential source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 22/03/10.
307 http://ec.europa.eu/culture/news/memorandum-of-understanding-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina_en.htm
(accessed 31/01/12).
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security, and the creation of a stable and secure neighbourhood is one way of achieving
this. Such an approach tends to lead to a situation in which local society is only partially
listened to. It is only taken seriously in representation through political elites or, in a
civil society format compatible with the EU’s policies. In that respect, an instrumental
approach to dealing with society is emerging in terms of using various actors on the
ground to create the needed legitimacy for the peacebuilding project as well as to
facilitate European integration. At the same time, those whose voices risk undermining
this project struggle to find their space in it, given that the EU’s institutional
arrangements, such as civil society dialogue and conditionalities, allow for a selective
use of local actors in the peacebuilding framework. Civil society can thus be viewed as
a policy instrument for the EU, while the priorities of the latter seem to be relying on
the usefulness of civil society for the accession process rather than on getting a more
nuanced picture of the complex processes occurring on the ground. As a result, local
needs and culture tend to be treated as secondary goals, or tools at best, which are only
taken into consideration after the implementation of EU standards and accession
conditionality. Since some organisational forms (mainly NGOs) appear to be convenient
instruments for the implementation of certain policies, the EU tends to fund them at the
expense of alternative and challenging groups. This, indeed, replicates the problems
faced by the international community in general, and, despite showing greater ambitions
to engage with a broad spectrum of actors, fails to make a substantial difference to
peacebuilding approaches. Just as most international actors present in BiH, the EU has
ambitions to spread its own norms and values in society (Europeanisation being the key
word here) by delivering a set of policy prescriptions, mainly in the form of its carrot of
membership status negotiations. The EU tries to prevent resistance to the associated
conditions by strengthening the groups that are more or less supportive of the overall
aims of the peacebuilding project. This, in turn, raises questions about the ways in
which the EU is able to deal with the supposedly ‘non-liberal’ European civil society. It
seems that the EU is trying to create a new middle-class in its ways of dealing with civil
society, the latter predominantly being viewed as professionalised NGOs in line with
the EU’s idea of progress.308 Actors who deviate from this blueprint might not be
308 Cf. Adam Fagan, “Transnational Aid for Civil Society Development in Post-Socialist Europe:
Democratic Consolidation or a New Imperialism?”, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition
Politics, vol.22, no.1, 2006, pp.115-134, p.125.
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supported, financially or ideationally, due to the EU’s institutional limitations in terms
of dealing with alternative or less-institutionalised organisational forms. This leads to
the exclusion and marginalisation of a variety of actors who, being ‘different’, might
enjoy a high degree of legitimacy on the ground, but cannot be framed in the EU’s
terms. This is not to argue that the EU does not wish to get a broader picture of society;
for example, the Commission’s mapping study and parts of the IPA, as outlined above,
mirror an aspiration to engage with a broad societal spectrum. However, these
ambitions are often not fulfilled in practice due to an institutional tendency to keep
things simple and straightforward. The EU’s efforts are further undermined by its
ambition to gradually make BiH an EU member state, which implies a prescription of
certain values and limits the space in which alternative discourses can be developed.
There is, thus, a gap between the EU’s aims and their actual achievements, and this gap
weakens the link between EU peacebuilding and local society. The EU’s engagement
with civil society shows that the latter is often considered to be weak, passive and in
need of external training to be able to respond to the challenges of peacebuilding and
conflict transformation. In that sense, the EU seems to imagine its engagement as a one-
way process, with locals lacking autonomous agency, while the EU can make use of
what it perceives as its capacity to transform society according to its interests and
values. Yet, much in contrast, I will continue to argue that there are spaces of local
agency that often remain unseen, yet which have an impact on how peacebuilding
policies play out contextually. The following chapter will provide the theoretical
framework with which such spaces of agency can be investigated.
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Chapter 4: The Spaces of Agency Concept to Frame
Peacebuilding Interaction
Introduction
This chapter will develop the theoretical framework with which interactions
between local cultural actors and different EU actors can be investigated. This is not
based on an assumption that the ‘local’ and the ‘international’ can be clearly separated
from each other as two distinct and independent spheres. The chapter rather aims to
develop an approach to explain how they are interrelated, constituting each other in
processes of complex interaction. To do so, I will develop a concept called spaces of
agency, through which the influence of various actors on the emergence and relevance
of different discourse clusters can be conceptualised. This framework conceptualises
agency as occurring in a fluid structural environment, yet does not claim that agency is
restrained by its surrounding spaces, but points to actors’ abilities to challenge and
transform them. To do so, the chapter will look at the (infra-)structures, contents, and
functions of such discursive spaces, aiming to investigate the ways in which different
forms of agency impact upon the design of such spaces as well as the meanings created
within and between them. This is a move away from the one-dimensional, visible and
merely actor-centred approaches to agency as they have been outlined above. To the
contrary, this thesis aims to develop a more fluid and dynamic concept of peacebuilding
agency, not only looking at direct and visible interaction processes, but investigating
subtler dynamics of power and agency. This framework is mainly the result of
observations I made during fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not only did I note the
centrality of thinking about space in public discourses (such as lectures about the
quality of public space, debates about the meaning of a post-Yugoslav space, the
creation of spaces free of ethnic tensions, and so forth), but I also realised that much
interaction in different social spheres is not direct, but quite subtle. In fact, partly
resulting from a history of state control, many controversial discussions are held outside
the public, political sphere and, therefore, only impact indirectly on that sphere. The
spaces of agency concept will take account of this.
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Methodologically, institutional ethnography (IE) will serve as a useful technique
for gaining access to these complex interactions between actors and their discursive
spaces in a nuanced way. In order to acknowledge the agency of the peacebuilding
institutions, local agencies and those in between, institutional ethnography will be used
as a two-way tool in order to investigate mutual (rather than one-sided) influences of
those spheres. Combined with participatory research techniques, this will allow for a
contextualised analysis of different spaces of agency. This will provide the background
against which the interaction between EU and local cultural actors can be analysed.
Considering different discursive spaces as manifestations of agency, this framework
will not confine itself to looking at the ways in which the EU treats local cultural actors.
Rather, will I take actors into account who are seemingly marginalised by the EU’s
peacebuilding framework, and this will be done by emphasising their impact on the
ways in which agency is constituted. The latter can be seen as constantly materialising
in different responses to the policies imposed or promoted by peacebuilding actors, as
well as in the creation of new spaces on the part of local actors. This takes account of
what Doreen Massey has observed in more general terms, namely that:
there is an overwhelming tendency both in academic and political literature, and other
forms of discourse, and in political practice to imagine the local as the product of the global
urged to neglect the counterpoint to this: the local construction of the global.309
In that respect, this thesis looks at a process of mutual interaction, suggesting
that the choices that actors have in terms of how their own spaces of agency respond to
peacebuilding programmes reflects their power, potentially subtle and hidden, and sheds
light on the feedback loop in which Bosnian agencies transform the EU’s projects,
rather than exclusively looking at how the EU transforms BiH. This in turn will help
one to understand the negotiation processes during the course of which different actors
use a wide variety of strategies to conceptualise and translate their own.
309 Doreen Massey, for space, London: Sage, 2005, reprinted 2007, 2008, p.101.
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Spaces of Agency
This section introduces the spaces of agency concept. Spaces of agency are
abstract spaces that actors create and use to display their agency vis-à-vis other actors’
spaces. Figuratively speaking, those spaces can be thought of as bubbles or discourse
clusters centred on a core issues, with many actors contributing to the creation of
different layers of meaning to the bubble, thereby enhancing it and making it relevant to
a wider audience. Linking processes related to the production of meaning to processes
of “othering”, Said has claimed that “space acquires emotional and even rational sense
by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous reaches of distance and
convert it into meaning for us here.”310 Said, therefore, points to the power of spaces to
create certain meanings and representations for the benefit of those engaged in such
spaces.
Although spaces of agency are not strictly geographical in terms of describing
locations or locales, I call them spaces due to their analogies to geographical spaces,
which similarly helps us understand the interrelationship between structural
environments and the ways in which actors challenge and build on them. There are also
parallels between the metaphor of abstract space and material, geographic space such as
a given infrastructure as well as social/physical dynamics such as inclusion and
exclusion, the display of power structures, boundaries, bridges and so forth. Yet in this
thesis, space is dissolved from its strict denotations of geographical locality and instead
the concept is used as an instrument to investigate which discursive spheres have an
influence on specific social groups and how those groups engage in their recreation.
This is not to argue that geographical spaces do not matter – it has indeed been
suggested that transformation requires both material and conceptual spaces in which it
can develop311 – but this chapter first and foremost points to the conceptual and
ideational processes that are necessary elements of agency and change before these take
a geographical dimension. Those spaces certainly connect to geographical spaces,
which I will illustrate below, but the primary concern of this chapter is to investigate the
ways in which meaning is created in conceptual spaces to make change thinkable in the
310 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage, 1978, p.55.
311 Mike Kesby, “Retheorizing Empowerment-through-Participation as a Performance in Space: Beyond
Tyranny to Transformation”, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol.30, no.4, 2005,
pp.2037-2065, p.2054.
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first place. Agents may connect their ideational spaces of agency to a locale, and indeed
they often do so, while the main substance of the space remains in the ideational and
imaginary sphere of meanings.
Since spaces of agency dig deep into the needs of society and its forms of
communication – expressing what concerns, connects and divides people – they contain
meanings that give access to deeper structures of a society, yet often in a hidden or
disguised form. According to Geertz, those meanings can give deep access to cultural
processes within a society since “meaning varies according to the pattern of life by
which it is informed.”312 In that sense, spaces of agency can be viewed as filled with
meanings, which in turn reflect socially and culturally informed patterns, and thus
penetrate societal spheres and discourses in various ways. Those meanings, in turn,
represent the structural context of action on the one hand, in terms of impacting upon
how actors perceive and make sense of their environment, while, on the other hand, they
also point to actors’ ability to challenge this structural context by creating new
meanings.
Lefebvre’s theory of space can help conceptualise those spaces of agency, at the
same time acknowledging crucial differences in the ways in which abstract space is
framed. Lefebvre points to the active nature of space, which can be both operational and
instrumental.313 Although Lefebvre does not emphasise agency as a cause for the
emergence of spaces (he has indeed been criticised for treating space as a product rather
than a process driven by human agency314), his work still reflects how spaces are, albeit
implicitly, manifestations of agency due to their potential strategic impact on discourses
and surrounding structures. In that sense, actors might find it a good strategy to create a
new space, or they might help to perpetuate and strengthen an existing space. In this
context Lefebvre claims that “space relies on the repetitive,”315 referring to the need for
the structure and content of a space to be repeated so it will stay alive.
Lefebvre outlines a trilogy, i.e. three moments of space, which are:
a) spatial practice, or espace SHUF u: the space of perception which is the fluid
(re)production of spatial sets and their connection to people’s everyday lives;
312 Clifford Geertz, op. cit., p.14.
313 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, p.11.
314 Tim Unwin, “A waste of space? Towards a critique of the social production of space”, Transactions of
the Institute of British Geographers, vol.25, no.1, 2000, pp.11-29, p.24.
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b) representations of space, or HVSDFHFRQF u: conceived space as tied to
relations of production and related to a notion of planning, and
c) representational spaces, or espace vécu :316 lived and experienced space.
Representational spaces consist of complex symbolisms, which are potentially coded
and derive their logic from the symbolic use of objects in space. Not only does the
notion of representational spaces connect to imaginary spaces, but, according to
Lefebvre, it is also linked to the underground side of social life, with arts potentially
serving as a code for this space. Indeed, certainly in its connection with spatial practice
and representations of space, as they stand in mutual tension and constantly inform each
other, representational space seems to be able to give access to a deeper level of society.
It constitutes a “space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and
hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’” as well as a “space which the imagination
seeks to change and appropriate”.317 Not only does this point to the abstract and
symbolic character of space, but at the same time reminds us that space is not a stable
construct, but changeable once the actors involved start thinking about changing it. In
that sense, representational space is alive;318 possibly, but not necessarily instrumental
to actors; and it harbours certain contradictions.319 Due to those contradictions, Lefebvre
points out that abstract space is never homogeneous, but deploys its centripetal forces to
render its contents homogenous.320 This in turn points to the contradictions inherent in
any space as it is both created by the diversity of actors creating, perpetuating and
challenging it, yet at the same time these actors are pursuing homogeneity with the goal
of keeping the space stable.
In this respect, it becomes obvious that space is not isolated from the society it
emerges from, but closely connected to it and mirroring the quantity and quality of
social relationships that have created and shaped it.321 Lefebvre views change as
catalysed through spaces, so every change takes place via the creation of an appropriate
space.322 Spaces of agency are spaces that impact on social developments and change,
given that actors use them to make newly emerging needs and interests heard, thereby
316 Ibid.
317 Ibid., p.39.
318 Ibid., p.42.
319 Ibid., p.52.
320 Ibid., p.287.
321 Ibid., pp.82f.
322 Ibid., p.59.
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instilling new visions and ideas in society via a certain space. It thus becomes clear that
spaces and agency cannot be separated, which contradicts Lefebvre’s statement that
“[e]very space is already in place before the appearance of its actors.”323 Lefebvre’s
statement understates the power of actors to create such spaces, while this chapter aims
to develop an integrated concept of spaces and agency. At the same time, although
building to a certain extent on his concept of abstract/representational spaces, this
challenges Lefebvre’s claim that agency emerges within a space,324 rather arguing that
spaces are manifestations and products of agency as opposed to merely providing the
boundaries within which agency can unfold.
I argue that actors define the boundaries of action themselves by using their
agency to constantly challenge existing boundaries and frameworks on their own terms.
Along those lines, spaces of agency reflect actors’ capacities to influence their
environment, i.e. other spaces of agency and actors who both reproduce and challenge
one another’s ideas. Therefore, in order to assess the power of such spaces, it is
important to investigate which actors create them, and who determines their further
development. The creators and the perpetuators may be the same group of actors, but
they may also diverge so that spaces become co-opted, used, negotiated, manipulated or
resisted by other actors who then influence their further development. In that sense,
spaces of agency are in constant development as hybrid constructs emerging in the
encounter between different actors in social interaction. This ties in with Gupta and
Ferguson’s argument that calls for “understanding social change and cultural
transformation as situated within interconnected spaces.”325 In a similar vein, Robinson
suggests that “the imaginative spatialities with which we describe processes of
transformation shape our sense of political possibilities and hence our political
choices.”326
This stands in contrast to Foucault’s conception of space as an enclosed,
segmented unity that serves as a disciplinary mechanism and a locus where power can
323 Ibid., p.57.
324 Ibid., p.412.
325 Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, “Beyond ‘Culture’: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference”,
in Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (eds.), Culture, power, place: explorations in critical anthropology,
Durham: N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997, pp.33-51, p.35.
326 Jenny Robinson, “Feminism and the spaces of transformation”, Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers, vol.25, no.3, 2000, pp.285-301, p.286.
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be exercised.327 On the other hand, Foucault refrains from using power as a one-way
concept, arguing that “[a]nyone who exercises power has to place himself in a field of
complex relations where he occupies a transition point.”328 In this context, Butler
suggests that:
[t]he Foucauldian subject is never fully constituted in subjection […]; it is repeatedly
constituted in subjection, and it is in the possibility of a repetition that repeats against its
origins that subjection might be understood to draw its inadvertently enabling power.329
This points to the enabling dimensions of subjection, and thus the power of resistance as
“an effect to the very power that it is said to oppose.”330 Along those lines, it may very
well be the case that spaces impose limits and boundaries on people, but one must not
neglect the latter’s ability to resist and challenge those spaces based on their own ideas
and conceptions. In this context, Cresswell suggests that “[t]he unintended consequence
of making space a means of control is to simultaneously make it a site of meaningful
resistance.”331 Therefore, space cannot exclusively be considered as a restraining and
limiting force – which it certainly can be – but it is equally an enabling force, a concept
in which individuals and collectivities can communicate their needs and interests to
different target audiences. What needs to be acknowledged is the ability of people to
create spaces in which they rid themselves of forms of control. Those spaces depend on
the creativity of actors to find spheres in which they can escape control mechanisms,
often in hidden forms. The fact that many artists in BiH have decided to occupy spaces
that are beyond the range of the state, both physically and ideationally, is illustrative of
that. What the respective space of agency addresses, and whether it is hidden or not,
depends on what the producers think is most suitable to voice their needs and interests.
In that sense, spaces of agency always have to be seen in a contextualised manner, with
respect to the actors involved, their (changing) goals and their strategies in relation to a
wider social environment. Again, this ties in with debates about the role of structure in
327 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: Vintage, 1995.
328 Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality. Vol.3, The care of the self, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990,
p.88.
329 Judith Butler, The psychic life of power: theories in subjection, Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1997, p.94.
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331 Tim Cresswell, In place/out of place: geography, ideology, and transgression, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p.163.
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relation to agency as well as the constraints of autonomous action, which will be
addressed below.
Against this background, the following section will examine in more detail the
ways in which such spaces operate. This, in turn, necessitates a focus on the (infra-)
structures and the processes developing within such spaces as well as their functions
and reasons for existence.
How Do Spaces of Agency Operate?
(Infra-)structure
As it has been suggested above, spaces of agency bear resemblance to
geographical, i.e. material, spaces. In that sense, abstract spaces can be said to have an
infrastructure that shapes the ways in which those spaces are structured and operate.
The following characterisation of spaces of agency reflects the analogies to
material space. It alludes to the structural properties of space as well as its processual
nature that allows for constant change and transformation.
Inclusion and Exclusion
Spaces have boundaries and therefore always include and exclude actors and
issues. In this context, Massey suggests that places and spaces are “open only to a
particular set of practices and to similar others.”332 Since, according to Lefebvre, spaces
aim to render their contents homogenous, actors who are open to becoming part of the
respective space are most likely to be included if it is in their interest to be part of it and
if they are willing to adapt to it to a certain extent. This is dependent on the extent to
which a space connects to actors’ needs as actors will only become part of a space if
they see it in their interests to do so. In that sense, the exclusion of actors is not
necessarily an act of force, but it can be a voluntary decision of those who do not feel
332 Massey, op. cit., p.178.
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affected by a space, or by those who do not believe themselves capable of bringing
about change.
At the same time as spaces have distinct boundaries, they also centre on certain
issues. Again, only issues that appear worth addressing due to their connection to
people’s needs and interests will become part of a space. This, however, does not mean
that one space focuses on one issue exclusively. To the contrary, actors can add new
layers of meaning around the core issue that sparked the creation of a space and they
can retrospectively add issues to the space that had been previously excluded by linking
them to its core discourse cluster. A similar process may happen with respect to actors
involved with the space – some may decide to join the space, thus modifying it, while
others may want to abandon their involvement and turn to other spaces and discourses
more relevant to them.
Open and Closed Spaces
Spaces of agency can be seen as located on a spectrum somewhere between
being open and closed. This depends on the extent to which they are open to new
members and issues, which therefore serves as an indicator of the degree to which they
are open to change and internal transformation. Indeed, the fluidity of a space can be
investigated by looking at the turnover of active participants and issues on the one hand,
and also by the speed with which those participants and issues change their goals and
strategies. There are different mechanisms that serve as ‘gates’ preventing undesirable
actors from accessing the space such as the creation of a physical or ideational distance,
processes of “othering”, the use of coded language or jargon within a space and so forth.
The closure of a space may reflect resistance to change, while spaces that are open to
new participants and issues tend to transform more quickly and are more adaptable to
their environment.
Top-down or Bottom-up Mechanisms
Different spaces of agency have different hierarchy structures. Their
development and transformation can be directed from the top, i.e. from a relatively
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small number of people who try to keep control of the space. They can also derive their
processes from the broad range of people participating in them, without strict control
structures or steep hierarchies. People from different societal strata may then be able to
impact upon the space either implicitly or explicitly. If that is the case, change from
below is very likely. Again, these are crucial factors for the ways in which change
within a space of agency may take place as well as for the scope of relevance of such
change.
Hybridity
Spaces of agency have no fixed boundaries and never stand in isolation, but
have to be seen in relation to the other spaces with which they interact. They are always
products of interrelations even should the actors involved in a space wish to delineate
themselves from the spaces around.333 Even if the respective response is nothing more
than an ignorance of other spaces, this still means that spaces of agency respond to
others indirectly. In that sense, interaction has different qualities and may be limited or
extensive, particularly when different spaces speak to each other, or even have a
conversation about an issue. If such forms of interaction get very close to each other,
they may merge into a single space of agency. There is certainly a risk of dichotomising
or categorising actors/spaces, which would, however, neglect the power of hybrid
spaces. I was made aware of this during a discussion in the cultural centre OKC
Abrašević in Mostar. During a discussion in the centre, the users of that space remarked 
that the people from the town were confused by the location of the centre since they
expect every actor to be situated either east (on the Bosniak side) or west (on the Croat
side). However, since Abrašević is directly on the border, on the frontline, it constitutes 
a space of hybridity, transgressing existing boundaries. The imaginary transgression of
boundaries materialises in practice, resulting in a hybrid space, both physically and
symbolically.
The boundaries between spaces are certainly blurred and hard to distinguish, but
once there is a tendency to homogenise, we can see a common space of agency
emerging. At the same time, following Bhabha’s thought, there may also be complex
333 Massey, op. cit., p.9.
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situations “where ‘previously unrecognized spiritual and intellectual needs’ emerge
from the imposition of ‘foreign’ ideas, cultural representations, and structures of
power”.334 BiH has indeed a long history of hybridity, having been subject to various
external interventions, which all shaped the country’s identity in different ways. The
norms and values brought into the country by those interventions have in turn been
accommodated, modified, challenged or resisted. Resistance to, or incorporation of
colonial structures then points to the power of hybrid spaces.335
There is always hybridisation between spaces of agency, whether it be direct or
indirect. This creates the option for spaces not only to merge, but also to split when
actors and their views drift apart and new issues or needs become relevant. This also
means that there are no purely ‘local’ or ‘international’ spaces, since there is constant
interaction between them. However, spaces differ with respect to their connection to
certain, subjective ‘everyday contexts’.
Structured and Improvised Spaces
Again, in analogy to geographical spaces, spaces of agency tend to develop
substructures, particularly when they grow big and involve a high number of
participants. This goes hand in hand with a high reliance on existing structures within
the space, while smaller spaces are potentially more flexible and open to improvisation.
Therefore structured spaces might be more efficient in communication the needs of the
actors involved and thus actors might benefit from a higher degree of visibility, whereas
smaller spaces can be more flexible and might find it easier to connect to a changing
environment and address the needs of their members.
Hidden and Public Spaces
Spaces of agency have different degrees of visibility in the public sphere. While
one would assume that actors would strive to make the spaces they created as publicly
visible as possible, there are also reasons for actors to deliberately keep their spaces
334 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London; New York: Routledge, 2004, p.17.
335 Cf. Rumi Sakamoto, “Japan, Hybridity and the Creation of Colonialist Discourse”, Theory, Culture &
Society, vol.13, no.3, 1996, pp.113-128.
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hidden, or at least restrict access to a specific audience. This can be out of fear that the
respective space may become co-opted or challenged by uncomfortable actors; and in
BiH this fear particularly involves a certain degree of scepticism towards state
censorship. At the same time, the strategy of keeping a space hidden means that the pool
of potential new members is rather small, which slows the pace of change down and
reduces both the number and intensity of direct interactions with other spaces.
Spaces Reflecting Society
As Gupta and Ferguson claim, “space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on
which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization is inscribed.”336
Equally, spaces of agency have to be viewed in relation to their active members as well
as to those whose spaces they respond to. According to Harvey, who reminds us of the
social dimensions of space, “there can be no politics of space independent of social
relations. The latter give the former their social content and meaning."337
Interestingly, spaces often reflect cleavages and bonds as they exist in their host
societies, but at the same time such structures can be challenged by the users of the
respective space of agency and be transformed into something new. Spaces of agency
thus reflect a certain social state as well as the possibility to transcend and transform it
into something new.
Identities, Representations and Power within Spaces of Agency
The previous section has outlined the different (infra-)structures that spaces of
agency can develop to pursue their goals. Against this background, the following
section will shed light on the contents of such spaces, looking at different processes that
form their very substance. This accounts for the fact that spaces are constantly under
construction in the transformation of their political meanings338 and relates to the
interaction of actors active within one space, thus referring to the quality of their
336 Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, op. cit., p.34.
337 David Harvey, The condition of postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1990, p.257.
338 cf. Massey, op. cit.
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interplay. Identity and difference, as well as representation and power, can be seen as
the foundation of such processes and will thus be looked at in more detail.
Identity formation has often been considered as a more or less passive concept,
while its contested and conflictual dimension has been neglected, in that it incorporates
negotiation processes during the course of which actors with different identities interact
and develop spaces in which they negotiate their identities. This may involve complex
differentiation processes, so that one group of actors might define their identity in
competition with another group and, thus, deliberately choose to engage in different
spaces of agency. Massey reminds us that power structures and their associated political
meanings reshape identities and, therefore, also reshape spatial relations.339
What is crucial when looking at identity is its potential to orientate a person or
group/space in several different ways. For example, identity could be related to a
concrete physical position in the world; and, as such, Appadurai claims that identity
formation occurs via the staging of locality.340 In that sense, people’s identity can be
said to give them a concrete space in a location to which they belong. On the other
hand, identity can also give the actor a position in an ideational sense by linking people
to the world as well as establishing a qualitative relationship with their social
environment.341 Here, difference, as an essential element of relational identity, becomes
salient in terms of assigning the actor an imaginary space in society and relating that
person, through processes of inclusion and exclusion,342 to other specific actors and
spaces of agency. Hall suggests that one should view identity as a construction and a
never-ending process,343 so that we might speak of the process of identification rather
than of identity as a more accurate way of alluding to the active dynamics of identity
formation. The deliberate “marking of symbolic boundaries”344 then leads to the
acknowledgement of identity politics, during the course of which identity and difference
are affirmed and contested, both within a space of agency as well as between spaces.
What matters here is, according to Jenkins, how we identify ourselves as well as how
339 Massey, op. cit., p.183.
340 Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy”, op. cit., p.306.
341 Cf. Kathryn Woodward, “Introduction“, in Kathryn Woodward (ed.), Identity and Difference, London:
SAGE, 1997, pp.1-6, p.1.
342 Cf. ibid., p.2.
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344 Ibid., p.3.
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we are identified by others.345 Identity is always created in relation to surrounding
actors and structures, with the social construction of ethnic or gendered identities being
only two examples of how people might choose to situate themselves in a specific
structural environment.
Jenkins claims that “[i]dentity is produced and reproduced by individuals
interacting in institutionalized contexts”346 and, therefore, alludes to the contextual
nature of identity as well as to its relation to the institutionalised structures that are
found on all levels of society. This ties in with Barth’s argument that boundaries
between identities are constructed, open to transformation and social.347 No actor nor
space ever has a ‘single’ identity, but identities tend to be multiple and contextual. Sen
has argued that everyone has many parallel identities, and people choose how much
importance they attach to each of those identities in a given context.348 He suggests that
“identities are robustly plural”;349 therefore, people are not just victims of identities
constructed by the very structures around them, but they play an active part in their
identity construction. As such they decide, consciously or subconsciously, which
identities they consider to be salient and, thus, which they will perpetuate. In that sense,
people can be part of various spaces of agency, focus on a variety of different issues and
play multiple roles associated with the different needs and interests of those spaces.
For this thesis it will be of particular relevance to look at what kinds of identity
become relevant to people in the peacebuilding context. This could range from
compliance to what Sen terms a “reactive identity,” describing how non-Western
societies think of themselves as the ‘other’ in their encounter with the international
sphere.350 The concept of reactive identity reflects the extent to which identity is
dialogical and hybrid in terms of expressing a relationship with others, close or
distant,351 as well as how such relationship is created in response to a specific context. It
is worth looking at Castells’ conceptualisation of identity, which he also uses as a
345 Richard Jenkins, “Categorization: Identity, Social Process and Epistemology“, Current Sociology,
vol.48, no.3, 2000, pp.7-25, p.7.
346 Ibid., p.14.
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relational concept, as it provides an interesting basis for investigating the ways in which
different identities may respond to each other. He distinguishes between three kinds of
identity, namely: legitimizing identity, resistance identity and project identity. While
legitimizing identity describes the ambitions of institutions to introduce an identity that
rationalises their domination over other actors, resistance identity challenges current
discourses by developing alternative principles of social interaction. Project identity can
be considered an attempt of social actors to build a new identity by transforming
existing social structures to redefine their own position.352 This conceptualisation
emphasises the relational nature of identity and frames resistance as an element that is
relevant to identity formation. At the same time, this distinction takes into account how
new identities can emerge from processes during the course of which actors challenge
existing structures. Identity is considered to be a fluid and changeable category, while it
is also situational and relational. At the same time, despite being ‘socially constructed’,
the connection to resistance and reaction to contemporary identities considers the
concrete implications of identity (re)formation in peacebuilding theory and practice,
which has perpetuated certain identities of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’.353
Representation is, as Spivak points out, an ambiguous concept. It is often used
as a way of describing a political process during the course of which some speak on
behalf of others (vertreten), while the term also refers to techniques of re-presenting as
in portraying something or someone (darstellen).354 Yet, even though those terms are
complicit in each other,355 the latter element is of particular interest here, relating to the
ways in which actors view themselves as opposed to how others perceive them. Such
representations can either coincide or conflict. Indeed, the ability to categorise and label
things, people or collectivities reflects power and is a form of control.356 In this context,
Woodward points to the power of representation, i.e. the power to exert social control in
terms of being able to establish categories and to label those that transgress them as
352 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
353 Cf. Ikechi Mgbeoji, “The Civilised Self and the Barbaric Other: imperial delusions of order and the
challenges of human security”, Third World Quarterly, vol.27, no.5, 2006, pp.855-869.
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‘outsiders'.357 This is why classifications are highly contested,358 especially in relation to
the boundaries that are drawn between social categories359 and the concrete social
implications of boundary-drawing. In that respect, the ability to label a space reflects a
high degree of power in terms of defining its core issue as well as issues and actors that
become excluded from the space. In this context, Harvey speaks of the “command over
space,”360 arguing that “the production of space is an important means to augment social
power.”361 For instance, the creation of an ethnicised space of agency may possibly
become a self-fulfilling prophesy if it introduces a certain ethnic language and
associated patterns of behaviour to that space. The increasing ethnicisation of public
space before the outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia was mostly driven by
political leaders that used their power of representing ethnicity as a crucial category in
public life and, as such, it is illustrative of ethnicised spaces of agency.
Miles views spaces as sites of display of power,362 thus pointing to the agency of
actors to appropriate a space and make it ‘theirs’ by representing it in a specific way.
Against this background, it becomes clear that representation is closely connected to
power, with hegemonic forces of (cultural) representation evoking struggles for
authority as well as being implicated in the establishment of social and political
hierarchies.363 This issue has been of particular interest to a number of postcolonial
thinkers who have focused on the ways in which the ‘subaltern’ or ‘other’ is being
represented by powerful actors, mainly in the West. Said, for instance, argues:
In any instance of at least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence,
but a re-presence, or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent veracity of a
written statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot instrumentally
depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is a presence to the
reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made supererogatory any such real
thing as "the Orient."364
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This statement reflects the extent to which re-presentation is a technique to ascribe
values to the represented, as well as establishing power relations in the social sphere.
Representation serves to create groups by speaking on their behalf.365 This in turn
allows for shaping the represented collectivity in the language and value hierarchies of
the one who represents. In BiH specifically, this has often resulted in representations of
‘Balkanism’, which, according to Bjelić, characterises the Balkans as a backwards-
oriented discursive locality in order to establish a hierarchy in which the Balkans and its
people are viewed as inferior to the West.366
Holland et al. suggest that people’s everyday lives consist of many complex
representations “that are neither bounded, stable, perduring, nor impermeable.”367 The
mode in which ‘otherness’ is represented can then be considered as one that aims to
establish coherency in the image of the ‘other’ to make it compatible with the
representers’ categories and views.368 At the same time, this reflects an ambition to keep
images simple and stable, so they can be referred to in certain ways and may potentially
be instrumentalised. Bhabha suggests that colonial representations are characterised by
their tendency to ascribe fixity to the ‘other’, representing a paradox which “connotes
rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, degeneracy and daemonic
repetition.”369 As a result, neither difference in time nor difference in space are taken
into consideration in such discourses, which instead tend to disavow diversity and fail to
represent complex and incoherent structures.
However, this does not mean that those who are being represented are powerless
victims of the discourses imposed onto them. In this context, Said points out that, albeit
late, Westerners have become aware that their discourses of representation can be
challenged by those that are represented.370 Indeed, labelling can provoke resistance
when it stretches too far.371 When Spivak asks whether the subaltern can speak she is, in
fact, implying that it cannot as a result of its definition as a homogenous mass of ‘other’
365 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, op. cit., p.740.
366 Dušan I. Bjelić, “Introduction: Blowing Up the “Bridge””, in Dušan I. Bjelić and Obrad Savić (eds.), 
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people.372 Yet to expand on this reasoning, one can argue that the subaltern can speak
when it re-defines and re-presents itself in all its complexity, fluidity and diversity. It is
worth quoting Bhabha again at this stage, who claims that “[t]he social articulation of
difference, from the minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks
to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation.”373
Therefore, culture can neither be considered a homogeneous and unitary entity, nor a
dualism between self and other.374 In that sense, representation and cultural
identification have to be considered reciprocal processes playing out in interactions
between different actors and, thus, between different spaces of agency.
Against this background, I argue that representations emerge at different levels.
On the one hand, actors moving within those spaces are constructing images of each
other as distinct or similar, nuanced or simple. On the other hand, actors within and
between the spaces develop representations of each other in order to establish their very
identity in similarity to or difference from other actors. These processes of
representation are linked to power in terms of who is being heard by whom and who has
the power make those representations relevant in discourses and in relation resource
distribution. However, it has to be taken into account that those representations, despite
their potential fixity, can always be challenged in different ways from any side or
position.
Functions of Spaces of Agency
Spaces of agency do not emerge by coincidence, but they fulfil functions that are
crucial for the actors involved in their creation and perpetuation. Their main function is
the articulation of actors’ needs and interests in either open or disguised ways. The
articulation of needs is processed through the attachment of meanings to the core issue
of a space which, in turn, reflects a certain perspective and its associated needs and
interests.
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Melucci has suggested that social mobilisation is related to the desire to express
emerging needs.375 In that sense, spaces of agency can be seen as fulfilling this desire in
terms of communicating needs and interests in a variety of ways. In many instances,
needs and interests cannot be clearly distinguished, but are merely two ways of referring
to the same issue, yet giving a different subjective priority to it, with needs usually
referring to something more essential than interests. Whether something should be
referred to as a need rather than an interest is a highly subjective judgement, which is
why this chapter does not aim to draw a clear distinction between needs and interests as
most literature on human needs aims to do. Thus, this chapter avoids essentialising
human needs as universal and biological necessities of life.376
As it has been contended in a variety of contexts, human needs manage to reach
to a deep level of both individuals and groups in terms of reflecting uncompromisable
requirements of human beings.377 What is problematic is that while needs are often
considered to be universal and biological givens, their social and cultural context is
marginalised or even ignored. In addition, human needs have often been treated as
stable across cultures. Despite acknowledging the lingual dimension of needs, Galtung,
for instance, concludes that there are four basic things people cannot live without,
namely survival, wellness, freedom and identity.378 This reflects the extent to which
culture and context tend to be treated as secondary and the neglect of the inherent
subjectivity and contextuality of human needs. The cultural insensitivity of the human
needs approaches has been criticised from a number of perspectives with Väyrynen,
specifically, blaming Burton’s human needs theory for rejecting perspectivism and,
hence, underestimating the impact of cultural differences.379 Avruch and Rubenstein
375 Alberto Melucci, “Liberation or Meaning? Social Movements, Culture and Democracy”, Development
and Change, vol.23, no.3, 1992, pp.43-77, p.44.
376 Cf. Mary E. Clark, “Symptoms of cultural pathologies: A hypothesis”, in Dennis J. D. Sandole and
Hugo van der Merwe (eds.), Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application,
Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993, pp.43-54.
377 See, for instance, Michelle Maiese, "Interests, Positions, Needs, and Values," Beyond Intractability,
Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, 2004,
<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/interests/> (accessed 03/06/11).
378 Johan Galtung, “Meeting basic needs: peace and development“, in Felicia A. Huppert, Nick Baylis and
Barry Keverne, (eds.), The Science of Well-being, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005,
pp.475-502, p.481.
379 Tarja Väyrynen, Culture and International Conflict Resolution: A Critical Analysis of the Work of
John Burton, Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2001, pp.109 and 80.
89
share these observations, pointing to the cultural blindness of human needs theories.380
Such approaches illustrate the tension of human needs concepts between universalist
and particularist ethics,381 with a clear tendency to rely on universalist values when the
particular is unknown or distanced.
Yet, the approach taken here will aim to view human needs as contextual,
relational, open to transformation and as expressions of human agency. This is in line
with Castoriadis’s affirmation that human needs are necessarily socially and culturally
created in terms of being inseparable from their objects.382 Castoriadis claims that “it is
the culture in which […] [human beings] live that teaches them that they 'need' one or
the other”.383 Therefore, needs cannot be isolated from the context in which they
develop given that they incorporate power structures, cultural influences and processes
of socialisation and representation. Not only must the meaning of needs be seen as
socially constructed,384 but so too must their very emergence and development. As a
result, it would be problematic to consider needs to be stable entities. This is not to
neglect the biological dimension to certain needs, but if we argue that needs develop
according to context, we also need to acknowledge that, with changing contexts, needs
will gradually change, and therefore also the way in which actors frame needs. In spaces
of agency, needs can be seen as communicated through the meanings attached to the
core issue of the space.
One of the problems with human needs research so far has often been the
tendency to regard individuals and groups as passive victims to their very needs, which
in turn neglects people’s agency in defining their own needs, rights and representations.
Against this background, this thesis combines a study of needs, as they are expressed
within spaces, with theories of agency to account for actors’ abilities to make a
difference to their own lives and the social world. This applies not only to individuals,
but also to collectivities, who create the space to define a set of priorities that they
380 Cf. Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution, Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 1998 and Richard E. Rubenstein, “Basic Human Needs: The Next Steps in Theory Development”,
The International Journal of Peace Studies, vol.6, no.1, 2001.
381 cf. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, London:
Vintage, 1999, p.6.
382 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, Cambridge: Polity, 1987, p.171.
383 Ibid., p.25.
384 Allister McGregor, “Researching wellbeing: from concepts to methodology”, in Ian Gough and
Allister McGregor (eds.), Wellbeing in Developing Countries. From Theory to Research, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.316-350, p.332.
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consider as important. White and Ellison point to the importance of agency for people’s
understanding of their needs as well as for the ways in which this relates to their goals
and the ability to access the resources required for achieving those.385 To turn this
argument on its head while at the same time reflecting the complexity of element
interaction, Holland et al. suggest that the “autonomy of the self, or self-agency,
depends upon one’s capacity to produce the means that organize one’s activity.”386
Through spaces of agency, actors convey their needs in coded ways. An issue
around which a discourse develops and starts to matter to a number of people contains
and derives from unsatisfied needs. By centring their energies on a discursive area that
the actors feel needs to be discussed publicly or semi-publicly, they decide to
communicate their needs in a specific way to a specific audience. Depending on the
space, the associated discourses of need(s) and interest(s) may not be accessible to a
general public, but only to a smaller section of the population. At the same time, the
actors involved in the space are not always and necessarily its target audience, but they
establish a target audience that they think the best fit for addressing their unsatisfied
needs. Along those lines, it may often not make sense for actors to voice their needs
openly, so hidden spaces would be used instead. Although the use of hidden spaces
results in accessing a smaller target audience, this approach can still be a powerful
strategy in terms of developing discourses in a subtle manner.
Agency in Spaces
It has been argued that spaces have to be seen in relation to the agency of those
who create, shape and challenge them. Perhaps most famously, de Certeau has pointed
to the strategies and tactics of the users of certain spaces as “an art of the weak” and as a
form of anti-discipline emerging through the creativity of actors on an everyday
basis.387 This suggests a close and subtle connection between spaces and agency. It also
outlines the necessity to refrain from a narrow view on power that only takes its
385 Sarah White and Mark Ellison, “Wellbeing, livelihoods and resources in social practice”, in Ian Gough
and Allister McGregor (eds.), Wellbeing in Developing Countries. From Theory to Research, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.157-175, p.158.
386 Dorothy Holland et al., op. cit., p.192.
387 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, esp.
p.37.
91
institutionalised forms into account. Much more in a Foucauldian understanding of
power, the thesis views power and agency as possibly diffuse. It focuses on the
marginalised and excluded on the one hand, and on power as emerging from creative
processes on the other hand.388
What Melucci frames as creation and expansion of public spaces389 is what
Deeds Ermarth calls “our power to revise social codes rather than merely to repeat the
same old exclusions and emphases, the same, same, old stories.”390 Both statements tie-
in with a concept of agency as the ability to create new relevant spaces and transcend
existing ones, yet there is no consensus about the extent to which agency can transgress
structural constraints. For instance, while Melucci views human action as the
“construction of possibilities within boundaries,”391 Cresswell emphasises the
possibility of transgressing old spaces to create new ones, which can in turn be
transgressed again.392 The latter mirrors the close connection between structures and the
agency to transform them into something new; and, when taken as such, agency cannot
be seen in isolation from the surrounding structures and vice versa. This has been
emphasised by a number of scholars who have conceptualised the relationship between
structure and agency in qualitatively different ways. There are controversies about what
kind of agency matters: is it individual or collective, capability or intention, formal or
informal and so forth. Gupta and Ferguson argue for a strong conception of agency in
relation to spatial structures, suggesting that the “ability of people to confound the
established spatial orders, either through physical movement or through their own
conceptual and political acts of re-imagination, means that space and place can never be
‘given’.”393 This points to the ability of actors to create structures, such as contexts and
boundaries of neighbourhood, by engaging “in the social activities of production,
representation, and reproduction.”394 It also recognises the importance of agency in its
structural setting. In that sense, despite its ability to transcend structural boundaries
388 Brent L. Pickett, “Foucault and the Politics of Resistance”, Polity, vol.28, no.4, 1996, pp.445-466,
p.458.
389 Alberto Melucci, “Vie quotidienne, besoins individuels et action volontaire,”, Sociologie et sociétés,
vol. 25, no.1, 1993, p. 189-198.
390 Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, “Agency in the Discursive Condition“, History and Theory, vol.40, no.4,
2001, pp.34-58.
391 Alberto Melucci, “Liberation or Meaning? Social Movements, Culture and Democracy”, op. cit., p.52.
392 Tim Cresswell, op. cit., p.176.
393 Ibid., p.17.
394 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization , p.185.
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agency cannot be viewed as isolated from its surrounding structures given that agency is
always situational and contextual rather than existing in a vacuum. It always connects to
its points of reference from which it emerges in the first place. Hence, the meanings
created in a space influence the ways in which actors perceive that space and how they
(inter)act within it. Kesby claims that “agency is also partial, positioned, and informed
by a situated consciousness of one’s location and interests within an evolving
constellation of powers.”395 Pile suggests that agency and resistance are closely
connected to the structures of oppression that made them emerge, thus contradicting the
notion that resistance is necessarily in opposition to power.396 Pile also points to the
ambiguity of tactics of resistance, which have an element responding to the power
structures that stirred them, while there is another element of resistance that projects
more invisible and hidden dynamics, which reflect underlying desires, fears, and hopes
and is thus more autonomous from oppressive structures.397
The relationship between structure and agency has been the main focus of
Giddens’s theory of structuration, defining agency in relation to capability. Agency is
thus seen as a way in which individuals can potentially make a difference to current
structures,398 while structures are analytically to be seen as subject-less, but situated in
time and space.399 Structuration then frames the ways in which structures are
transformed and how this contributes to the reproduction of social systems,400 while the
context in time and space, as well as the actors involved, are crucial in such
processes.401 The essence of structuration views structures not as external to individuals,
but rather constraining and enabling actors in the social system.402 Thus, the intricate
mutual implications of structure and agency become clear, with Giddens claiming that:
[s]tructural constraints […] always operate via agents’ motives and reasons, establishing
(often in diffuse and convoluted ways) conditions and consequences affecting options
open to others, and what they want from whatever options they have.403
395 Mike Kesby, op. cit., p.2046.
396 Steve Pile, “Opposition, political identities and spaces of resistance“, in Steve Pile and Michael Keith
(eds.), Geographies of resistance, London, New York: Routledge, 1997, pp.1-32, p.1.
397 Ibid., p.16.
398 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1984, p.9.
399 Ibid., p.25.
400 Ibid., p.25.
401 Ibid., p.282.
402 Ibid., p.25.
403 Ibid., p.310.
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The recursiveness of human action, to which Giddens points, has been taken up by
Jabri, who suggests that actors reproduce social and institutional continuities over time,
so behaviours and acts need to be seen in relation to those surrounding structures that
consist mainly of social norms and values.404 This underlines the importance of the
institutional settings and frames of reference in which a decision is made,405 yet at the
same time claiming that structures of legitimation and domination can always be
contested in the very social context from which they have emerged.406 This recognises
the transformative capacity of agents operating within structural constraints and frames
the public space as space of contestation and conflict.407 Jabri’s and Gidden’s
approaches can be considered valuable in that they outline the ways in which structure
and agency are not only mutually constitutive, but also situational and contextual. In
addition, these approaches take away the structural determinism often found in
sociological approaches and yet situate social actors in their social context to question to
notion of autonomous agency. In this thesis, I will assume the possibility of acting and
transforming structures, while agency is guided – to a certain extent – by surrounding
structures. In that respect, certain meanings may constitute the essence of a space of
agency, but they may also constantly be modified and questioned by actors engaging
with that space. This is in line with Wight’s approach, stating that “agency is embedded
in a complex relational network of positioned practices, but does not reduce those that
practise to the positions they occupy.”408 The possibility to transcend structures to be
able to transform them has also been investigated by Holland et al., who identifies
improvisation as a tool of agency in terms of reflecting the space of authoring that
agents have in creating the social world.409 Agency hence arises out of episodes in
which a deviation from routines and engrained structures takes place, while this very
agency is formed dialectically and dialogically in imagined worlds.410 Individuals can
404 Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence, Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1996,
p.54.
405 Ibid., p.67.
406 Ibid., pp.83f.
407 Ibid., p.145 and 158.
408 Colin Wight, “They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They? Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure
Problematique”, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 5, no.1, 1999, pp.109-142, pp.134f.
409 Dorothy Holland et al., op. cit., p.40 and 210.
410 Ibid., p.49.
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improvise and act in these imagined worlds to transform actual social structures just as
much as collectivities and groups who have the same capacity.
The spaces of agency concept refers to changes in imagined and discursive
worlds and shows how such ideational changes are translated into social practice. When
spaces of agency change, which they constantly do to a greater or lesser extent, social
relations inevitably change as well due to the fact that spaces respond to each other and
are mutually linked. In that sense, bringing about change is possible not only from the
position of dominance, but also from more marginalised segments in society. Bhabha
argues that “a subaltern or minority agency may attempt to interrogate and rearticulate
the ‘interest’ of society that marginalizes its interests” by resorting to discourses
challenging the dominant order.”411 This reflects a rather broad conceptualisation of
power, pointing to its invisible dimensions. In fact Spivak’s suggests that “the agency of
change is located in the insurgent or the ‘subaltern’”.412 At the same time, Robinson
reminds us that spaces are never securely ordered and achieved, but may constantly be
reshaped.413
The creation of new or the modification of existing spaces of agency may
therefore appear to be an appropriate strategy to make one’s voice and needs heard,
even from a marginalised position. This, however, does not imply a coherent set of
needs among marginalised actors, but it is essential to deconstruct unity in terms of
asking who acts (for whom), who speaks (on behalf of whom), as well as by which
forces a common space is established.414 At the same time, Melucci reminds us that
collective actors are never in complete control of their actions,415 yet without denying
their agency to consciously modify and resist the structures surrounding them. Those
structures may link to cultural processes, which can serve “as a set of control
mechanisms […] for the governing of behavior.”416 Indeed, cultural structures play an
essential role in the ways in which spaces of agency are shaped and are in themselves
constantly modified by actors exercising their transformational powers. Being tied to
411 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, op. cit., p.274.
412 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historigraphy”, in Ranajit Guha and
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies, New York, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988, pp.3-32, p.3.
413 Jenny Robinson, op. cit., p.297.
414 Cf. Alberto Melucci, “Liberation or Meaning? Social Movements, Culture and Democracy”, op. cit.,
p.49.
415 Ibid., p.66.
416 Clifford Geertz, op. cit., p.44.
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ideas, the power of culture then depends on its social relevance, since “[i]deas […] must
[…] be carried by powerful social groups to have powerful social effects.”417 In that
sense, cultural processes represent both a platform for agency as well as providing the
structures of social life.
This results in a complex interplay of agency and structure, with structures
impacting on how responses to power and oppression are formed. At the same time, I
refrain from using a deterministic notion of agency. Following Pile’s and Bhabha’s
arguments about the ambivalence of power and resistance, there is this second side to
the concept of agency that is not purely a direct response to existing power structures,
but which also involves a consideration of what agents bring to discursive spaces as
their needs, hopes and fears. This, in turn, allows for a modification of structures and
thus represents a space in which interactions between different spaces, as well as within
them, may lead to change. As a result, agency is not viewed here as merely inherent, but
as constructed in relation to surrounding structures, while retaining a certain notion of
autonomy and space for the projection of human needs, associated interests and
emotions. Agency is thus manifested by filling spaces with new meaning as well as
creating new spaces with a particular meaning. Such processes do not happen in
isolation, but draw on existing resources. Kesby puts it as follows: “If ordinary people
are to deconstruct existing structures and then hold them at bay […], they require new
powers to provide some guidance for alternative living.”418 There are various sources,
both internal and external, that may contribute to this process and from which guidance
of spaces may emerge.
Peacebuilding Agency
Agency can be exercised in various ways and with various purposes. It must not
be romanticised, since agency is not necessarily constructive, but may at the same time
be destructive in terms of undermining the foundations on which people build their
lives. In that sense, agency may be diverse and nuanced, whether it be constructive or
destructive, related to peace or war, and so forth. However, what this thesis is interested
417 Ibid., p.314.
418 Mike Kesby, op. cit., p.2049.
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in, and looks at in closer detail, is a particular form of agency that, which I call
‘peacebuilding agency. It refers to the manifestations of agency as they are voiced by
actors that are, implicitly or explicitly, interested in peacebuilding in the broader sense.
This means peacebuilding agency as not exclusively liberal or neo-liberal in nature,419
but in relation to any action carried out in relation to peace. This may be rather indirect
and does not only refer to actors representing themselves as peacebuilding actors. In
fact, some of the cultural actors I interviewed, such as museums or musicians, do not
refer to themselves as peacebuilding actors. Yet, in the wider sense of the term,
peacebuilding agency refers to processes and reflects actions undertaken in order to
improve societal co-habitation and to create change in the everyday, thus comprising a
transformative potential. At the same time, this does not imply that this idea of
‘improvement’ is necessarily a good form of agency from a normative point of view as
it refers to the subjective perceptions and strategies of a certain actor. Rather than
alluding to desirable forms of agency in the peacebuilding context, it relates to the
social practices of actors in the light of their transformative ambitions. The artists’
association Ambrosia, based in Sarajevo, illustrates the fact that it is impossible to
distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ agency. Their ambition is to create a better society
by challenging its traditional values commonly associated with ‘raja’, with the latter
representing principles of egalitarianism and communal belonging.420 While the value
system linked to ‘raja’ may be a desirable form of social behaviour for large parts of the
population who identify with its underlying norms, Ambrosia is considering it as
oppressive and limiting creativity as a result of its collective nature.421 This example
reflects the extent to which peacebuilding agency is not inherently consensual and cosy,
but contested and linked to competing norm systems. The concept does therefore not
refer to selected normative systems, but instead refers to constructive social practices;
or, if they have destructive elements, to practices that still represent an attempt to make
space to build new foundations on which spaces of agency can emerge that are meant to
lead to a transformed society. The peacebuilding element is not exclusively measured
by the impacts it causes, since peacebuilding agency can cause new conflictual
processes or revive old ones, though, mostly, this is unintentional. Peacebuilding
419 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, op. cit.420 Nebojša Šavija-Valha, Ambrosia, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 23/03/10.
421 Ibid.
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agency thus relates to the constructive ambition and associated action of actors aiming
to change society and its ways of dealing with conflict. It can thus be seen as a social
practice. This thesis includes actors from a variety of backgrounds who compete over
the meaning of peace as well as the ways in which to achieve it. Yet, what they have in
common is an ambition to deal with conflict, and to create spaces in which peace can
unfold.
Interactions between Spaces of Agency
Going back to the image of spaces of agency as bubbles, the following section
explores different outcomes when two ‘bubbles of meaning’ approach or touch each
other. Do they destroy, merge, coexist or shape each other?
Lefebvre has claimed that “[c]onflict is not rare between representational spaces
and the symbolic systems they encompass.”422 At the same time, looking at the
interaction between spaces, not only in conflictual terms, but also with respect to
cooperation and symbiosis, we need to consider Gupta’s and Fergusons’ argument that
socio-cultural change and transformation can be understood as being located within
interconnected spaces.423 In that sense, if we want to understand change within the
peacebuilding context, we need to look at the interactions of those spaces that are
relevant to the peacebuilding context. When agency meets other forms of agency, how
do they transform each other, and what happens to the associated spaces? How do those
spaces newly emerging from encounters between EU and local spaces impact on the
overall peacebuilding process, its actors and core issues? Such questions will help us
understand changes in meanings as they are relevant in the peacebuilding process, as
well as to understand the different forms of agency that come into play.
Methodologies: Institutional Ethnography and Participatory Research Techniques
Investigating the interaction between imaginary spaces of agency requires an
adequate methodology. In combination with participatory research techniques, the
422 Henri Lefebvre, op.cit., p.213.
423 Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, op. cit., p.8.
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methodology that appears to be most useful for this purpose is based on institutional
ethnography (IE), a technique developed during the American women’s movement in
the 1970s, which aimed to critique the prevailing sociological discourse that often
ignored the everyday.424 In that context, traditional sociology was mainly critiqued for
its tendency to focus on “the constructed realities of privileged experts over the lived
realities of its subjects,”425 thus neglecting the recipients of the policies of those experts.
This is the background against which institutional ethnography, in the first place
promoted by Dorothy Smith, was developed as an approach that privileged the
experiences of the ‘people on the ground’ by creating “a sociology for rather than of
people.”426 For this purpose, IE is interested in the ways in which people are affected by
institutional discourses in terms of how their daily lives are influenced by the latter.
This means locating a perspective in a specific institutional order, which allows for
investigating the relationship that is established between an institution and people’s
everyday lives. In that sense, people are viewed as embedded in an everyday life
context in which “they are hooked into relations that connect them beyond scope of
experience.”427 Here, the contexts in which people’s activities are deployed, organised
and contribute to social organisation are relevant for the analysis of the social world,428
while social relations and their connection to the organisation of experience matter. IE
is conducted from the perspective of exclusion, given that it focuses on the perspectives
of those who have been excluded from the making of institutional discourses,429 such as
cultural actors excluded from the institutionalisation of peacebuilding. In that sense, the
ambition of IE is to see what has been overlooked by mainstream sociology to bring
hidden agencies back into the political and social world. Therefore, the main emphasis
of analysis lies on the ways in which people’s everyday lives are externally regulated by
the very institutional and social settings in which they are situated. In this context, IE is
particularly interested in the discursive influence of institutions on those everyday
situations in terms of looking at texts (in a broad sense) and how those reflect power
424 Dorothy E. Smith, “Institutional Ethnography”, in Tim May (ed.), Qualitative Research in Action,
London: SAGE, 2000, pp.17-52, pp.17f.
425 Peter R. Grahame, “Ethnography, Institutions, and the Problematic of the Everyday World“, Human
Studies, vol.21, 1998, pp.347-360, p.348.
426 Dorothy E. Smith, op. cit., p.19.
427 Ibid., p.21.
428 Ibid., p.18.
429 Peter R. Grahame, op. cit., pp.356f.
99
relations, regulation and social organisation.430 Not only are texts revealing in terms of
reflecting a specific institutional position, but they also reflect the ways in which
labelling and counter-labelling matter in the discursive construction of social spaces.431
With a slightly stronger focus on discourses within institutions in such processes,
Escobar argues that IE allows for investigating how local (historical) spaces are
influenced by non-local practices of institutions.432 This argument can be extended in
terms of claiming that at the same time, textual practices can reveal the extent to which
non-local spaces are shaped by local discourses and practices. As a result, the ways in
which ‘local’ and ‘non-local’ spaces overlap and impact on each other can be grasped
by looking at their mutual influences, given that the nature of daily life in either of those
spheres is not exempt from external influences.433 In that sense, the impacts of
institutional discourses on the everyday mirrors the extent to which those institutions
structure people’s lives and thoughts.434 The organising power of texts mirrors the extra-
local management of local settings through texts and discourses,435 reflecting back on
the dynamics of social structures and processes outlined above. This is the background
against which Wright characterises IE “as an effective research tool useful for
investigating oppressive ruling relations that intersect institutional and cultural
boundaries.”436 At the same time, IE manages to situate people in the complexities of
their everyday worlds,437 which are rather disorganised and fragmented as a result of
transversal processes related to state agencies, institutions, the market and so forth.438
Indeed, local ideas and ideologies as well as discourses, such as liberalism and neo-
liberalism provide the master-frames of institutional ethnographies in terms of how they
impact on the everyday.439
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Thus, I will use IE as a method to look at the interactions between different
spaces of agency. It will be a useful methodology to investigate the ways in which the
EU’s discourses influence local spaces of agency. This, in turn, allows for an
investigation of how such spaces are shaped and transformed by institutional spaces.
However, this represents a one-way approach that fails to look at the feedback loop in
which local (counter-)discourses respond to those discourses imposed by institutions.
Instead, a two-way approach of investigating discourses will be necessary. Examining
not only how institutions shape people’s everyday lives, but also how the latter shape
the former, will allow for an investigation of the extent to which people challenge those
institutional structures in terms of how they modify, co-opt, take over or resist them. In
addition, using IE as a two-way process will help understand how institutional spaces
are impacted upon by responses emerging from the everyday and how discourses keep
emerging in the encounter of those spheres. Using IE as a two-way process will then
help create an investigation of the dynamics of interaction between local needs and
those of the EU whilst acknowledging that institutional discourses are not immune from
resistance from the ground. By turning IE on its head, it will be possible to investigate
the different responses of local agencies to EU peacebuilding policies and how they
impact on the latter. As a result, those agencies will not be considered as passive victims
of imposed spaces, but be looked at with regard to their capacities to re-transform those
spaces on their own terms.
For this purpose, the investigation of texts as manifestations of discourse has to
be understood in a very broad sense, not only encompassing written texts, but at the
same time investigating non-written texts such oral discourses and symbolic language.
This is particularly important in order to focus on the everyday lives of people, which,
in most cases, are not written, but rather consist of verbal responses as well as acts and
reactions to imposed discourses. Those responses feed back into institutional discourses,
for instance by challenging their legitimacy or by modifying them on their own terms.
As far as the EU is concerned, there is a large body of written texts available in the form
of policy papers and documents. However, to fully comprehend the dynamics and
processes of interaction between the EU’s spaces and local spaces, it will not be
sufficient to rely on those written texts. Instead, it is essential to take into account the
verbal communication of people working in EU agencies in order to concretely account
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for the ways in which policy changes are thought through (informally) and possibly
modified, thus creating specific spaces of agency. As a result, both the quantity and
quality of interaction are of crucial importance in using a two-way approach to IE,
which will then help understand how different spaces interact in (re)producing
conceptualisations of peace and various actors’ needs associated with it. In that sense,
IE will serve as a method for understanding the relationship between local actors and
the EU in their engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not only will this methodology
allow for an analysis of the EU’s impact on Bosnian society, but at the same time it will
be possible to investigate the feedback loop during the course of which local agencies
are capable of transforming EU peacebuilding spaces. This is why semi-structured
interviews coupled with participatory research techniques have formed the cornerstone
of the research upon which this thesis is based.
Due to its emphasis on local agency, the methodological approach this thesis
takes is built on participatory research techniques. As Cahill has pointed out, such
techniques relate to personal experiences and concerns, taking into account the
emotional experiences of the participants in the research process.440 It aims to take the
perspective and visions of the ‘subjects’ of research into account, yet without claiming
to provide a full representation of their ideas. This thesis rather implies that, while it is
never possible to be representative in terms of speaking on behalf of a group of actors,
this cannot serve as an excuse to avoid listening to them. Against this background,
research undertaken for this thesis builds on a number of elements taken from
participatory research techniques in the belief that different voices, even if they are
biased, can make an important contribution to the research process. In this vein, this
project builds on the following participatory elements:441
First, I have undertaken several field trips to BiH and thus maintained ongoing
contact with many participants. Conversations and interviews were partly followed up
by phone or email to allow for a more dialogical view on the research process. This, in
turn, made it possible to constantly revise and rethink the findings with a low degree of
440 Caitlin Cahill, “Participatory data analysis”, in Sara Kindon, Rachel Pain and Mike Kesby (eds.),
Participatory Action Research Approaches and Methods. Connecting People, participation and place,
London; New York: Routledge, 2007, pp.181-187, p.186.
441 This is based on Mike Kesby, Sara Kindon and Rachel Pain, “Participatory approaches and
diagramming techniques”, in Robin Flowerdew and David Martin (eds.), Methods in Human Geography,
2nd ed., Harlow; New York: Prentice Hall, 2005, pp.144-166.
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distortion. To check whether the findings correspond to what people in BiH think of
themselves, findings have also been presented at conferences. One was organised in the
framework of “Just and Durable Peace by Piece,” a project situated in the EU’s Seventh
Framework Programme, and aimed to gathering together researchers and local
participants from different societal sectors. It thus created the opportunity for academics
to get feedback from those addressed by their writings. Another conference took place
in Brussels, where I presented some of my research findings at a meeting in the
framework of the People-to-People programme to participants from the Western
Balkans.
Second, in the process of interviewing participants, I put emphasis on not
dictating the conditions and topics, but was eager to leave space for what the
interviewees wanted to talk about and considered important. This sometimes took the
conversation in unexpected directions, and these directions then constituted the most
central part of the research in terms of pointing to central aspects of agency. It was those
findings that led to a complete revision of the theoretical framework after the field
work, taking into consideration the views of the participants – not only from
interviewees, but also gathered through random conversations ‘on the street’, in more
social environments with friends as well as semi-public spheres such as museum
exhibitions, theatre performances, gatherings in youth centres and so forth. These
experiences were crucial in how the theoretical framework of this thesis was developed
and this research can thus claim to draw on a certain degree of participatory knowledge.
At the same time, those techniques do not claim to be comprehensive in terms of
allowing the researcher to gain access to all aspects of agency, since such agency might
be partly unconscious and thus not communicable, or actors might deliberately want to
hide some of their strategies to keep them from losing their strategic power. After all, as
Rose has suggested, there can be more meaning in silence than in interviews and
communication.442
Finally, as far as participatory techniques are concerned, there was also a certain
extent of reciprocity involved, with the author supporting and assisting in some
442 Gillian Rose, ”Performing Inoperative Community. The Space and the resistance of some community
arts projects,“ in Steve Pile and Michael Keith (eds.), Geographies of resistance, London, New York:
Routledge, 1997, pp.184-202, p.184.
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organisational activities on the ground. However, due to issues of confidentiality, these
activities cannot be outlined in detail.
Although these research strategies are participatory in nature, this does not mean
that the entire research process has been participatory. Some elements, such as the
preparation of semi-structured interview questions and the writing up process, have
been less participatory. The actual choice of interviewees has not been participatory in
all cases, with the purpose of not just hearing the ‘loudest’ voices, but instead to
actively find more silent and less networked voices that may not have considered
themselves as participants to such a research project. Furthermore, there have been
critiques of participatory techniques, and in particular concerns regarding the dilemma
of researchers who may get involved in the very power relations they are studying and,
thus, risk their research becoming co-opted.443 Whilst acknowledging such dangers, I
still believe that, since power and co-optation cannot be avoided, even biased
participation can still wield important insights as long as it does not claim to be
representative. Indeed, different manifestations of agency can only be discovered when
the researcher deliberately departs from the claim to be neutral or unbiased in favour of
an approach that aims to discover purposeful agency in different spheres. For this
purpose, a sensitive methodology is crucial in order to take into account the everyday
context in which the research project is situated. Therefore, this thesis does not claim to
give a complete account of spaces of agency, but rather intends to point to some
selected manifestations of peacebuilding agency as well as its associated interaction
processes.
Participatory research techniques integrate well with IE. They manage to shed
light on discursive relationships between different actors that might not necessarily be
visible to ‘outsiders’ and mere observers. In that sense, participatory research can
enhance the scope and quality of IE by giving a more nuanced account of what matters
to the participants of discourses rather than just observing and assessing from an outside
perspective, which often fails to see the roots of discourses. Participatory techniques can
therefore help to gain access to the everyday dimension of peacebuilding, which is also
an essential element of IE.
443 See, for instance, Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds.), Participation: The new Tyranny?, op. cit.
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Taking these methodological considerations into account and reflecting on the
hybridity and interaction between agencies, the variety of ways in which local agencies
can impact on EU peacebuilding policies, and vice versa, will be outlined in the
following paragraph.
Types of Interaction Between Spaces
As far as the interaction between local and international actors is concerned, a
fair amount of research has been conducted on the ways in which local society is
impacted upon and transformed by peacebuilding agencies. This has often been
investigated from a biopolitical perspective in terms of uncovering the techniques by
which social engineering is used to govern societies rather than liberating them from
structures of domination.444 On the other hand, the extent to which these diverse forms
of governance have led to the emergence of new spaces, in which local agency can
unfold, has hardly been conceptualised. Against this background, I want to argue that
much research on the governing power of peacebuilding has ignored the ability of local
actors to make a difference to their everyday lives in the peacebuilding context in a
variety of ways. It is essential to look not only at the ways in which societies are
externally governed, but also how they feed their own ideas back into political
processes and transform discourse on their own terms. Investigating this feedback loop
helps find alternative spaces in which the seemingly powerless suddenly manage to
acquire forces that often remain unaccounted for. At the same time it becomes obvious
that in many cases smaller agencies have a variety of options at their disposal when
choosing how to respond to official policies, even though this might not be so evident
on the surface. However, one could even argue that it is through the ignorance of
peacebuilding policies on a superficial and official level that local actors uncover spaces
that internationals tend to turn a blind eye to – mostly because such spaces are difficult
to access, complex and disguised. By ignoring or underestimating local agency,
international actors may thus even contribute to the emergence of new spaces in which
actors claim their agency back. Focusing on such spaces allows for a conceptualisation
of various local responses as people shape their structural environment on their own
444 Cf. Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism”, op. cit.
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terms. In this context, marginalised agency comes to the fore when actors develop their
own spaces of agency. This, in turn, illustrates the complexity of interaction and control.
Control is not only exercised from the top down, but it develops in the interaction
between spaces, while spaces indirectly regulate each other. This results from the fact
that spaces respond to each other, suggesting certain patterns of behaviour that are most
promising in satisfying the needs at stake. To do so, actors aim to influence others
through the discursive spaces they create, for instance by controlling them and
emphasising their agency vis-à-vis their environment. By acting together, people are
able to emphasise what they consider important for their own lives and to choose from a
variety of strategies to communicate their identities and needs. The latter are illustrative
of culturally and socially shaped conditions in which specific needs are stressed by the
respective actor and/or collectivity. Those contextually-emerging needs have often been
neglected by peacebuilding institutions, although it is in those spheres that local actors
develop their own visions of peace and create alternative responses to what is being
imposed upon them.
As alluded to above, this is not to essentialise the local or the international as
spheres clearly distinguishable from or opposed to each other, but to imply that there is
always some kind of hybridity in the constitution of local and international agency.445 In
that sense, this framework does not make the claim that the EU or ‘the local’ are
coherent and clearly distinguishable realms, but argues that they keep reconstituting
themselves, drawing on internal and external sources and processes. Regarding the EU,
I have shown above that its sub-institutions differ considerably in their mandates and
self-representations. At the same time, those institutions also change according to the
people working in them. For instance, with respect to culture, some EU officials that I
interviewed ascribed no importance to it while others identified it as one of the fields
that the EU should engage with most in the near future. This certainly depends on the
identity, engagement and professional role of the respective interviewee.
The variety of actors that identify themselves as ‘local’ in turn emphasises the
wide range of possible reactions and responses to the policies of the peacebuilding
agencies, whose power is visible on the surface, but may be viewed differently from a
bottom-up perspective. Local agencies in different positions choose (not always
445 Cf. Oliver Richmond, “De-romanticising the Local, De-mystifying the International”, op. cit.
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consciously) from different reactions to official policies, such as accommodation and
assimilation, acceptance and tolerance, complicity, compliance, conformity and
obedience, ambiguity, negotiation, modification, co-optation, ignorance, rejection and
resistance. Those patterns represent a breakdown derived from Castells’ ‘resistance
identity’ as described above446 and reflect the modes in which local agencies relate to
the frameworks the EU has been proposing. In a similar vein, Barnett and Zürcher point
to the dependence of peacebuilders on local elites and introduced four different results
of interaction between the former and the latter.447 Those results range from cooperative
to conflictive peacebuilding, yet the authors fail to develop a more nuanced and
contextualised approach to peacebuilding interactions, instead relying on what comes
close to a behaviouralistic notion of agency. Therefore, the following section aims to
provide a more detailed typology of processes as they can be observed in the interaction
between the EU and local society. In this context, Richmond has encouraged a
distinction between different responses to liberal peace and peacebuilding on the part of
its subjects.448 Those categories are equally applicable to the EU’s ways of dealing with
Bosnian society and can thus be considered a two-way process. They do not stand in
isolation, given that in many cases, several forms of responses are at play at the same
time. However, the following typology provides a point of departure from which
various responses to the EUPF can be investigated.
Accommodation and Assimilation
When (EU) norms and policies are deeply internalised, they are can be
accommodated with local society in terms of connecting to local spaces of agency. This
might mean that society or a group of agents are willing to assimilate to institutional
requirements due to a deep, inner conviction that it is the right thing to do. Such an
internalised accommodation of spaces is usually not linked to material incentives, but
446 Manuel Castells, op. cit.
447 Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, “The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding
Reinforces Weak Statehood”, in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds.), The dilemmas of statebuilding :
confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations, Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2008.
448 Oliver P. Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace“, Millennium, vol. 38, no.3, 2010,
pp.665-692.
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reflects a normative attitude that considers the destined changes to be beneficial.
Accommodation requires active choices in terms of making social dynamics compatible
with the underlying norms of the policy to be implemented. With respect to the EU, this
ties in with what Diez et al. have outlined as the “constructive impact” of EU
engagement, during the course of which “underlying identity-scripts of conflicts” are
transformed, while new discursive frameworks emerge.449 However, this represents a
one-way approach and needs to be complemented with a perspective that takes the
inverse direction into account as well. Not only can EU values be accommodated with a
society, but we also need to investigate the extent to which the EU has accommodated
local needs and values as they emerge from various spaces of agency. In that respect,
accommodation and assimilation are not only results of actions, but they equally
represent ongoing processes of interaction between actors.
Acceptance and Tolerance
The acceptance and tolerance of a space are somewhat weaker responses than
accommodation. They still reflect a general approval of its contents and structures, but
do so less out of inner conviction. Rather, such responses come from a perspective that
views a reform or the measure linked to it as necessary (maybe even a necessary evil),
without necessarily enjoying the concrete adoption of the values of the space. This is
similar to accommodation in as far as it does not call for measures against the policies
to be implemented, but it is a less active form of acceptance, given that it is a mere
reception of measures that are considered necessary for progress and development
according to the space in question. This can be the case when certain benefits are
attached to policies and such benefits are seen as outweighing any disadvantages or
painful elements of the policy. In this context, Menkhaus has argued that acceptance of
peacebuilding policies can also be the result of a longer-lasting process which may have
449 Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter and Matthias Albert, “The European Union and Border Conflicts: The
Transformative Power of Integration“, International Organization, vol.60, 2006, pp.563-593, p.574.
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started with initial resistance to those policies.450 Therefore, acceptance and tolerance
are both an attitude and a result of that attitude.
Complicity
Bourdieu views complicity as closely linked to symbolic power, arguing that:
For symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the
complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that
they themselves exercise it.451
Schaffer contends that in the senses that Bourdieu and Sartre use the word, complicity
refers to the reproduction of certain structures and hierarchies, whilst leaving
possibilities for acting against such possibly oppressive structures.452 Complicity can
thus be overcome through the agency of each actor.
In the context of this thesis, complicity is viewed in a similar vein: a
manifestation of agency and reflection of a process in which agencies become involved
with the design of a discourse within a space of agency. This means that specific actors
are actively engaged in designing a process of change, while they may represent a broad
societal view or only a sectional interest. However, it does not mean that this complicity
has to be public and obvious, although it can. In other cases, complicit agencies may
refuse to take responsibility for, or to admit to, their involvement in the process
publicly. This might be because they are aware of possibly facing resistance by other
societal or institutional factions. Complicity is, therefore, a mode of interaction that is
processual in nature.
Compliance, Conformity and Obedience
Actors may want to comply with certain contents of a space without agreeing
with them for a number of reasons. On the one hand, a certain degree of control and
450 Kai Menkhaus, “Impact Assessment in Post– Conflict Peacebuilding. Challenges and Future
Directions“, interpeace, 2004,
http://pdf2.hegoa.efaber.net/entry/content/643/3_Impact_Assessment_in.pdf (accessed 12/05/11).
451 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, Cambridge: Polity, 1991, p.164.
452 Scott Schaffer, Resisting Ethics, New York, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 2004, pp.106.
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governance which domineering actors of spaces may strive to exercise may make other
actors conform to the requirements put on them. This can even take the form of
coercion, during the course of which an outside agency overtly forces a space into a
specific direction, while the nature of the respective measures may vary. This category
also comprises what is often referred to as the carrot and stick approach where either
incentives or punishments impact upon actors’ attitudes and behaviour. The EU’s policy
of imposing conditionalities on potential member states is a prevalent strategy of
incentivising and punishing certain types of behaviour and making actors comply.453
Having said that, one has to be aware that compliance and conformity are often only
faked, and actors may find other channels through which they can circumvent structures
of obedience. As a result, they may still get the benefits linked to compliance, yet
without getting totally absorbed by the spaces that contain the imposed structures and
norms. At the same time, the EU may be forced to play by the rules of some local actors
on whose compliance the implementation of a policy may depend.
Ambiguity
Ambiguity as a concept has often been ascribed to the actual peace process and
provided a basis for critiquing it.454 Yet this can also be seen as an attitude of actors
towards a specific peace process and is, according to Lefebvre, “a category of everyday
life.”455 Collective actors hardly ever have a clear and precise opinion about their goals
and values. Rather they might have an ambiguous attitude towards certain spaces. This
might be because the contents and implications of those spaces cannot be fully
estimated, because they consist of diverse individuals or because they do not directly
concern the agencies in question. Moreover, actors may not have enough information to
be able to assess the space fully, which can be a deliberate policy of the participants of
the respective other space. This is because ambiguity may be a factor inhibiting
resistance due to a lack of a clear position. To a certain extent, ambiguity is present in
453 There have been long debates about the usefulness of the carrot and stick strategy. See, for example,
Dimitar Bechev, “Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe“,
Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, vol.8, no.1, 2006, pp.27-43.
454 See, for instance, Béatrice Pouligny, op. cit.
455 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of everyday life, vol.1, op. cit., p.18.
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most positions, but it is often linked to other forms of responding, such as ignorance or
negotiation.
Negotiation
In most academic work on negotiation, the term negotiation refers to actions
taken by political elites who decide the conditions and contents of a certain peace
agreement.456 However, negotiation can take place on a much more subtle level as well.
In this thesis, negotiation reflects a process during the course of which actors try to get
actively and visibly involved in the design of a space of agency. There is no complete
rejection of the space in the first place, but an attempt to modify its contents, needs and
associated meanings. This aims to make the space of agency compatible with the
respective actor’s ideas by exerting influence in an early stage of the creation process.
However, the extent to which alternative ideas are integrated with the ‘draft’ varies
considerably.
Modification
The modification of spaces represents both an active process and a possible
result of negotiations that may occur when local or EU agencies have been successful in
bringing in their specific and alternative ideas and visions of the policy design into a
pre-existing space. If, through a selection of various strategies (such as cooptation or
negotiation), a space of agency changes, then we can see a modified space as a result. It
is important to be aware that such modifications happen constantly. Yet, again, the
degree to which alterations are possible is highly variable.
456 See Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving international conflicts: the theory and practice of mediation,
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1996.
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Co-optation
The core issue of a space can be taken over, but during the course of that
process, be co-opted, when the layers of meaning that are cocooned around it are
changed for the benefit of the co-opting actor(s). As a result, the space might appear as
the same on the surface in terms of the issues it addresses, but since the meanings
attached to it are changing it reflects different needs and serves different interests. This
ties in with Barnett and Zuercher’s notion of “captured peacebuilding,” during the
course of which both peacebuilders and local elites shape assistance in a way that it is
consistent with their interests.457 With respect to the liberal peace, Franks and
Richmond have illustrated how the entire liberal state has become co-opted by local
elites in Kosovo.458 Those elites have built on the rhetoric of the peacebuilding
community, at the same time attaching new meanings to it to make it their own. Similar
dynamics are also at work at the level of a certain space of agency, the meanings of
which may become co-opted by certain actors.
Ignorance
With a different strategy, actors can ignore spaces to minimise their impact. This
can either happen when a space does not appear to matter for one’s own space, or
because the actors engaged with the space do not want to be affected by another space.
Indeed, if spaces are ignored they tend to lose their power. In that sense, when the target
audience ignores the space a revision of it may follow, possibly involving some
members of the target audience in the re-designing process. Ignorance can therefore be
a very conscious decision, a strategic option and deliberate withdrawal to reduce the
impact of a certain space. It can also be the result of not knowing the other space
through a lack of contact with it. Either way, ignorance may be a very powerful tool in
terms of impacting on discourse clusters.
457 Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, op. cit., pp.24, 25.
458 Jason Franks and Oliver P. Richmond, “Coopting Liberal Peace-building : Untying the Gordian Knot
in Kosovo”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol.43, no.1, 2008, pp.81-103.
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Rejection
When spaces and their contents are deemed unacceptable, they risk being
rejected by their target audience. The latter can show their disagreement in different
ways, for instance by circumventing it, again, to minimise its impact. Rejection is
generally accompanied by a conviction that the space in question is harmful to one’s
own needs and interests and should therefore not be in place. Rejection, however, does
not necessarily imply active behaviour, but, unlike resistance, reflects a certain state of
mind.
Resistance
Resistance goes beyond rejection and involves active behaviour and a sense of
opposition.459 Not only does it represent a negative attitude towards the space of agency
in question, but, beyond that, it also attempts to transform it. In that context, Richmond
has linked resistance to peacebuilding and its pitfalls460 by drawing on Scott’s
conceptualisation of resistance in terms of powerful small-scale processes as
infrapolitics.461
Resistance is mostly no centralised process, but happens on “multiple and
intersecting sites of struggle.”462 Since those spaces can be more and less hidden, acts of
resistance are diverse in their visibility463 and are exercised by different actors, in
different places and with different purposes. This is the background against which Scott
uncovers resistance in hidden transcripts that are beyond the control of powerholders,
although those transcripts are within the spheres of both the powerholders and
subordinates.464 Scott argues that those transcripts are often deliberately kept hidden to
create a sheen of complicity with the dominators, while at the same time creating spaces
459 Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner, “Conceptualising Resistance“, Sociological Forum,
vol.19, no.4, 2004, pp.533-554, p.538.
460 Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, op. cit.
461 Cf. James Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990.
462 Lucy Healey, “Gender, power and the ambiguities of resistance in a Malay community of peninsular
Malaysia“, Women’s Studies International Forum, vol.22, no.1, 1999, pp.49-61, p.50.
463 Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner, op. cit., p.540.
464 James Scott, op. cit., pp.15, 86.
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outside the control of the dominators.465 In some cases, open resistance is forced into
clandestine channels.466 Hence, Scott suggests that in order to find those spaces one
must go beyond the public and official spheres and look at gossip, linguistic tricks,
metaphors, folktales, rituals, and local codes and dialects.467 Those are the spaces in
which resistance manifests itself in the subtleties of everyday life. Healey points out that
identity construction can become a form of resistance (even unintentionally) when
identities are used to counter a label imposed from outside.468 However, there are
various ways in which resistance can be voiced, whether it be via identity creation,
rumours, alternative discourses or the deliberate ignoring of policies. Hollander and
Einwohner make this point by suggesting a typology of resistance that takes into
consideration the diverse manifestations of resistance, ranging from overt resistance to
missed resistance and many more nuances in between.469 The authors claim that
resistance can be distinguished according to whether it is intended, whether it is
recognised as resistance by its target audience and whether recognised as resistance by
observer.470 This sheds light on the complexity of resistance acts without even taking
into account the divergent forms that resistance can take, which Scott puts emphasis on.
This is not to argue that ‘subalterns’ can be reduced to their reactivity to the
spaces imposed on them.471 Yet, it is to take into consideration the hybridity that
emerges from the interaction in both official and unofficial spaces between local and
international agencies. At the same time, the limitations of resistance cannot be
neglected, such as social pressures and material factors.472 Healey has suggested that
agencies can become complicit in power and domination through expressions of
resistance,473 so acts of resistance can never be seen in absolute terms.
465 Ibid., pp.86, 118.
466 Ibid., p.192.
467 Ibid., p.137f.
468 Lucy Healey, op. cit., p.49.
469 Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. Einwohner, op. cit., p.544.
470 Ibid., p.544.
471 Cf. Sherry B. Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal“, Comparative Studies in
Society and History, vol.37, no.1, 1995, pp.173-193, p.180.
472 Cf. Lucy Healey, op. cit., pp.56f.
473 Ibid., pp.59f.
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The variety of reactions on the part of different (local) agencies mirrors the
impact that actors can have one each other’s spaces, although they are often portrayed
as powerless and marginal. However, it becomes evident that actors tend to have certain
options from which they can choose (to different degrees), to demonstrate their agency
and power, often deployed in more hidden spaces. This list of reactions does not claim
to be able to clearly separate those responses, which tend to be overlapping and
nuanced. In many cases, several of these reactions are deployed simultaneously by
different agencies and even from within one specific agency. What is recognised as a
local response generally depends on the perspective of the observer as well as on the
depth of focus. Yet, even marginal agencies can have an impact on bigger policies in
terms of pushing for change, ignoring those policies, becoming complicit in or resisting
them. This is the background against which the ways in which EU agencies’ impacts
upon local spaces can be investigated, yet also how local agencies transform EU
peacebuilding spaces by feeding back into policies through their own power and
agency.
Translation between Spaces
This raises the following questions: How are the preceding reflections relevant
for the study of peace and peacebuilding? And, how do spaces of agency affect
peacebuilding processes?
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I argue that an investigation of spaces of agency allows for the development of a
perspective on the complexity of voices and their infrastructures in the day-to-day
negotiation of peace, thereby taking the subjectivity of peace into account. Focusing on
the social processes through which a space is shaped, constantly reproduced and
modified sheds light on the dynamics of social interaction. In this context, it is
important to investigate what can be said in which spaces, with respect to the prevailing
logics of inclusion and exclusion. Spaces of agency reflect people’s everyday discourses
as they are performed and circulated within various spaces, and thus sheds light on
underlying societal processes and concerns. Such an approach involves questions about
who participates in a certain space in specific ways, as well as who is excluded from its
(re)production as far as the creation of meanings is concerned. This, in turn, relates to
power relations as they are constructed in a space and between spaces through
mechanisms of mutual control.
It suggests itself that the crucial point in investigating the power of the
interaction between spaces of agency lies in the potential of discourse translation
between spaces. This means that spaces not only control each other, but they are also
capable of instilling discourses into one another, thus shaping each other. Bhabha has
spoken of “cultural translation” as a strategy of resisting the colonisers and their
discourses through the imitation and manipulation of the colonial discourses when those
are moved to a different context.474 Lefebvre also hints at the capacity of translation, yet
in a constructive rather than resisting capacity. He points to the power of the everyday
to translate ‘sign systems’ into what is more accessible to people by recoding
bureaucratic language.475 Translation may also happen when there is a common
audience to two spaces, which carries meanings from one to the other. For instance, a
staff member of the EU may, at the same time, be involved in cultural activities and will
therefore be able to carry meanings back and forth between the spheres of cultural
activity and the EU’s policy spaces. Another option is that one space creates attracts the
audience of a different space who, in turn, carry meanings across spaces. It is important
to note that the mere size of a space does not determine its power to influence another
space. Rather, it is important to look at the overlaps between two spaces, their common
474 Homi Bhabha, “The Third Space”, in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.), Identity, Community, Culture,
Difference, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990, pp.207-221, p.210.
475 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of everyday life, vol.3, op. cit., p.68.
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audience and their potential to translate their own discourses and meanings into the
language of another space, or have those translated by interested actors from another
space. This raises questions such as: How can relatively small and invisible actors, as
are often found in the cultural sector, make a difference to peacebuilding? How do such
actors instil their discourses and meanings into other spaces? And, at the same time,
how are the EU’s own spaces changed when its actors translate discourses into other
spaces?
The ability to translate meanings from a space to another is, thus, a central sign
of the capacity of an actor, which is why even marginalised and small actors may be
more influential than often assumed. Indeed, they may, in more or less disguised ways,
be able to slightly change meanings in spaces and exercise their power without other
actors necessarily realising it. This is due to the fact that this power does not emerge
from direct interaction between actors, but rather through a modification of a space of
agency, both within as well as between each other. The central power-holders of a
particular space may not even realise these subtle changes. However, giving a chance to
actors traditionally considered as weak or powerless to impact on the peacebuilding
process, this ties in with Bhabha’s objectives:
My purpose in specifying the enunciative present in the articulation of culture is to
provide a process by which objectified others may be turned into subjects of their history
and experience.476
Conclusion
This framework suggests investigating encounters between local actors and the
EU by establishing the spaces of agency concept. This is based on the idea that core
issues in debates make discursive spaces emerge in which meanings are cocooned
around a core issue and in which there are corresponding layers of meaning reflecting
underlying needs, identities and interests. This approach claims that spaces are clearly
reflective of agency, serving as a tool to make one’s voice heard, whether it be official
or informal.
476 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, op. cit., p.255.
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To investigate the ways in which different spaces respond to and shape each
other can best be analysed by using IE, combined with participatory research
techniques, as a two-way method for looking at the mutuality of space-constitution.
Rather than exclusively investigating the EU’s ways of dealing with spaces in Bosnian
society, a variety of local responses and attempts to transform EU peacebuilding spaces
will be taken into account. In that sense, the agency of marginalised actors will be
acknowledged without implying that local and EU spaces are always oppositional to
each other, but instead claiming that those spaces are hybrid and reconstitute each other
in complex ways. In that sense, the ability to translate meanings between spaces can be
seen as an indicator of agency, pointing to disguised forms of power that emerge in the
interaction between spaces rather than directly between individual actors
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Chapter 5: The EU’s Spaces of Agency in the
Bosnian Peacebuilding Context
The previous chapter has shed light on the processes of how spaces of agency
emerge. It has also investigated the tensions between different spaces and their mutual
interaction, pointing to their interactive potential in relation to the manifestation of
agency. Based on Castells’ notion of legitimizing identity as the inclination of
institutions to justify their interventions, this chapter will look at concrete spaces of
agency as they are shaped by the EU as a peacebuilding actor in its interaction with
politics and society in BiH.
The EU and its Peacebuilding Spaces in BiH
As outlined above, there are very clearly differences and conflicts between the
approaches and ideas of the different sub-bodies of the EU. While these different sub-
bodies are meant to be complementing each other, at times they contradict each other as
well. This is why I do not represent the EU’s spaces as closed unities and will not claim
that those represent its discourses in their entirety. The following section, rather, aims to
illustrate a number of spaces that have become important for the EU’s identity with
respect to its peacebuilding ambitions in BiH. The spaces that matter most to the EU
can be viewed as derived from those that have shaped the liberal peace and its actors.
Indeed, the spaces that emerge from the EU’s discourses on peace in BiH, as well as
from personal interviews, largely seem to concur with the literature on liberal peace,
although they slightly deviate from it.477 Thus the EU’s spaces of agency that will be
outlined below can be seen in close relation with elements of liberal peace outlined in
the work of Richmond and Franks,478 but also combined with Manner’s analysis of a set
of EU core values and ethics.479 In addition, Richmond et al. have pointed to some
particular characteristics of the emerging EU peacebuilding framework.480 However,
477 cf. Oliver Richmond, Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler, op. cit.
478 Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal peace transitions: between statebuilding and
peacebuilding, Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
479 Ian Manners, “The normative ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs, vol. 84, no.1,
2008, p.46.
480 Oliver Richmond et al. op. cit.
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rather than merely building on the work of those academics, this thesis expands them
contextually in the light of the EU’s peacebuilding ambitions in BiH. This context has
not only influenced the ways in which the EU develops its values and interests further,
but has also resulted in the emergence of some specific patterns that are of lesser
importance in the EU’s other spheres of influence.
The selection of the spaces of agency analysed in this thesis tie in with the
participatory research methods as outlined above. Against this background, the spaecs
that were selected were the ones that interviewees kept mentioning without specifically
being asked to talk about. They therefore represent the red threads running through the
conversations and thus the data gathered for this study. Those spaces were not
preselected, but responded to the discourses encountered both in Brussels and in BiH,
mirroring the discursive leitmotifs that not only the interviewees kept mentioning, but
additionally derived from what discourses in local communities emphasised, and the
cultural sector more specifically. As a result, the selection criteria of the spaces outlined
below focused on the extent to which a specific topic was mentioned both in the EU and
in cultural discourses. This in turn was necessary in order to be able to establish
relations of interaction between the two. As discourses in the ways in which they are
conceptualised in this thesis do not stand in isolation, but are shaped, accommodated,
and resisted by different actors, this selection procedure helped to understand the
processes through which different sets of actors modify and (re-)create discursive fields.
The fact that both EU actors and local cultural actors often mentioned certain topics and
issues without specifically being asked to talk about them in turn reflects the extent to
which subtle interaction through spaces of agency take place. In that sense, to be able to
uncover the varied processes of interaction between discursive spaces, I am focusing on
those spaces that recurred through the discourses that were analysed for the purposes of
this thesis. Those spaces may seem somewhat surprising as some of them deviate to a
certain extent from what one might expect when investigating the policies of the EU.
However, those spaces were the ones that seemed most relevant for the context this
thesis focuses on. At the same time, this reflects the extent to which the EU is not a
coherent actor, but adopts its discourses according to context. The specific case study
investigated here then mirrors how EU institutions are developing and adapting their
policies in the Bosnian peacebuilding context.I argue that some of the most relevant and
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current EU spaces of agency are civil society, democratisation, regional cooperation,
human rights, institutions/control, the state and politics, the travel and the future. Since
the list could be extended to include even more spaces, the spaces outlined above should
not be viewed as representative, but as examples through which we can better
understand the processes of the constitution of such spaces as well as their dynamics
and flexible nature. The analysis below is, therefore, a snapshot of the spaces listed
above and is intended to shed light on their fluid nature and infrastructures, and yet it
refrains from claiming to be able to draw clear boundaries around those spaces. Instead,
those spaces are viewed as translocal and transversal, isolated neither from their
environment nor from the actors that constitute and constantly challenge them.
Therefore, this chapter will identify discourse clusters in order to show how those
assemble and constitute specific spaces of agency. Against this background, the
following sections will look in closer detail at the quality of the eight spaces listed
above.
Civil Society
The EU tends to frame social relationships as situated within civil society, as
this space is one on which it relies heavily for the implementation of its peacebuilding
agenda. In the 2000’s this connection between civil society and peacebuilding was
instrumental in shaping the EU’s engagement in different areas and contexts, and ran
like a red thread through most of its policies. As a result, the Commission and the High
Representative identified NGOs as central not only to conflict prevention, but also to
the promotion of democracy and conflict resolution.481 The Commission and the
European Parliament have stated, for instance, that “[i]ncreased participation of civil
society organisations strengthens the quality of democracy and contributes to
reconciliation.”482 In that sense, the EU has been using civil society partners to help
implement specific policy agendas, the latter mainly relating to the acquis and the
481 “Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union. Action in the Field of Conflict
Prevention”, Report Presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary General/High
Representative and the Commission, 2000.
482 Communication from the Commission and the European Parliament and the Council, “Enlargement
Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010”, p.8,
http://ec.europa.eu/ceskarepublika/pdf/press/ks5strategy.pdf (accessed 04/06/11).
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Copenhagen Criteria in the light of prospective future membership. Indeed, the
Commission has emphasised the importance of cooperation with civil society
particularly in cases where governments do not represent satisfactory partners and
where political processes on the state-level turn out to be too complex to work with.483
Under such circumstances, the EU believes civil society to be capable of assisting in EU
efforts to foster good governance, institution-building, establishing a rule of law and
poverty reduction.484 The Commission has put particular emphasis on the links between
a flourishing civil society, democratisation and reconciliation. Democratisation and
reconciliation are then considered a result of civil society organisations familiarising
with “structures and procedures of the EU”.485 Thus, to be able to maximise its
influence in BiH, the EU is ideally looking for a situation in which a healthy and free
civil society sector acts as a watchdog to the government.486 This, in turn, enables the
EU to work more efficiently, since this situation creates the conditions under which EU
policies have been developed and are viable and implementable. In fact, the EU views
civil society in the Western Balkans as weak and in need of training,487 a perspective
that is used to justify its intervention in the region in the name of democracy and
reconciliation.
Not only does civil society act as a subcontractor for EU policy implementation
(i.e. democratisation and reconciliation), but at the same time it serves as a legitimating
device through which the EU claims local legitimacy and ownership of peacebuilding
processes rather than portraying those processes as an imposition.488 In addition, an EU
official has pointed out that the EU resorts to partnering with civil society actors as the
483 Confidential source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 22/03/10.
484 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 8 May 2001,
“The European Union's role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries”, Brussels,
2001,
http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/resources/Communication_on_Promoting_democracy_and_HR.
pdf (accessed 04/06/11).
485 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 5 March 2008,
“Western Balkans: enhancing the European perspective”, op. cit. See also Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges
2009-2010”, op. cit., p.8.
486 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 08/03/10.
487 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 5 March 2008,
“Western Balkans: enhancing the European perspective”, op. cit.
488 See “Non-paper expanding on the proposals contained in the communication to the European
parliament and the council on “Strengthening the ENP” – COM (2006) 726 Final of 4 December 2006,
Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP”, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-
paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf (accessed 13/01/11).
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political structures of BiH are too complex for effective collaboration, while civil
society actors, on the other hand, are easier to deal with.489 As a result, the EU still
builds on civil society structures in its peacebuilding ambitions despite being aware of
some issues with civil society as a policy partner. However, due to the highly politicised
nature of such structures, the EU risks becoming complicit in local power struggles by
reinforcing the legitimacy of those actors that have the power to make their voices heard
while neglecting those that are not able or willing to be classified civil society actors. It
is somewhat surprising that the EU has only minimally modified its civil society
approach despite a growing awareness in the EU that civil society in the Western
Balkans is highly politicised. An EU official has indeed suggested that considerable
amounts of EU funds are spent on civil society partners with only minimal impact on
quality of life.490
At the same time, it is unclear what the EU means when it speaks of civil
society. The Commission, despite admitting that there is no agreed definition of civil
society,491 has promoted a rather broad definition in 2005 with respect to EU candidate
countries:
Civil society would thus include: the labour-market actors, i.e. the social partners
(trade unions and employers federations); organisations representing social and
economic players at large (consumer organisations for instance,); non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations, i.e. organisations at
grassroots level through which citizens participate in local and municipal life (e.g.
youth or family associations); religious communities and media.492
At the same time, it can be observed that definitions of civil society vary
according to the circumstances in which they are created as well as the institutional
context in which they are used. The Council of the European Union, for instance,
489 Confidential source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 22/03/10.
490 Confidential source, Council of the European Union (Western Balkans Unit), Personal Interview,
Brussels, 09/09/10.
491 See http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/apgen_en.htm#4 (accessed 13/01/11).
492 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and
Candidate Countries”, 2005, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl&lang=en&ihmlang=en&lng1=en,de&lng2=de,en,fr,mt,pl,pt,sl,sv,&va
l=403615:cs&page= (accessed 04/06/11).
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emphasises NGOs as central civil society actors493 and thus relinquishes the
Commission’s slightly broader approach to civil society.
There are indeed a number of competing definitions of civil society, while the
Economic and Social Committee clearly recognised this lack of clearness in terms of
defining civil society, referring to the various strands of thinking about civil society.494
This is evident in the Commission’s approach to the concept. Initially, it promoted a
broad notion of civil society as illustrated above, but is now emphasising the need for
‘quality standards’ of civil society organisations.495 Thus, only actors that manage to
live up to the EU’s expectations in terms of professionalisation are considered part of
civil society. Again, this can be seen as linked to the agenda of the respective
institution, for which a certain selection of actors may be needed at a certain point of
time. Slightly modifying the definition of civil society ensures the EU’s agenda can be
changed, yet the overall rhetoric (i.e. legitimacy through cooperation with local civil
society) remains the same. This approach to definition and policy rhetoric reflects the
extent to which the actual meaning of civil society can be constantly recreated, whereas
this may not be clearly visible given that the EU has more broadly been speaking in
favour of civil society cooperation for a long time. Changes in meaning have occurred
in more subtle ways, namely the nuances that have been given to the term civil society.
In this context, it was interesting to observe that when asked about whether cultural
actors/artists were part of the EU’s approach to civil society, many EU officials both in
Brussels and Sarajevo stated that culture was not a real priority in their programmes.
However, a few officials emphasised the need to include cultural actors more often in
the EU’s civil society programmes; and one EU official also asserted that, despite
493 Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) No 1658/98 of 17 July 1998 on co-
financing operations with European non-governmental development organisations (NGOs) in fields of
interest to the developing countries”, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:213:0001:0005:EN:PDF (accessed 13/01/11).
494 Cf. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on “The role and contribution of civil society
organisations in the building of Europe”, op. cit. For competing definitions and ideas of civil society, see
for instance Council Regulation (EC) No 1658/98 of 17 July op. cit.; “Improving the Coherence and
Effectiveness of the European Union Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention”, op. cit.; Communication
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 8 May 2001, “The European
Union's role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries”, op. cit.; Communication
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, “Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Thematic
programme”, op. cit; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,
“Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009”, op. cit., etc.
495 Delegation of the European Union to BiH, “Civil Society”, News Archives, 23/12/10,
http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/?akcija=vijesti&akcija2=pregled&jezik=2&ID=817 (accessed 16/01/11).
124
representing an excellent event, the Sarajevo Film Festival cannot be funded because
“they do not send anything written within the proper procedure.”496 This, in turn,
reflects how contested the field of culture is even within the EU, while culture is often
viewed as hardly compatible with EU standards and norms. In fact, another EU official
stated that the different EU agencies in the field are unable to engage with culture due to
the lack of a ‘cultural mandate’, so the only way for the EU to engage with culture in
BiH is through civil society programmes.497
Cooperation with civil society has also served as a way for the EU to polish its
reputation. The Commission has, for instance, suggested that particular countries that
have not yet entered into a contractual relationship with the EU tend to have weak civil
society structures and their citizens are often subject to repression.498 This implies that
the EU is superior in its ways of dealing with civil society, and thus legitimises EU
intervention as saving those other, non-EU societies from such problems.
In the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Delegation understands its role
in a more technical manner – in terms of winning civil society as a partner to implement
certain agendas – the EUSR is more political, aiming to help civil society develop and
implement ideas locally.499 The latter represents a more content-oriented approach to
peacebuilding; and, although it is not a guided process with boundaries set by the
EUSR, there is a certain interest in ideas developed locally. The Commission, in
contrast, takes a more technical approach to civil society cooperation. It conceives of a
triangular relationship between the EU, local authorities and local civil society, which it
then takes as a point of departure500 and as a way to create a balance between those
three elements that is suitable to facilitate eventual EU accession. In line with their
membership criteria, the Commission expects civil society actors to be able to work
without restrictions and to be responsive to the EU’s needs.501 The latter is a vital
criterion for organisations who wish to influence EU policy-making. Furthermore, it has
496 Confidential source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 22/03/10.
497 Confidential source, Council of the European Union (Western Balkans Unit), Personal Interview,
Brussels, 09/09/10.
498 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Thematic
Programme for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide under the future Financial
Perspectives (2007-2013)”, 2006, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0023:FIN:EN:HTML (accessed 04/06/11).
499 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 24/03/10.
500 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 15/03/10.
501 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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been admitted that the EU tends to resort to partnering with professional NGOs that
respond to its needs when it comes to looking for policy inputs from civil society.502
This is in line with the Ljubljana Declaration,503 which was adopted in 2008. The
declaration points to the need to listen more to civil society actors by integrating them in
policy-making processes. The EU takes this into account, but only on its own terms.
Developing a certain meaning for civil society and drawing boundaries of inclusion and
exclusion, the EU can maintain both the apparent legitimacy of the peacebuilding
discourse and a certain degree of instrumentality. The latter, especially, relates to issues
of EU enlargement, a process during the course of which civil society is a necessary
player in social and political transition. Recently, the Commission has also made it clear
that the participation of civil society actors is crucial in determining the success of the
accession process, both in terms of the quality and the pace of integration.504
What becomes obvious here is that the space of civil society is an exclusive one.
There is a tendency to fund mainly NGOs that are already professional and able to
implement big projects, while smaller and less professional organisations are neglected.
As a staff member of the Commission in Brussels pointed out, this is because the EU is
unable to effectively conclude smaller contracts due to its cumbersome institutional
procedures, which require the same reporting procedures for every project, no matter
how small it is. As a result, it takes more effort for the EU to fund many small projects
than it does to fund a few larger projects.505 As a result, smaller and ad hoc social
movements, although being quite common in the Bosnian context, withdraw from the
space of civil society – a space in which they do not feel welcome anyway. In practice,
this means that EU funds repeatedly go to nearly the same group of larger NGOs that
have the financial, linguistic and organisational ability to work through the complex
application process.506 This reflects the extent to which the civil society space is closed
and difficult for new actors to enter.
502 Ibid.
503 Ljubljana Declaration, International conference Brdo, Slovenia, 2 April 2008.
http://www.trialog.or.at/images/doku/ljubljana_declaration.pdf (accessed 29/11/10).
504 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Enlargement
Strategy and Main Challenges 2008-2009”, op. cit.
505 Confidential source, European Commission, DG ELARG, Personal Interview, Brussels, 09/09/10.
506 Adam Fagan, op. cit., p.125.
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Although civil society often implies the presence of bottom-up social processes
and a certain connection to the ‘grassroots’, there are some strong top-down
mechanisms at play in the EU’s civil society space. This results from the EU’s power to
use financial means in order to act as a gatekeeper to the space, and it is thus able to
frame actors to be included in the space in certain ways. This type of gatekeeping leaves
little room for ‘grassroots’ organisations to modify the space, and, furthermore, it
reflects a tendency for the EU to shape the content and participants of civil society
through financial means and processes of categorisation.
As a result, civil society appears to be a structured rather than an improvised
space. Its meaning has certainly changed over time, but its contents and structures have
been discussed in Brussels – and in Sarajevo only to a limited extent – so that local
actors willing to become part of this space have had to adapt to the structures defined by
the EU. Along those lines, the EU’s civil society space presents itself as a public one, of
which, theoretically, all actors can become part if they agree to adjust to the conditions
created in the space. On the other hand, its meaning and content are not discussed in
public, but tend to be defined by the EU sub-institutions, with various meanings in
constant re-negotiation. The difference between the Commission’s approach and the
EUSR’s is rather obvious. The former takes a technical approach to civil society,
viewing it as a dialogue partner for the EU,507 while the latter takes a more political
approach in terms of calling for a broader notion of civil society that includes artists and
religious leaders.508
Such differences reflect the EU’s own split identity in terms of conceptualising
civil society structures as they are imagined within the EU, relatively free from threats,
and acting as watchdogs of neoliberal governments. In its engagement with Bosnian
civil society the EU then projects these elements of its own identity onto Bosnian
society. Therefore, representing society as ‘civil’ is an important instrument for the EU
and a way of viewing BiH on the move towards ‘civilised’ European standards.
Eventually, an active civil society is believed to make rapprochement to the EU
possible.509 At the same time, by characterising Bosnian societal structures that lay
507 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and
Candidate Countries”, op. cit.
508 Confidential source, EU official, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 29/04/10.
509 Confidential Source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 11/03/09.
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outside of civil society as ‘deficient’, the latter becomes glorified and rhetorically
superior. This is coupled with a rather negative view of Bosnian society and local
conditions, which results in both often being considered incompatible with EU
standards.510 Such dynamics of identity and representation of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’
characterise the space of civil society in which differences and processes are framed in
relation to the EU’s internal structures. At the same time, as far as the functions of the
space of civil society are concerned, the EU emphasises its enlargement needs which
are predicated on potential member states possessing ‘healthy’ civil societies. Using the
space to create a specific meaning of civil society, i.e. as ‘civil’, ‘functional’, and a
watchdog of government, then responds to the EU’s need for a reliable partner (a
functional civil society) in the absence of coherent, reliable government structures.
Democratisation
Democracy can be viewed as one of the cornerstones of the EU, both in its
internal structures and in its foreign policy. The Treaty of Maastricht has put particular
emphasis on the internal importance of democratic governance, claiming that:
[t]he Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States.511
Not only in its internal affairs, but also in its external relations, the EU has come to put
emphasis on the importance of democratic governments. However, there seems to be a
general mistrust towards governments in third countries outside the EU, with the
suspicion that they might not be as committed to democratic governance as countries
within the EU, a suspicion used to justify intervention in the neighbourhood on the part
of the EU.512 This is also the result of a rather wide conceptualisation of democratic
510 Mark Wheeler, OHR, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 10/03/09.
511 Treaty of the European Union, Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992, article 6, http://europa.eu/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html (accessed 21/07/09).
512 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Towards an EU response to
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governance, which the Commission links to issues of needs, dialogue, service delivery
and institutional capacities.513
Democracy has become one of the main cornerstones in the EU’s engagement in
BiH, which has to be seen in relation to the Copenhagen Criteria and more specifically
to the EU’s Eastern enlargement. The Commission emphasises that “[t]he fifth
enlargement of the EU has helped to consolidate democracy and the rule of law in
Europe,”514 referring to enlargement as an instrument of democracy promotion. This
has, however, not remained without criticism, even from within the EU institutions. A
Senior Policy Advisor to the EUPM Head of Mission pointed out that democracy
promotion is viewed as part of the Copenhagen Criteria and reflects the EU’s
introspective peace agenda rather than a merely altruistic concern for the people and
their rights in neighbouring countries.515 However, it can be observed that the emphasis
on democratisation in EU policy documents related to BiH has declined over the recent
years, which is somewhat surprising given the great enthusiasm with which democracy
was promoted, at least rhetorically, from Dayton onwards. This can be seen in relation
to two issues: first, as a staff member of the Delegation Enlargement in Brussels
suggested, the accession process (and with it the issue of democratisation) has to be
made with local political actors.516 As suggested above, the latter tend to be considered
to be corrupt and problematic partners, which means that unless local politicians
cooperate with the EU’s policies, democratisation according to the EU’s norms and
ideas will not be possible. Indeed, the EU does not have the capacity to intervene
against the will of the local political actors but has to rely on its sticks and carrots.517
Second, to a certain extent this takes into account the critiques of the international
community, which is accused of being undemocratic and unaccountable.518 This
particularly relates to the ways in which the OHR operates in terms of being able to
impose laws or remove democratically elected politicians from office. From this stance,
situations of fragility. Engaging in difficult environments for sustainable development, stability and
peace”, Brussels, 2007.
513 Ibid.
514 Communication from the Commission and the European Parliament and the Council, “Enlargement
Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010”, op. cit., p.2.
515 Tobias Flessenkemper, EUPM, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 20/04/10.
516 Confidential source, European Commission, DG ELARG, Personal Interview, Brussels, 09/09/10.
517 Vladimir Pandurević, Personal Interview, op. cit.
518 See, for instance, David Chandler, Bosnia: Faking democracy after Dayton, London; Sterling, Va:
Pluto Press, 1999.
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it is hard for international actors who are part of this system to credibly force a country
to become democratic.
As far as the EU is concerned, the existence, or rather creation, of civil society is
viewed as an important indicator for the development of a liberal democracy and serves
as an instrument for implementing the basic tenets of the EU’s version of liberal peace.
Civil society is often referred to as a “school for democracy,”519 which, in turn, means
that once a strong and stable civil society has been established, then democracy will
automatically arise due to the fact that democratic values are inherent to civil society
dynamics.520 Civil society and democracy are thus perceived as mutually constitutive,
so that transformation in BiH is achieved via the creation of democratic civil society
structures. As a result, financial assistance under IPA is primarily intended to support
those civil society actors that contribute to the ‘democratic stabilisation’ of the
country.521 In that sense, a democratically organised civil society is expected to act as a
watchdog that holds the government accountable to its citizens522 and has, therefore,
been made a cornerstone of the EU’s conditionalities towards BiH. This mirrors the
fluid connections between different spaces of agency – in this case civil society and the
spaces of democratisation. Certainly, as pointed out above, the EU has started to
promote a rather wide understanding of democratisation, which involves a dialogue
between the EU’s different sub-institutions with civil society. Yet on the other hand,
most central decisions regarding the bigger framework of engagement in BiH are made
in Brussels, from a distance. As a staff member of the Delegation External Relations in
Brussels suggested, they are in touch with civil society, although not directly; rather,
this contact is made through the EU’s specific Delegation to the country.523 Given that
an EU Delegation is based only in a country’s capital city, and does not have field
offices in other parts of the country, there is clearly a filtering process at work in which
it is decided, in the capital, what local organisations are heard by the EU and,
519 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on “The role and contribution of civil society
organisations in the building of Europe”, op. cit., p.8.
520 Cf. Robert D. Putnam, Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary
Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002.
521 “Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)”, op. cit.
522 European Commission, “Mapping Study of Non-State Actors (NSA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, op. cit.,
p.74, and “Project Fiche – IPA Annual Action Programme 2007 for Bosnia and Herzegovina”, op. cit.,
p.1. See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,
“Western Balkans: Enhancing the European perspective”, op. cit., p.11.
523 Olga Baus-Gibert, EC Relex, Personal Interview, Brussels, 10/09/10.
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particularly, by Brussels. This, in turn, represents a considerable limit to the extent to
which the EU can incorporate a variety of organisations within its terms of engagement
and can thus be considered another obstacle to the EU’s ideas about the promotion of
democracy. This situation also reflects the limits of the democratisation space in terms
of who is included or excluded. We can observe an ambiguity of the space at this point:
on the one hand, the democratisation space aims to be rather broad and inclusive, with
both politicians and civil society (believed to represent local society) as actors therein.
On the other hand, the limits of geographical access to a wider array of civil society
actors represents an obstacle to this ambition and, thus, unintentionally excludes a large
number of actors. Hence, despite aiming to be an open and public space, it tends to be
closed to those groups that are too distant from the EU, either geographically or in terms
of ideology and/or interest.
Similar to the civil society space, the democratisation space essentially builds on
bottom-up processes. At the same time, those processes are filtered through the
paradigms and policies of the EU and given a specific direction so that local actors can
only modify minor parts of the space. The main discursive authority rests with the EU,
who has the carrot of accession and can thus insist on the fulfilment of the Copenhagen
Criteria. These conditions make the space a highly structured one, as one staff member
at the EU Delegation to BiH explained, since the Copenhagen Criteria cannot be
compromised.524 Improvisation and change are thus rather difficult to achieve for local
actors. This is partly due to the EU’s desire to present itself as a democratic entity, with
democracy being one of the cornerstones of intra-European cooperation. By casting
non-members as less democratic, the EU emphasises its own legitimacy and justifies its
own moral imperative to intervene, teach and transform those neighbouring countries.
At the same time, the EU is set up to deal with democratically elected governments, so
that the democratisation of government structures is in its own interest and thus
represents a need on the part of the EU.
524 Xavier Oleiro-Ogando, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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Regional Cooperation
Similar to democracy, the EU has decided to make regional cooperation a
cornerstone of its engagement based on the assumption that there is still not sufficient
reconciliation between BiH and its neighbours. In 2005, the Enlargement Delegation
and External Relations Delegation put emphasis on regional cooperation as one of the
EU’s policy priorities.525 As a result, regional cooperation has been made “a key priority
of the European Partnership.”526 Against this background, the SAA and SAP put
particular emphasis on regional cooperation; however, according to a staff member on
the EU Delegation to BiH, this is a difficult process.527 On the other hand, the
Commission is not only interested in regional cooperation for its own sake, but also
because this has an impact on the EU itself with regards to politics, economics and
issues of security.528 These issues are at the basis of the guidelines according to which
regional cooperation is meant to work in the Western Balkans, and they mirror the EU’s
self-image as a geographical space of regional cooperation. This particularly ties in with
the internal market and its associated free movement of goods, capital, services and
people. Against, this background, the EU has enhanced its engagement in the area of
regional cooperation, with the Commission becoming a member of the Regional
Cooperation Council in 2008, a regional framework for cooperation that addresses
regional cooperation from a political and economic point of view.529 This seems to be a
perspective widely shared by the EU’s different sub-institutions, given that not only the
Commission is involved, but also the European Council. Van Rompuy, the President of
the European Council, only recently emphasised the importance of regional cooperation
for the creation of peace in the Western Balkans.530 At the same time, regional
cooperation cannot be seen as a stand-alone policy, but is linked to the EU’s wider
525 European Commission, “Regional cooperation in the western Balkans. A policy priority for the
European Union”, Brussels, 2005.
526 Communication from the Commission and the European Parliament and the Council, “Enlargement
Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010”, op. cit., p.30.
527 Confidential source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 11/03/09.
528 European Commission, “Regional cooperation in the western Balkans”, op. cit., p.3.
529 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/projects-in-focus/regional-cooperation/index_en.htm (accessed
13/12/10).
530 Herman Van Rompuy, " Western Balkans: fulfilling a European destiny", Video Message, Brussels,
18 Oct 2010. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117114.pdf
(accessed 13/12/10).
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ambitions such as the desire to fight against organised crime and to promote regional
reconciliation.
In this context, the EU has identified the lack of reconciliation, mainly between
the different ethnic groups, as a major problem in BiH and in the wider region.531 In
terms of fostering cross-ethnic cooperation, the Commission emphasises its ambition to
initiate a dialogue with churches and religious groups across the region as they have the
potential to help the EU promote reconciliation. Dialogue forums, festivals, debates and
conferences organised by the EU are illustrative of such an approach. This approach is
related to the ways in which the EU imagines its own role of dealing with internal
conflict, so regional cooperation is closely linked to rapprochement to the EU. It can
thus be understood not only as regional reconciliation, but also as a movement of the
entire region towards its north-west in terms of adopting its institutional structures to
those of the EU.
The space of regional cooperation seems to be comparatively diverse and
inclusive given that it addresses a variety of actors on the political, economic and
societal levels; however, it only does so as long as the EU considers them relevant to the
regional peacebuilding process and as long as the actors are prepared to cooperate with
the EU’s programmes. As a result, the space of regional cooperation tends to be rather
open, though is still operated through top-down mechanisms. Regional cooperation is
directed by the EU’s rules and, although local actors may use communication with the
EU institutions to influence the discourse to a certain extent, this communication seems
to be rather limited as it is structured by the needs and interests of the EU. Nonetheless,
it represents a public space that is both visible to the people in BiH and that responds to
local dynamics. This can be seen in relation to the EU’s own history of regional
cooperation and thus reflects a deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics and
stakes involved. The Balkans are viewed as having not yet achieved the level of
regional cooperation mastered by the EU, while there seems to be a belief that
reproducing the EU’s own history of cooperation will bring positive results to the
Balkan region. The Balkans, in turn, would be a test case for the EU and a means of
ascertaining whether countries in the region might be potential EU members. This
approach responds to the EU’s need to integrate only members that are capable of
531 Confidential Source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 11/03/09.
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regional cooperation and engaging in normative processes of peacebuilding, which the
EU, based on its own identity as a peace union through regional cooperation, associates
with a logic of regional integration.
Human Rights
The EU has, since its foundation, put strong emphasis on the promotion of
human rights as one of its own core values. Human rights are generally linked to
democratisation,532 which also points to the link between those two elements established
in the Copenhagen Criteria. In this context, the EU has suggested that both human rights
and democratisation can be seen as “universal values,”533 an emphasis that, in turn,
legitimates the EU’s engagement in third countries’ internal politics. Democracy is,
thus, considered by the EU as a precondition for the promotion of human rights and vice
versa: Therefore, those two elements are essential parts of any contractual relations
between the EU and third countries.534 This is particularly important in the enlargement
context, with the EU External Action Service (EEAS) claiming that
[c]ountries seeking to join the EU must respect human rights. And all trade and
cooperation agreements with third countries contain a clause stipulating that human
rights are an essential element in relations between the parties.535
Yet, although the Commission tends to view human rights as a universal concept and as
a necessity for its engagement in third countries, there is a call for more local ownership
of concrete processes such as bringing justice to victims and so forth.536 However, this
does not mean that the concern with human rights on a localised basis is a purely
532 See, for instance, European Commission, “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR) Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013”, April 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-
rights/documents/eidhr_strategy_paper_2011_2013_com_decision_21_april_2011_text_published_on_int
ernet_en.pdf (accessed 13/12/10).
533 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/index_en.htm (accessed 17/12/10).
534 “Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006
on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide”,
2006.
535 http://eeas.europa.eu/_human_rights/index_en.htm (accessed 17/12/10).
536 European Commission, “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013”, April 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-
rights/documents/eidhr_strategy_paper_2011_2013_com_decision_21_april_2011_text_published_on_int
ernet_en.pdf (accessed 13 December 2010).
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altruistic undertaking since, as the Commission has pointed out, it is also about making
the EU visible through its human-rights-related policies.537
Specifically in BiH, the Commission has suggested that its main emphasis is on
“[t]he pursuit of common agendas for human rights and democratic reform”, “[b]uilding
towards consensus on disputed or controversial areas of policy in deeply divided
societies” as well as “[e]nhancing political representation and participation.”538
Currently the EU’s engagement in BiH in the context of human rights is mainly
channelled through EIDHR, which entered into force in 2007. The principle actor
identified as responsible for the defence of human rights is civil society.539 The
Commission has made clear that, indeed, the EIDHR instrument builds on a strength of
the EU, which lies in its ability to circumvent third-country governments and other
public authorities in terms of directly supporting civil society actors in their activities
related to human rights and democracy.540 In that sense, civil society is expected to act
as “an effective force for positive change” in its capacity to combat discrimination, fight
for “peaceful conciliation of group interests” and generally working towards a higher
degree of social cohesion.541
This, in turn, suggests a certain quality to the human rights space as the EU
promotes it. Although the space has widened in terms of gradually including more
societal actors, it still draws on processes of exclusion. What can be observed in the
above-mentioned policies is that the space tends to include actors labelled as, or
labelling themselves as, civil society. At the same time, governments are not directly
included within this space, nor are more fragmented actors included as those groups that
lack a clear organisational basis are not viewed as (professional) civil society actors by
537 European Commission, “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
Strategy Paper 2011 – 2013”, op. cit.
538 Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Bosnia and Herzegovina's Country Based Support Scheme
2008. Guidelines for grant applicants Budget line 19.04.01 Restricted Call for Proposals”, 2008.
539 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-
rights/documents/eidhr_strategy_paper_2011_2013_com_decision_21_april_2011_text_published_on_int
ernet_en.pdf (accessed 17/12/10), p.5. See also Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Bosnia and
Herzegovina's Country Based Support Scheme 2008”, op. cit.
540 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-
rights/documents/eidhr_strategy_paper_2011_2013_com_decision_21_april_2011_text_published_on_int
ernet_en.pdf (accessed 17/12/10), p.10.
541 Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, “European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Bosnia and Herzegovina's Country Based Support Scheme
2008”, op. cit.
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the EU. In fact, professionalism is an important aspect in the EU’s peacebuilding
policies as its calls for proposals do not really target smaller, more ad hoc organisations;
rather, they target organisations who have the power to act as a counter-balance to the
government.542 Those calls also require the recipient of the funds to be able to provide
match funding. This, in turn, results in a rather closed space, despite the EU’s ambitions
to address the grassroots and, through the inflexible Copenhagen Criteria, means that
top-down processes outweigh bottom-up mechanisms. As a result, the human rights
space is highly structured, and BiH has to fulfil human rights standards according to the
Thessaloniki agenda of the European Council. In particular, BiH has to live up to EU
standards with respect to refugee return, the provision of justice relating to war crimes
and resolving the issues of internally displaced persons.543 If this is not being followed
in addition to harmonising the constitution with the ECHR, EU accession becomes
impossible. The human rights space relies on the public space to a certain extent: it aims
to make human rights freely and publically accessible to everyone, yet refrains from
giving the public (‘everyone’) the option to re-negotiate the meaning of human rights.
In that sense, the human rights space reflects the EU’s self-confidence in its own values,
legitimising their underlying normative agenda elsewhere. Along those lines, the EU
imagines itself as a bearer of human rights (whether those right are implemented
internally is certainly a different story) and imagines BiH as a student that can learn
from the EU’s idealised example. Again, this self-image on the part of the EU is used to
legitimise intervention in the name of human rights.
Institutions/Control
Since the Dayton Peace Agreement concluded in 1995 with the close
involvement of the EU as a member of the PIC, the EU has become part of the
international community’s peace- and state-building ambitions. In this context, the EU
has built its own institutions in the BiH: EUFOR, EUPM, EUSR and the Delegation of
542 Confidential source, European Commission, DG ELARG, Personal Interview, Brussels, 09/09/10.
543 European Union, “EU-Western Balkans Summit Declaration”, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_
eu/sap/thessaloniki_summit_en.htm (accessed 16/01/11).
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the Commission. It is through these institutions that a space of institutional control has
started to emerge. The EU’s diverse institutions serve as tools through which the EU
exerts a certain degree of control over the directions in which BiH is developing. For
the EU, institutions (as governing bodies), control (as a process) and institutional
control (as the process that those governing bodies pursue) mainly consist of bringing
the Western Balkans politically, economically and socially closer to the EU through
political and economic measures.544 In that sense, institutional control as exercised
through the EU is associated with the goal of stabilising BiH and guiding the country
into steady EU integration with the help of the SAA and its control mechanisms, such as
integration conditionalities and benchmarks.545 An adviser to the EU Delegation to BiH
emphasised the necessity of strengthening institutions in BiH so that they are able to
cope with the EU agenda and with the European Partnership priorities.546 This certainly
reflects the extent to which institution–building is a priority for the EU as a political
entity rather than exclusively for the good of BiH. In this context, the main objective is
the stabilisation of the country to allow for eventual European integration according to
the SAA.547 The main instrument for achieving this is the European Partnership, and its
principle objective is to bring the Western Balkans closer to EU integration. Thus, the
EU has been prescribing political and economic criteria for BiH’s ills in order to bring it
in line with the acquis.
The EU claims to pursue a ‘soft’ approach to enlargement and its associated
conditionalities. The Commission, for instance, has pointed out that “[f]or the EU’s
enlargement process to succeed, it is essential to listen to citizens and address their
concerns and questions.”548 Indeed, there is a huge emphasis in EU policy on citizens’
participation in the enlargement process. However, on the other hand, voices from
within the EU’s institutions have observed that, from a more realistic viewpoint,
European integration tends to be elite driven.549 This is considered as particularly
problematic in a country such as BiH where people view the political elite as corrupt
and distanced from the needs of the vast majority of citizens. In this context, there are
544 Confidential Source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 11/03/09.
545 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 29/04/10.
546 Elisabet Tomasinec, EU Delegation to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 03/03/11.
547 Ibid.
548 Communication from the Commission and the European Parliament and the Council, “Enlargement
Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010”, op. cit. p.10.
549 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 29/04/10.
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critical voices within the EU claiming that their engagement in BiH mainly represents a
politics of self-interest rather than a concern for the people living in the country.550 In
that sense, the value preamble tends to be a rhetorical tool in the first place, but is in
reality only secondary to the EU’s policies.551 Against this background, one can argue
that even though there might be a general ambition to include people and citizens in the
EU enlargement process, this ties in with the exclusive practices of the civil society
space and fails to work in practice. This is because the EU seems to go for a more
pragmatic approach that negotiates its conditions of accession negotiations with the
elites rather than wider societal groups. To justify this, it is sometimes argued that
people might want to become part of the EU, but they do not know how to politically
articulate it. This points to a possible issue with translation of ‘different languages’ in
spaces, where translation between spaces may fail if the languages used represent a
divisive force.
However, this is not to suggest that the EU does not make any efforts to engage
with local society. There are a number of ways in which the EU engages with civil
society, as outlined above, while those ways reflect a high degree of institutional
governance and control. The Delegation of the EU in Sarajevo employs Bosnians as one
way of including ‘locals’. Yet civil society has been found to be an increasingly useful
tool for the efficient implementation of EU models of governance, both within and
outside the EU. Crucially, civil society is assumed to be a promoter and manifestation
of good governance, which is increasingly conflated with peace in the EU
framework.552 As such, the elements of transformative civil society that are thought
most conducive to effective governance are emphasised within EU discourses on
peacebuilding. Smismans claims that both the European Commission and the Economic
and Social Council use civil society discourses as a source of institutional
legitimisation, banking on civil society’s role as a platform for functional participation
and representation, politicising and mobilising social capital as well as decentralising
550 Tobias Flessenkemper, Personal Interview, op. cit.
551 Ibid.
552 Audra Mitchell, “Transforming a deeply divided society? NGOs and peacebuilding in Northern
Ireland, 1997-2006”, in M. Hilton, N. Crowson and J. McKay (eds.), NGOs in Contemporary Britain,
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009, pp.242-60.
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politics by taking over functions of central public authority.553 In addition, the EU
maintains control over how the country is governed by empowering some actors more
than others. This is mainly achieved through funding mechanisms. As a staff member of
the Delegation of the Commission pointed out, this is subject to regulations from
Brussels, following a strict numerical system. In this system, the achievement of a high
score in the evaluation scheme is necessary to be considered for funding at all, while the
final decision is made according to the applicant organisation’s capacities and whether
their strategies are in line with the EU’s call for applications.554 These procedures
clearly favour stronger and more professionalised organisations, many of which are also
able to take over control functions over societal sectors due to their relative strength.
In that sense, the EU exercises institutional control on two different paths: first,
negotiations are made with the political elites, who can then be guided and directed by
the EU’s needs. Second, through selective empowerment of certain actors the EU
contributes to the establishment of social hierarchies, and thus controls societal
processes in the country. Again, this suggests a partly inclusive and open approach and
the ambition to localise institutional control, but only to the extent to which this is in
line with the EU’s structural constraints, norms and values. In that sense, top-down
processes still dominate impulses coming from the grassroots, since the latter need to fit
the institutional background accordingly if they want to be taken into consideration. As
a result, a structured approach is predominant over improvisation and modification,
while one can equally still speak of a space that is based on the public sphere in that the
EU tries to make itself publicly visible. This is truer for the Commission than for the
EUSR, with the EUPM being in the middle of the two, but, in general, one can observe
a tendency for the EU to make its benefits very visible in BiH. Such benefits are more
noticeable in the cities than in the countryside, and, thus, can only be deemed semi-
public. In terms of identity, power and representation, the space of institutional control
relates to a perception that BiH has to be governed and controlled to be able to face the
EU as a partner and, thus, represents a belief in the superiority of the EU. The latter is
only prepared to integrate BiH if the country follows EU instructions. In addition, the
553 Stijn Smismans, “European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Institutional Interests“, European
Law Journal, vol.9, no.4, 2003, pp.473-495, pp.484-8.
554 Vladimir Pandurević, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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EU makes the closure of the OHR a precondition of eventual accession,555 which, in
turn, reflects an interest in enhancing the influence of the EU at the expense of other
international institutions. This suggests a European future for BiH and represents a
control mechanism on the part of the EU in terms of prescribing a certain direction to
which the country is supposed to move. Through its institutional control mechanisms,
the EU is thus able to enhance its influence over local actors with its power of
persuasion and promise of future EU assertion. Yet, this does not necessarily imply a
linear enhancement of EU control mechanisms. It had indeed been suggested that now,
“it is high time to stop baby–sitting BiH”.556 This suggestion has also been linked to a
call to ease off on the pressure to implement reforms quickly in BiH.557 As we can see,
there are clearly ambivalent attitudes towards the necessary intensity of EU engagement
as well as tensions between what different institutions believe is feasible for the EU’s
future involvement in BiH. The space of institutional control is, therefore, contested and
there are strong centrifugal tendencies at play.
State and Politics
As far as the state, its structures and the political system are concerned, an EU
space seems to crystallise in which its different sub-institutions cluster their needs with
respect to the entity- and state-level and their cooperation with it.
The most prominent need for the EU seems to be a centralisation of BiH’s
structures of governance. Brussels’ requirement to centralise governing structures is a
basic pre-requisite for BiH to become a member of the EU.558 In that context, the EU
particularly struggles to reform the complex governmental structures in the country.559
The biggest issue seems to be the lack of one central voice of political authority given
that BiH is divided into a number of different political (cantons, municipalities) and
ethnic groups. In addition, the constitution of BiH entitles every one of the ‘constituting
555 Olli Rehn, “Towards A European Era for Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Way Ahead”, speech delivered
to the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 24/07/09,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/349&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 03/08/11).
556 Elisabet Tomasinec, Personal Interview, op. cit.
557 Ibid.
558 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Personal Interview, op. cit.
559 Vladimir Pandurevic, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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nations’ the right to veto any legislation they feel threatens their interests as a nation.560
This, in turn, often leads to the EU receiving contradictory messages from local
authorities,561 which creates an obstacle to entering into proper accession negotiations.
Interestingly enough, the failure to come to a coherent, nation-wide consensus on issues
tends to be blamed on the Bosnian state and people rather than on the international
powers (such as the EU) who helped devise the problematic constitution in the first
place. In fact, an EU official has argued that the DPA may have been a useful tool for
ending the war, but now it needs revision given that it represents an obstacle to
European integration.562 Yet, although there now is a call to revise the DPA, an in-depth
revision seems impossible due to the veto powers of the national groups; therefore, it
has been suggested that only the parts of the DPA that are vital to EU integration be
revised for now.563 It remains to be seen whether this will be feasible given that
numerous aspects, such as the constitution, would have to be harmonised with the
ECHR. Furthermore, such revision would require that the OHR be closed down564
before BiH could get candidate status in the EU.565 The different sub-institutions of the
EU are indeed alert about these issues, pointing to the high degree of fragmentation
between the country’s majorities as well as to the possibilities this situation allows for
in terms of political change.566 As some have suggested, the EU’s main issue seems to
be the fact that its institutions are not decision-makers, but, rather, it is the local
authorities that make the major decisions.567 At the same time, the EU tends to view
those local authorities as unreliable,568 so change from the perspective of the EU seems
unlikely.
On the other hand, this situation is a double-edged sword, given that there are
voices within the Commission claiming that it is the BiH government’s responsibility to
act and work for peace, while the EU should only support and assist rather than repeat
560 See Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, available at
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372 (accessed 17/01/11).
561 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Personal Interview, op. cit.
562 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 29/04/10.
563 Ibid.
564 European Commission, “Commission staff working document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 Progress
Report, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council”, Brussels, 2009.
565 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Personal Interview, op. cit.
566 Jadranka Mihic, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 15/03/10.
567 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Personal Interview, op. cit.
568 Ibid.
141
the mistakes of the much-involved international community.569 Against this
background, the Council of the European Union articulates a hope that the political
class in BiH will show a greater sense of responsibility and leadership to achieve
reforms.570 This is meant to lead to a more functional state and successful constitutional
reform in line with the ECHR and which will eventually lead to EU integration.571 Such
an approach goes hand in hand with the EU’s need to establish efficient bureaucratic
systems in BiH with which they can work.572 To facilitate this, staff members of the
Commission have suggested that progress could be achieved via the improvement of
coordination among ministers573 and that the wider perspective of the international
community be made use of in order to improve the current political deadlock impeding
constitutional reform.574 Yet these perspectives have not gone unchallenged. In this
context, a senior EUPM official has suggested that this approach of the EU is
centralising, biased and imposing.575 As a better alternative, he suggested to prescribe
only final objectives, while Bosnians get the choice of means to achieve these.576
As we can see, the state and politics space is a very centralised and exclusive
one. It mainly centres on elites and their (in)ability and (un)willingness to consolidate
the Bosnian state into a unit that the EU is able to deal with. This approach neglects the
multidimensional debates around the topic of centralisation in relation to (national)
identity, economic concerns and so forth. As a result, the state and politics space can be
viewed as closed with little room for negotiation due to the EU’s need for unified state
structures to work with as well as the EU’s focus on governmental actors. A structured,
top-down approach is the main feature of this space that is mainly interested in making
the country compatible with the EU’s structures rather than vice versa. At the same
time, it is a public space, given that the EU keeps emphasising its need for cooperation
with the elites for a more strategic engagement in public: an approach often framed as
political cooperation or dialogue.577 The state and politics space represents BiH as
569 Vladimir Pandurevic, Personal Interview, op. cit.
570 Confidential source, Council of the European Union, Personal Interview, Brussels, 9 Sept 2010.
571 Ibid.
572 Vladimir Pandurevic, Personal Interview, op. cit.
573 Jadranka Mihic, Student Presentation, op. cit.
574 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Student Presentation, op. cit.
575 Tobias Flessenkemper, Personal Interview, op. cit.
576 Ibid.
577 “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. The Western
Balkans and European Integration”, Brussels, 2003.
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fragmented and different from EU member states, which is yet a contestable issue due
to divisions within EU countries such as Belgium and Spain. Again, this mirrors the
power of representation through which the EU is able to claim a certain degree of
superiority and to prescribe a certain course of action to the Bosnian authorities.
Simultaneously, this discourse serves as a facilitating device for the EU in terms of
making the accession negotiations less complex and more straightforward for the EU,
while maintaining its claims to be representative of the people.
Travel
One of the EU’s central foci of engagement in BiH presents itself as the
possibility for Bosnians to travel more easily, which has long posed a major problem for
people, particularly for those living outside the capital city. Creating a space of free
travel can be said to be one of the EU’s fields of expertise due to its internal experiences
with visa-free travelling.
In this context, the Visa Facilitation Agreements, which entered into force in
2008, represented an important symbolic step towards an opening of a geographical
travel space for Bosnians and also towards opening a political dialogue and roadmap
towards a visa exemption for Bosnian citizens.578 The big move towards visa exemption
was made towards the end of 2010, thus also representing a major political
breakthrough. Yet, this move only signifies that travelling for Bosnians in the EU is still
not possible for more than 90 days per period of 180 days.579 In fact, there is a growing
acknowledgement on the part of the EU about the importance of working on this issue
given that Europe still appears to be a very distant entity to Bosnian citizens.580 In that
sense, visa liberalisation has become a very effective short term motivating force that
the EU can use in order to encourage BiH to fulfil EU conditionalities such as the
revision of passports, police cooperation, the combating of illegal migration as well as
tackling human rights issues and discrimination.581
578 http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/files/docs/news/Visa_Agreement.pdf (accessed 14/10/10).
579 See http://www.schengenplus.eu/visafacilitation.html#Bosnia (accessed 31/05/11).
580 Confidential source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 11/03/09.
581 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Student Presentation, op. cit.
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For the EU, a common travel space as part of the accession conditionalities
mainly represents a way to ensure that the political leadership fulfils other benchmarks.
In that sense, progress within the travel space is highly dependent on political action and
mainly includes political elites as central actors in the engagement with the EU. On the
other hand, though, the space is more inclusive as far as ‘passive’ participation is
concerned. Grassroots actors are not necessarily consulted with respect to their needs in
that context, but they are considered recipients of the space and included in the role of
an audience. The travel space is, therefore, rather closed in terms of who can directly
impact upon it, but, on the other hand, it is open to those who are interested in using its
benefits. The dynamics within the space are still mainly top-down, reflecting the EU’s
ambitions to make BiH work to become a member of the EU by preparing it for the free
travel dimension of accession. At the same time, this preparation helps improve the
public image of the EU – indeed, it may indeed be part of its PR strategy582 – being one
of its most public and visible spaces of action. With the travel space, the EU puts
emphasis on its identity as an open and tolerant entity, while it also attaches conditions
to this, suggesting that BiH is not ready yet for a final opening and needs to be
reformed/educated before the travel space can be opened up. At the same time, this
conveys the EU’s need for a safe neighbourhood of “Fortress Europe”583 in terms of
having put pressure on BiH before having abolished the visa requirement.
Future
There is a tendency to focus on the future as the EU’s main time reference in the
context of peace- and institution-building. This is most clearly articulated with the
accession process, which implies a clear direction for BiH and represents an option
without alternatives – at least from the perspective of the EU. Ashton’s speech in
Belgrade is illustrative of a future-centred perspective for the bigger region: “Let me
begin by saying something about the foreign country that is the most important of all.
582 The need to win ‘hearts and minds’ in the future EU engagement in BiH was emphasised by a
confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 29/04/10.
583 W. Bruggemann, “Illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings seen as
a security problem for EUROPE”, EUROPOL, 2002.
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That foreign country is called the future.”584 In that sense, the accession process reflects
an underlying notion of ‘progress’ as a linear transition process from a conflictive
society towards a European peaceful future. This is often linked to the idea that
peacebuilding in a post-conflict area can start from a specific stage of conflict, while
institution- and civil society-building can help liberate social life from its past. In that
sense, EU rapprochement in the Western Balkans becomes a rather deterministic and
outcome-oriented policy.
The European Partnership policies are clear on their ambitions to dissolve from
the past in terms of expecting BiH to move forward and make progress in a number of
policy areas that the EU considers as crucial for the future of the country.585 This is how
the creation of peace becomes an outcome-oriented mission during the course of which
it is expected that a state structure emerges in which institutions are capable of restoring
justice, of promoting reconciliation and providing security – the latter mainly through
the EUPM – in order to move the country towards a better future.586 This is not to imply
that the EU has a clear blueprint that cannot be changed – indeed it is rather obvious
that the EU is in the process of (re)developing its policies according to its own
experiences and has shown some variety in its policies over time. This is rather to argue
that there is a belief in the possibility of almost linear progress during the course of
which BiH can move closer to the acquis and move away from its troublesome past
with the assistance of the EU.587 There is an agreement among all EU institutions in that
they want to push BiH forward towards accession.588 The EUSR views its role as an
assistant to the country in the context of the accession process, with the view that BiH
has no alternative but enter the EU.589 In agreement, a staff member of the Delegation of
the Commission in Sarajevo confirms that the future of BiH is necessarily within the
EU, although accession might only happen 20 or more years in the future.590
584 Catherine Ashton High Representative / Vice President, “The EU and the Western Balkans in a
changing world”, Civil Society Meeting Belgrade, 18/02/10, http://www.europa-eu-
un.org/articles/en/article_9508_en.htm (accessed 04/06/11).
585 Cf. Council of the European Union, “Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the principles,
priorities and conditions contained in the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and
repealing Decision 2006/55/EC”, Official Journal L 080, 19/03/2008, pp.18-31.
586 Cf. http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/?akcija=vijesti&akcija2=pregled&jezik=2&ID=157 (accessed
18/04/10).
587 Cf. http://euobserver.com/9/26335 (accessed 18/04/10).
588 Xavier Oleiro Ogando, Personal Interview, op. cit.
589 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 24/03/10.
590 Vladimir Pandurevic, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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The future space can be considered an inclusive one that addresses different
levels of society, all of which are meant to transform the country and enable it to move
towards a better future. Again, this inclusivity is only on the passive side since the
design of the future is reserved for the EU, or at least those actors in BiH who are
deemed capable of implementing the EU’s norms and values. The space is thus
exclusive as far as its creation is concerned, being reluctant to open up to differing
voices. It is open to ‘receivers’, but closed to ‘creators’ outside the EU’s peacebuilding
framework. As a result, it is mainly based on top-down processes and offers little room
for improvisation as the EU retains control of identifying the processes that are central
for the development of BiH. It can be said that the future space is highly structured in
terms of having a clear direction. At the same time, the space is public with the EU
making its vision for the country clear through its communication with the people. This
also reflects a desire of the EU to transform BiH into a suitable neighbour, if not
member, in the long run by making it similar to what are believed to be EU norms and
values. This shows that the EU believes to share common values591 – although the
quality of those values is hardly ever outlined explicitly. At the same time, this reflects a
belief that Europeanisation will represent an appropriate solution for BiH. What is
imagined and represented as ‘European values’ is based on some sort of shared identity,
as well as the frequent reference to the acquis, which BiH has to be made compatible
with. In that sense, BiH is portrayed as different from the EU and in need of change.
This conveys the EU’s need to transform countries before admitting them, possibly due
its issues when it comes to dealing with difference.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined eight exemplary spaces of agency as the EU promotes
them. It has shown that the civil society space is contested even within the EU, but has
tended to frame local agency in a narrow version of ‘civilised society’. The latter has
served as a central partner for the EU to implement its policies related to the
591 Cf. European Union, “Respect for and promotion of the common values of the European Union: the
European Commission puts the emphasis on prevention”, Brussels, 2003.
146
democratisation space, which aims to make BiH compatible with the Copenhagen
Criteria. The regional cooperation space builds on the notion that, just as the EU itself
tends to take a regional approach internally, BiH cannot be seen in isolation of its
neighbours. Again building on civil society as a partner, the EU has developed a human
rights space that can be considered one of the key spaces in the context of accession. In
this context, the institutions/control space provides the tools with which the EU can
intervene into Bosnian political affairs, which can be seen, for instance, through its
approach to the emergence of a state and politics space of agency. One of the EU’s main
attractions having been the visa facilitation agreements, this can be framed as a travel
space in which discourses about free movement cluster. Finally, specifically relating to
the EU’s peacebuilding ambitions, a future space can be said to emerge, which focuses
on ‘progress’ and the eventual accession process.
Those exemplary spaces illustrate some patterns running through the ways in
which the EU acts in its spaces of agency. Those spaces are not clearly distinguishable,
but overlapping, and they feed into each other. For instance, civil society is not only a
policy field for the EU on its own terms, but at the same time an essential element in the
development of many other spaces. Along similar lines, the human rights and
democratisation space are closely linked to each other. It can thereby be observed that
the EU’s spaces tend to be highly abstract and are not tied to actual geographical places.
As a result, there is an inherent notion that those spaces can be easily translated into
other places elsewhere, independent of their physical location.
I have shown that, although some of these spaces have an inclusive component,
they are only accessible to those willing to act as receivers or participate passively in the
respective space. At the same time, most of the EU’s spaces, the regional cooperation
space to a lesser extent, are rather exclusive for actors outside the EU, in terms of which
actors gain access to contribute actively to the development of the space. In that way,
the EU tries to ensure to keep control over its spaces, their constituting discourses, and
the directions in which those are moving. This is reinforced by a predominance of top-
down over bottom-up mechanisms, where the central guidelines come from Brussels are
taken up, slightly modified by the Delegation in Sarajevo and, from there, passed on to
local society and local actors. The latter are viewed in need of change to be able to
become part of the space. This is particularly evident in the civil society space, to which
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local actors can contribute if they are willing to act according to the logic of the space
(i.e. professionalising their organisational structures and responding to the EU’s
priorities and guidelines). This is a means for the EU to spread its values and
mechanisms among society, in terms of empowering those actors that are willing to act
according to the mechanisms of the EU spaces of agency. The fact that the EU sets the
conditions for who gets access to the spaces and under which conditions is also implied
by its ambition to centralise the country. The EU is eager to centralise BiH into one unit
that it can deal with, which means that actors who favour divisions in the country do not
easily gain access to the EU’s spaces. This, in turn, reflects the EU’s strategies of
translation between spaces: it tries to talk to actors that are more or less sympathetic to
its spaces, and, if so, will make them active actors within that space. Once those actors
are part of the space of agency, then the EU can guide them. A related tool of translation
is the strategy to include a number of actors passively acting as recipients of the space,
which is the case, for instance, with the travel space. This space concerns many
Bosnians and raises their interest in the work of the EU, although they cannot directly
participate in the creation and development of this space. At the same time, through
their interest in it, they learn to speak the language of the space, thereby unconsciously
translating it towards other (local) spaces. This explains why most of the EU’s spaces
are public to a certain extent, given that this helps spread its institutional discourses and
their associated meanings broadly, enhancing the space of agency by connecting it to
other spaces in the societal sphere. At the same time, the EU’s strategies at play in those
different spaces of agency differ from one another, which will help us understand later
on why some spaces find it easier to connect to local spaces than others.
In general, these strategies reflect the EU’s self-understanding as a
“transformative power,”592 with the EU trying to find ways in which Bosnian society
can move towards what the EU believes to be its own identity. In that sense, BiH is
often viewed as different and in need of learning, while the EU uses its own spaces to
transform local spaces. This also serves as a way to respond to the EU’s need for a
secure neighbourhood as well as a realistic framework for enlargement. The latter is
only considered realistic under certain conditions such as a functioning civil society, a
592 Cf. Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in
Central and Eastern Europe, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
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democratic and centralised organisation of the state, the implementation of human rights
and so forth. The success or failure of the EU to achieve this in terms of being able to
meaningfully translate those discourses into local spaces of agency will be investigated
below. This will cast light on the extent to which the EU‘s spaces represent spaces
relevant to local peacebuilding, and it will look at these spaces and processes in terms of
how much and in what way they are referred to locally.
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Ch.6: Local Responses to the EU’s Spaces of Agency
This section will now look in closer detail at the responses to the EU’s spaces
from local cultural actors. It can be considered part of what Castells has termed
resistance identity as the ability of local actors to challenge institutional discourses. The
chapter investigates how the EU’s spaces are received by a number of actors, and how
are they modified by them. Based on this, it will attempt to investigate how successful
the EU is in translating its spaces in BiH, as well as how local actors work with and
resist them.
The Choice of Voices and Agents
To gain a deeper insight into some responses, this and the following chapter
specifically look at local cultural actors. This may not be an obvious choice, given that
many culturally engaged actors do not find the EU a topic they want to talk about.
During my fieldwork interviews, most of them even rapidly changed the conversation
topic when I started asking them about the EU. However, what I will show here is the
centrality of cultural actors to the EU’s peacebuilding ambitions as well as their indirect
contribution to it through their involvement in certain spaces of agency.
Here, I understand ‘culture’ as a label referring to creative energies that are
dissipated within a society. Yet the distinction between ‘high culture’ and ‘popular
culture’ is not relevant for this thesis, given that creative energies can be found in the
everyday sphere, as well as, in a more distilled form, in the activities of cultural
institutions. Indeed, the artists that this thesis focuses on may be considered actors of
the sphere of ‘high culture’ on the one hand, but on the other hand, they are situated in
an everyday context from which they draw inspiration and are also part of social
networks; they are family members, neighbours, producers, consumers and so forth. In
that respect, I challenge the boundary that is sometimes artificially created between high
culture and popular culture. Lefebvre, for instance argues:
Certainly, right from the start, festivals contrasted violently with everyday life, but they were
not separate from it. They were like everyday life, but more intense; and the moments of that
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life – the practical community, food, the relation with nature - in other words, work - were
reunited, amplified, magnified in the festival.593
Lefebvre suggests that arts, creation and inventiveness emerge from the politics
of everyday life and from their position they can provide a critique of the everyday, just
as much as the everyday can provide a critique of arts.594 This assertion ties in with de
Certeau’s view on arts as related to their everyday significations and the tactics
associated with them, with tactics themselves representing an art that may represent the
voices of the weak.595 This is why their artwork can be viewed as particularly insightful
in terms of cultural responses to peacebuilding, but by no means can it be considered as
isolated from the everyday context from which it develops. Therefore, local cultural
actors in this thesis refer to a variety of actors that are involved in creative processes in
terms of transforming a general experience into an artistic product. The ways in which
they do this vary considerably, ranging from film productions to theatre workshops,
from museum exhibitions to music performances. Those activities are not necessarily
public, but may also be semi-public or well hidden from the public sphere. In this
context, the question arises as to why it might make sense to choose local cultural actors
as a case study for the analysis of processes during the course of which spaces of
agency are shaped. There are a number of reasons for this. First and foremost, arts are
multidimensional. Not only are they situated in concrete creative processes, but they are
reflective of underlying identities and needs on which their creative moment is based.
Indeed, cultural actors cannot be viewed as exclusively cultural, but they are part of
society and thus carry political, economic and social identities as well, with arts
reflecting those in a cross-cutting way. This ties in with Harvey’s suggestion stating that
Aesthetic and cultural practices are particularly susceptible to the changing experience of
space and time precisely because they entail the construction of spatial representations and
artefacts out of the flow of human experience. They always broker between Being and
Becoming.
(…)
The politics of the cultural mass are (…) important, since they are in the business of defining
the symbolic order through the production of images for everyone.“596
593 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of everyday life, vol.1, op. cit., p.207.
594 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of everyday life, vol.2; translated by John Moore ; with a preface by Michel
Trebitsch, London: Verso, 2008, pp.19, 44, 240.
595 Michel de Certeau, op. cit., p.37.
596 David Harvey, op. cit., pp.327, 348.
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In that sense, cultural processes build upon experiences from different societal
spheres as the inspiration and foundation for the representational processes in which
specific elements and needs are emphasised by the artist. Arts are revealing of
underlying identities and needs, they reflect upon them, distil them and translate them to
make them accessible to a wide range of people, using the arts space to find the liberty
to say things that cannot necessarily be said otherwise. In that sense, cultural actors are
able to mobilise a broad spectrum of people, although this may not be visible all the
time. As Caruso suggests, arts are based on the respective artist’s lived experiences,
situated in a social system and are therefore political in nature.597 Caruso claims that,
representing political and economic power, culture reflects the search for identity
through its imaginative and transformative-subversive potentials.598 Arts can thus be
said to help us understand a specific context politically due to its ability to connect the
personal and the political.599 This makes arts a relevant category for this thesis because
it opens up a political understanding of peacebuilding from a different angle, one which
is less censored compared to that which is voiced in the political realm, as a result of its
ability to code information and limit its access to an interested public. In this context,
Danto argues that “all art is political in consequence, even if politics should not be its
immediate content.”600 In that respect, a focus on culture and arts allows for a deep
understanding of social contexts and of how personal experiences relate to bigger
public, political ideas.
Second, cultural actors have a diverse range of means and techniques at their
disposal. This means that creative techniques in themselves reflect actors’ ability to
create spaces of agency, not only through what they address, but also how they do so.
Since those techniques are not necessarily always accessible to policy actors or possibly
even the broader public sphere, they are less subject to censorship and political control.
Against this background, both the techniques and content with which artists decide to
work have a high potential in reflecting underlying needs and tend to find creative
channels to do so while making use of the liberties of the arts sector. At the same time,
597 Hwa Young Choi Caruso, “Art as a Political Act: Expression of Cultural Identity, Self-Identity, and
Gender by Suk Nam Yun and Yong Soon Min”, The Journal of Aesthetic Education, vol.39, no.3, 2005,
pp.71-87.
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
600 Arthur C. Danto, Beyond the brillo box: The visual arts in post-historical perspective, Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1998, p.182.
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as Landry has pointed out, as long as they are not part of a ‘culture of control’, arts and
culture have the power to transform social settings on their own terms as well as
symbolising complex ideas.601 Third, cultural actors are particularly insightful in a
country like BiH, where culture has a history of challenging the political and its
associated forms of control in more disguised ways. This is also the context in which
society became mobilised during the war in the 90s through cultural resistance to
violence, with artists launching theatre and film festivals to make their voices heard,
exercising a profound influence on society. Zelizer describes how, despite the adverse
social conditions during the siege of Sarajevo, the city enjoyed a vibrant cultural life,
staging countless performances, exhibitions and other arts projects.602 Events such as
the theatre festival MESS or the film festival became signs of the people’s resilience
and their resistance to violence. Still today, people in Sarajevo talk with pride about the
vibrant cultural life during the war and how this brought a feeling of being human back
into their otherwise cruel everyday lives. There is thus a high degree of identification
with cultural processes in the Bosnian context, while cultural actors often assume the
role of making people’s voices heard and translating the social into the cultural, and
often the latter also into the political.
However, although cultural actors reflect a variety of identities and needs as they
emerge from within society, this is not to argue that they are representative of society as
a whole. Indeed, they may only represent a niche of actors within a bigger picture. What
their voices can do, however, is to cast light on the dynamics with which various forms
of peace are negotiated between different actors that try to make their voices heard in
different ways. Given that such negotiations of peace are processes in constant
reproduction and modification, they can indeed never be said to be representative. In
that sense, examining some instances in which local cultural actors, a diverse group in
itself, act, can only represent a snap-shot of selected local spaces of agency. As a result,
this section aims neither to essentialise spaces of agency as objective or timeless truths,
nor to look at the EU’s and local spaces as binary, but rather to point to processes that
are key to understanding how spaces change and impact on each other as well as the
mechanisms of translation and hybridisation between them. In that respect, the
601 Charles Landry, “Culture at the Heart of Transformation”, DEZA and Pro Helvetia, 2006.
602 Craig Zelizer, “The role of artistic processes in peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Peace and
Conflict Studies, vol.10, no.2, 2003, pp.62-75, p.66.
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following section has the ambition to investigate a number of factors that impact on the
development of selected spaces of agency in order to emphasise the transformative and
negotiable dimension of peacebuilding. This has often been played down by the existing
literature on peace and conflict, which tends to imagine peace as a coherent and
universal matter, neglecting its contextuality and transformability. Instead, this chapter
deconstructs processes of agency, negotiation and resistance as they are voiced towards
specific elements of peacebuilding, showing that the latter is never just black or white,
but much more nuanced, fragmented and complex than that.
Responses to the EU’s Spaces of Agency
Civil Society
As it has been outlined above, the EU has – together with other actors active in
the peacebuilding and development area - actively participated in the creation of a civil
society space, which frames local society in its (in)ability to professionalise and adapt to
what the EU imagines civil society to be. Indeed, the EU considers civil society a
central actor and partner in the peacebuilding process. In the responses to this space, we
can observe a certain degree of complicity, while particularly NGOs have become
complicit in the EU’s civil society conceptions. This is hardly ever openly voiced, but
some (cultural) NGOs have benefitted from the EU’s focus on civil society as a partner
by getting access to funds or at least being invited to conferences and receptions hosted
by the EU.603 This in turn makes it easier for such actors to get involved in the EU’s
strategies and funding priorities for the future. Such actors, mainly NGOs that have
access to funding and / or dialogue with the EU, tend to become complicit in this
system by confirming the EU in its approach to focus on civil society as a peacebuilding
partner. Indeed, in the Delegation in Sarajevo, there is a perception that NGOs are
generally happy with the EU in the country, which a staff member of the Delegation
derives from the high number of funding applications that are put in every year.604
However, in many cases this represents a tuning of local interests to EU interests rather
than vice versa – the Delegation of the EU is very clear about the procedure being a
603 I observed this throughout my fieldwork in 2010.
604 Vladimir Pandurević, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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numerical process with the priorities being set in Brussels.605 This means that the
version of peace that the EU is developing in BiH represents mostly a realisation of the
EU’s approaches instead of reflecting contextualised peacebuilding that takes into
account the everyday dimension of peace in BiH. Peacebuilding subcontracted to local
NGOs may help selected local actors to get access to resources and public attention on
the one hand, but on the other hand, it is often perceived as constraining. Therefore,
local actors often have an ambiguous attitude towards the EU’s policies and approaches
in this field. A programme manager of a Sarajevo-based NGO working on civil courage
and resistance, for instance, did not criticise the EU’s funding procedures per se, and
implied that Bosnians will need to be trained to learn how to write proposals according
to EU guidelines. Yet, the interviewee also suggested that the EU give easier access to
funding to make funding procedures work better for BiH, which in turns reflects a
certain degree of ambiguity towards the EU’s civil society space.606 The fact that local
NGOs have adapted to the EU’s requirements on the one hand, but do not identify with
them to a large extent, became obvious when I attended a civil society meeting hosted
by the Delegation of the EU in Sarajevo.607 Although many NGO representatives
participated in it, there was not much enthusiasm about the pre-set agenda, which was
mainly organisational in nature, and was not responsive to the ideas and the input of the
NGO representatives. People indeed apologised to me afterwards that this meeting
lacked substance.
This reflects the extent to which there are feelings of rejection against the civil
society space, which is also voiced by a number of cultural actors, relating to the quality
of civil society from a domestic perspective on the one hand, but also to the EU’s ways
of engaging with it on the other hand. In this context, a radio journalist suggested that
civil society in BiH is a minority and not a common way of organising social life.608
Along those lines, the president of the alumni organisation Alumni Centra za
Interdisciplinarne Postdiplomske Studije (ACIPS) suggested that civil society does not
represent a valid partner neither to local politicians nor to the international community,
since it has not emerged from the grassroots, but acts as a client of political parties.
605 Ibid.
606 Eleonora Emkić, Gariwo, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 23/04/10.
607 Meeting held in Sarajevo, 19/03/10.
608 Adnan Čalkić, EFM Student Radio, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 12/03/10.
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According to him, the fact that civil society never emerged from within society, but is
rather based on money and financial opportunities, makes it an unsuitable policy
partner. Pointing to his own association, ACIPS, he explained that the ‘real civil’
society comes by accident, as opposed to being artificially set up and planned.609 The
problem seems to lie in the fact that the EU has high expectations on civil society, often
equalising it with NGOs, as an NGO staff member pointed out.610 He claimed that this
reflects a managerial paradigm, in terms of thinking in frameworks, structures and
deadlines, and since this is “all about money and donor frameworks”, it closes
possibilities and inhibits creativity: “If you cannot put it in a framework, the problem
does not exist.”611 This fails to connect to the ways in which people experience conflict
and peace as well as their associated needs, which are hardly ever amenable to being
organised in a framework.
In that respect, the founder of a youth and music centre in Travnik, ‘Alter Art’,
explained that the NGO format was advantageous in terms of facilitating access to
funds, but he expressed his regret having to run a centre as an NGO, given that this felt
to him like losing the spirit of the project as a result of having to explain every little step
to the donors.612 Again, this mirrors the extent to which the EU’s ambitions to frame
their relations with civil society in administrative terms fails to connect to the
expectations from numerous Bosnian actors. The observation that in the Peacebuilding
Partnership programme a major problem was that “many of the proposals lacked quality
and some contained administrative errors. In some cases this was no doubt due to a lack
of experience in writing EC proposals”,613 is illustrative of why there is a lack of mutual
engagement between the organisational structures of the EU and local cultural actors.
The associated engines (organisational efficiency vs. complex approaches based on a
‘messy’ everyday) therefore appear distant, not finding a common space of agency.
Therefore, although societal actors work with the civil society frame that is provided by
the EU (and indeed other international peacebuilding actors in the country), they are not
uncritical of it, and do voice their resentments to it. The main issue seems to be the
609 Sanel Huskić, ACIPS, student presentation, Sarajevo, 15/03/10. 
610 Nebojša Šavija-Valha, NDC Sarajevo, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 12/03/09.
611 Ibid.
612 Darko Saračević, Alter Art, Personal Interview, Travnik, 02/03/11.
613 Sarah Bayne and Patrick Trolliet, “Stocktaking and scoping of the Peacebuilding Partnership”,
European Commission 2009, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ifs/pbp/docs/study_en.pdf (accessed 31/07/11).
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EU’s tendency to think in frames and structures rather than in terms of social needs and
contents that are voiced by the recipients of policies. There seems to be a thread running
through local discourses, saying that “the EU Commission is not about people”614, but
about institutions and power.
Criticism towards the EU’s civil society space does not remain passive, but there
are also actual acts of resistance to this space. In this context, the Youth Theatre in
Sarajevo tries to find alternative ways of making a difference in post-war BiH. A
dramaturgist of this theatre explained that NGOs did not have adequate means to bring
about change in society, while the work of theatres was more connected to society,
more productive and transformative.615 This ties in with a more general feeling on the
ground that NGOs have often become job creators and become distanced from the
ground. Taking this perception up, the film company ‘deblokada’ has developed its
particular ways of dealing with unresolved societal issues in terms of integrating them
with their films. Explaining their deviation from the NGO format, a staff member
criticised the focus on keywords such as ‘peacebuilding’, ‘democracy’ and ‘human
rights’, which are all domains of various NGOs, but they do not seem to be influential
in society, so an alternative approach is required.616 This clearly points to the perception
that NGOs are not representative of the people, but are rather focused on keywords that
donors want to hear. Interestingly enough, the interviewee had worked for an NGO
herself before engaging in cultural work, which in turn reflects the dissatisfaction of
many people (even inside NGOs) with the language and rhetoric used by the
international peacebuilding community. ‘Civil society’ can be considered part of that
rhetoric, while it is locally often associated with the idea of being driven by foreign
donors.617
An activist of the social resistance movement ‘Dosta!’ (English: ‘Enough!’)
confirmed the necessity of establishing a strong society in BiH rather than a technical
civil society.618 This is indeed what Dosta! is trying to do by encouraging people to get
involved in the political sphere to be able to create a version of peace which is their own
614 sMagdalena Schildknecht, Narko-Ne, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 11/03/10 and Aida Pilav,
Pozorište Mladih Sarajevo, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 31/03/10.
615 Aida Pilav, Personal Interview, op cit.
616 Amira Kresevljaković, deblokada, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 13/04/10.
617 Confidential source, E-mail Conversation, 03/08/11.
618 Darko Brkan, Dosta!, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 01/04/10.
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and in which society makes decisions itself (rather than external authorities).619 It
encourages people to stand up for their rights and needs and thus to transform the public
sphere. To be able to achieve this, Dosta! is not run like an NGO, but represents an
association of activist and socially-engaged citizens, mostly working on a voluntary
basis. They leave their traces throughout Sarajevo to make their resistance visible and
are much better known than most NGOs in the city, particularly in Sarajevo. Dosta!
deliberately refrains from considering itself a member of civil society, since they view
the latter as being played by the international community, and not by the local
population.620 Through their ambition to include the interested public to change the
political realm in BiH, Dosta! builds on the initiative of citizens rather than the input of
the international community. As a result, they do not rely on the stereotypical
peacebuilding keywords mentioned above (‘civil society’, ‘human rights’ etc), but their
key values are ‘povjerenje’ (trust), ‘solidarnost’ (solidarity), ‘beskompromisnost’
(intransigence), ‘istrajnost’ (persistence), ‘socijalna pravda’ (social justice),
‘dostojanstvo’ (dignity), ‘osviještenost građana’ (a citizens’ consciousness), ‘apsolutna 
moć glasu naroda’ (the absolute power of the voice of the people), ‘bez nacionalizma i 
isticanja nacionalnih interesa” (no nationalism and national interests), ‘kreativnost’
(creativity) and ‘popularizacija’ (popularisation).621 These terms deviate clearly from
the version of peace that is envisaged by the EU and reflect the extent to which Bosnian
agencies have found ways of voicing their vision of BiH in alternative terms.
However, resistance to the civil society space is not only voiced in public, but
also in more hidden ways, as it is the case with the Duplex Gallery in Sarajevo. Its
founder is eager to keep this art gallery hidden, so only people genuinely interested in
visiting it will find it. The gallery is located in the backyard of a small shopping passage
in the centre of Sarajevo, so it is technically accessible to everyone, but practically only
people who have heard about it from ‘insiders’ will be able to access it. Not only does
this strategy prevent the gallery from becoming a product of consumer politics, but,
according to the owner of the gallery, this also keeps actors such as the EU from using it
as a tool of the promotion of their policies.622 The example of the Duplex Gallery shows
619 Ibid.
620 Ibid.
621 http://dosta.ba/latinica/o-pokretu-dosta/ (accessed 31/07/11).
622 Pierre Courtin, Duplex Gallery, Several Personal Conversations, Sarajevo, April 2010.
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how resistance may be voiced through the withdrawal from its public sphere that is
predicated on a visible and transparent civil society. This points to the fact that being
part of civil society also means being a policy tool for the international community in
terms of depending on their funding, showing in their reports and (possibly even
unconsciously) responding to their needs and demands. In this vein, the civil society
space becomes distanced from people’s everyday lives and thus fails to take hold locally
in a sustainable way. Indeed, a journalist from the regional network BIRN explained
that reconciliation is a very personal issue and cannot be decided about collectively623 -
as many donors try to do with the help of civil society partners who are believed to be
representative of local society. However, since many people view CSOs as part of the
international community or clients of local authorities, reconciliation via civil society is
unlikely to trickle down in terms of being translated into local spaces of agency. Against
this background, it becomes understandable why many cultural actors are experimenting
with alternative approaches to engage with local society. Although it may seem that
those alternatives ideas remain trapped within the cultural arena, the discourses
produced within this sphere do get multiplied beyond it. For instance, the Sarajevo
Center for Contemporary Art (SCCA) launched a campaign in 2005 in which they
expressed their “support of art projects which publicly and openly raise issues related to
our time and start a direct dialogue with citizens in a new and untraditional way, both in
form and content.”624 This is clearly a call for arts to develop alternative ways of
addressing people’s needs. Yet, instead of doing so via a civil society framework, this
represents an attempt to abstract those needs and transform them into something
creative rather than something exclusively responsive to donor requirements.
Against this background, it becomes obvious that the degree of approval of the
EU’s civil society space seems to be low among the actors interviewed for this thesis.
Where there is translation into other spaces, this comes mainly in the form of complicity
or compliance as a response to imposition rather than as a genuine will to implement the
EU’s policies, i.e. accommodation. This is not only due to the fact that the EU has
rather inflexible requirements in this respect, but it is also a result of the low levels of
623 Nidžara Ahmetasević, BIRN, Phone Interview, 19/07/10. 
624 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, “New Monument. De/Construction of Monument”, Sarajevo,
2006, p.8.
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trust civil society enjoys in BiH, where people tend to be sceptical towards its potential
to actually represent societal needs and interests. There seems to be only little contact to
other spaces, so the EU struggles translating the meanings it is creating in this space of
agency into local spaces, where civil society is often considered a superficial construct
of the international community, in fact mainly an engine to get donor money. This
partly results from the exclusivity of the space, as it has been shown above, so many
actors feel excluded from it and do not feel they should become involved, given that
they often do not see how they can make a difference in a highly pre-structured space.
Such forms of rejection and resistance have indeed led to a growing awareness within
the EU that its use of the “civil society” notion is rather limited and needs rethinking.
The fact that this is changing to a certain extent can be seen in recent events organised
by the EU, to which not only NGOs in the narrow sense are invited. In fact, we can see
some tentative efforts to enhance the guest list, for instance including cultural actors.625
To what extent this will influence the bigger lines of cooperation with civil society is
yet to be seen.
Democratisation
It has been outlined above that the democratisation space is a central one for the
EU, relating to its own identity on the one hand, but also to its accession criteria and
conditionality. However, both the quantity and quality of responses from the ground
towards democratisation are somewhat limited, while it seems to be hardly relevant in
discourses of local cultural actors and their spaces. Yet although there is not much
response to democracy and democratisation from the ground, actors like the Swiss
Cultural Programme in the Western Balkans (SCP) have created a link between the
democratisation agenda and their cultural engagement in the entire region, which is an
example of a local actor accommodating the EU’s democratisation space as well as the
connection of this space to a broad notion of peacebuilding. In this context, the Deputy
Regional Manager explained that within their cultural agenda, democratisation has been
made an important goal since it contributes to empowerment and ownership and
625 An example of this is the P2P programme, for which a meeting with different organisations from the
Western Balkans was organised in Brussels, 4 May 2011.
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therefore represents an important contribution to cultural life in the Western Balkans.626
The SCP uses culture as an instrument to promote its much broader agenda, one of the
central goals of which can be seen to be democratisation as a result of cultural dialogue.
This is particularly evident in their recent project “Balkans’ Initiative for Cultural
Cooperation, Exchange and Development (BICCED)” that SCP is conducting in
cooperation with various journalist associations and networks. This project is focused
on training journalists on reporting in the cultural sector to provide high quality
analytical reporting on crucial political issues relating to culture and arts.627 Along those
lines, the cultural sector is being used not only for the sake of itself, but also as a
training sphere for a wider democratisation agenda. This process also works vice versa,
where democracy is used instrumentally in terms of creating a positive environment in
which cultural activities can unfold. This is the case with the SCP’s “Rural
Communities Culture” project that is implemented with a number of local partners in
the Western Balkans, aiming to create the environment in which cultural needs can be
identified and local artists can develop their own projects.628
The Centre André Malraux in Sarajevo pursues a similar approach in terms of
using their cultural projects to support “the development of a democratic, civil and
intercultural Bosnia and Herzegovina.”629 Again, this represents a more or less indirect
link between cultural activities and democratisation, while the latter becomes an
implicit goal of the Centre’s activities, such as book festivals, cooperation with other
NGOs in the country as well as its efforts to strengthen civil society more generally.630
Such activities situate the abstract notion of democracy in a bigger context, with the
ability to personalise and emotionalise it to connect it to a wider audience.
At the same time, apart from examples such as the SCP or the Centre André
Malraux, which are actors that can be situated somewhere towards the middle of a
spectrum between local society and the EU, endorsement of the democratisation space
among other cultural actors appears largely lacking – meaning that acceptance and
accommodation of this space is relatively low. This is often seen as related to the lack of
contextuality of the EU’s democratisation agenda. It has been suggested that democracy
626 Bertan Selim, SCP, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 08/04/10.
627 http://www.scp-ba.net/files/BIRN_project_sheet_final.pdf (accessed 27/01/11).
628 http://www.scp-ba.net/files/Rural_Communities_Culture_1.pdf (accessed 27/01/11).
629 Centre André Malraux, “Europe every day”, Sarajevo, 2009.
630 Ibid.
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cannot be implemented as a general pattern, but it has to be developed and adopted as a
gradual process.631 This is where cultural actors come into play in their ability to modify
and adapt abstract concepts by working with them on a different level as well as
experimenting with the ways in which those can be implemented.
Yet, in many of these creative experiments, actors seem to deploy strong
feelings of rejection against, or at least demands for modification of the EU’s
democratisation space – not only against its contents, but more against the ways in
which it is being implemented in BiH. In terms of content, a staff member of the
Nansen Dialogue Center in Mostar suggested that democracy must be connected to
material needs to connect to people in terms of providing “what they can feel and see
and touch” rather than just representing empty talks.632 This is opposed to the EU’s
approach viewing democracy mainly as a policy tool that needs to be integrated with
policy documents, NGO agendas and so forth. Yet democratisation policies are often
perceived as rhetorical devices that do not lead to substantial improvements in people’s
lives. It has been emphasised to me that
due to the fact that we have been hearing about it for the last 20 years, and compared to
the "good" authoritarian regime that we used to have, demokracija democracy didn't
bring much benefits for ordinary Bosnians.633
In this context, a theatre dramaturgist suggested that democracy was indeed a
meaningless term.634 In a similar vein, the president of ACIPS criticised the fact that the
international community did not substantially change existing power structures, but
rather legitimised incumbent power holders, which resulted in a minimal democracy,
which is, according to the interviewee, the worst form of democracy, since it actually
exacerbates the situation of those who are not in power.635 This in turn is linked to the
criticism of the blueprint approach of the international community, which assumes that
democratisation will work in similar ways, independent of the places in which it is
being implemented. With respect to the EU, local critiques tend to take offence at what
has been outlined above, namely the EU’s lack of flexibility to adapt democratisation
631 Asja Hafner, SCCA / pro.ba, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 16/04/10.
632 Elvir Djuliman, NDC Mostar, Personal Interview, Mostar, 15/04/10.
633 Confidential source, E-mail Conversation, 03/08/11.
634 Aida Pilav, Personal Interview, op. cit.
635 Sanel Huskić, Student Presentation, op. cit.
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policies to the Bosnian context, given that its approach to democratisation cannot be
compromised upon as a result of it being part of the Copenhagen Criteria.
A programme coordinator of the SCCA in Sarajevo voiced her rejection of this,
arguing that the international community only created one single model of democracy,
but is applying this everywhere out of context.636 In that sense, efforts aimed at
democracy promotion are mainly associated with the international community rather
than local actors. This results in a perception of democracy being exclusively one-way
and top-down,637 without taking into account the diverse and specific needs of the local
population. The latter is expected to act as a passive recipient of the EU’s
democratisation space and responds accordingly by refusing to get involved, thus
voicing their feelings of rejection towards it. This is partly grounded in a perception that
the EU is playing with its assumed position of superiority by teaching people about how
to live democracy. In this context, numerous interlocutors complained about the attitude
of the EU that is often perceived as patronising. A cultural event manager of the Youth
Centre ‘Dom Mladih’ in Sarajevo voiced his anger with this approach, saying that the
fact that foreigners were promoting democracy and tolerance after the war was
ridiculous, given that the country had developed these things before the war and was
thus not in need of a teacher.638 Agreeing with that, another interviewee claimed that
there was no need to talk about democracy and that he felt offended by others trying to
teach him how to be ‘civilised’.639
Yet, while there is a lot of rejection of the EU’s democratisation space, which
seems to have turned into an “othering” space in terms of assuming that the “other”
needs to learn how to be democratic, the degree of resistance to it is only low. This may
be connected to the fact that more generally, democracy seems a desirable goal for
many local actors, whereas the main points of contention seem to lie in the patronising
processes during the course of which democracy is being ‘taught’ in BiH as well as the
lack of contextuality and connection to people’s lives. Against this background, the
Nansen Dialogue Center in Mostar has tried to develop its own way of approaching
democratisation by organising a concert that intended to bring different people together.
636 Asja Hafner, Personal Interview, op. cit.
637 Ibid.
638 Zijad Pekmez, Dom Mladih Sarajevo, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 12/04/10.
639 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 25/03/10.
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The goal was to establish a dialogue during the concert, so that people would start
talking about social issues – not only, but also about democracy and its associated
meanings.640 Again, such initiatives mirror the extent to which smaller initiatives can
use their tools (i.e. access to music groups and concert venues) to mobilise a wider
public for their ideas as well as translating the meanings of a EU space into a specific
context in a way that makes more sense to society. Democratisation makes sense
contextually through such events, because they establish its meanings in relation to the
people.
All in all, it becomes obvious that there are strong feelings of rejection against
the EU’s democratisation space of agency. This is linked to the fact that this is a highly
pre-structured space that seems to leave hardly any room for local actors to challenge or
modify it. Only if those actors already share the basic foundations of the space – as it is
the case with bigger international NGOs such as the SCP or the Centre André Malraux,
then they can participate, shape and fill it with their own ideas. However, where actors
feel they are not being heard or that they do not have a chance to contribute to the space,
there seems to be only a small likelihood for them to become active members. As a
result, the democratisation space remains highly abstract and top-down as it is perceived
locally, and thus fails to translate its meanings into local spaces of agency.
Democratisation is not very present as a buzzword in local public discourses, and
although the degree of resistance to the space is low, there are hardly any mechanisms
through which the contents of that space can be translated into local discourses. Only
where local actors take the initiative to engage with the space can it be translated into a
language that connects to people’s everyday lives. This runs contrary to the assumption
that mechanisms of translation work best when already strong actors take the initiative
and integrate them with their bigger agendas. There is only little conversation about the
meaning of democratisation for peacebuilding in BiH between the EU and local actors.
So it seems that no common space of agency is emerging through which
democratisation policies could be negotiated and processed. What can be observed,
however, is that, despite its institutional paralysis to change democratisation policies,
there is an increasing critical awareness within the EU towards its own democratisation
agenda, while at the same time, democracy has lost its central role in the relationship
640 Elvir Djuliman, Personal Interview, op.cit.
164
between the EU and BiH. The Commission’s latest progress report is reflective of that
change, winding down its previously-placed emphasis on democratisation, not least as a
result of the failure of such policies to take hold locally.641
Regional Cooperation
As outlined above, regional cooperation is one of the cornerstones of EU
engagement in BiH and follows the EU’s own history of regional integration.
Generally, there seems to be some degree of accommodation and tolerance
towards the regional cooperation space. Again, the SCP has incorporated this notion and
bases its cultural approach to peacebuilding on regional cooperation projects to instil a
culture of social change. To achieve this, SCP supports individual cultural actors to
cooperate across the region through a variety of projects.642 An example is the E761
programme, funded by SCP, which aims to build creative capacities in both BiH and
Serbia as well as establishing regional networks.643 Such initiatives emanate not only
from bigger organisations, but also from artists themselves. For instance, the Museum
for Contemporary Arts in Republika Srpska regularly bases projects on cooperation
with curators from the region. As the PR manager outlined, their biggest arts project
involved a curator from Sarajevo, one from South Serbia and one from Banja Luka.644
The president of Protok, the Center for Visual Communication, makes a more general
statement about the need to follow the EU’s approach to regional cooperation, which
Protok does by inviting artists from the region and cooperating with the SCCA.645 This
is a clear sign of the willingness to accommodate the EU’s regional cooperation space,
and even take it further from there. In contrast to the EU, such initiatives may not
necessarily have the goal of peacebuilding or memberstate-building, since they are
641 European Commission, “Commission staff working document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 Progress
Report, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council”, Brussels, 2010.
642 Bertan Selim, Personal Interview, op. cit.
643 http://www.scp-ba.net/files/Academica_project_sheet_final.pdf (accessed 27/01/11).
644 Branka Šestić, Muzej Savremene Umjetnosti RS, Personal Interview, Banja Luka, 27/04/10.
645 Radenko Milak,“ Dijalogom do budućeg suživota”, interview in kulturpunkt.hr, 15/11/09, available at 
http://www.kulturpunkt.hr/i/kulturoskop/341/ (accessed 04/06/10).
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looking at the practical implications and concrete advantages for a cultural project by
building on regional cooperation. However, the way of achieving this seems to be more
or less coherent with the EU’s approach to regional cooperation and therefore shows
how processes that do not seem to be linked in the first place (a cultural and a
peacebuilding agenda) can be brought into symbiosis for mutual benefit.
At the same time, these cross-regional contacts with other cities, such as Mostar
or Sarajevo, are limited to the individual rather than the structural level and are thus
highly dependent on the individual actors and their mutual relationships.646 A member
of the EFM student radio, for instance, emphasised that, after having travelled
throughout BiH, he realised that young people in Banja Luka had the same problems as
people in Sarajevo.647 This example mirrors the way in which the space of local cultural
actors often connects to the EU’s space, by connecting it to their own experiences. For
instance, they partly use ideas contained in the EU’s regional cooperation space to make
sense of their personal experiences.
As a result, we can see efforts to modify the EU’s space of agency by
transforming its structured and top-down nature into something that can take hold
locally. Via this modified approach to regional cooperation, it becomes possible for
actors to use elements of the EU space and translate them into local discourses to make
them relevant on the ground. This may be one of the success factors of the film
producing company ‘deblokada’. In fact, not only their films but also their other
projects, such as artists’ and theatre workshops, often have a regional dimension, with
the main producer, Jasmila Žbanić, working closely with actors cross-regionally.648 Her
recent film, ‘Na Putu’ (‘On the Path’) is just one example of this, being played by actors
from the entire region rather than just from BiH. In this respect, ‘deblokada’ is
developing its own ways of talking about regional issues as well as creating concrete
meanings for people’s everyday lives. Again, this represents an attempt of translation
from a bigger space of agency (‘regional cooperation’) into a more localised one.
In a different way, but no less creatively, the ‘D-O Ark Underground’ (Biennale
of Contemporary Art) has internalised regional cooperation as an engine of its approach.
The project committee has transformed Tito’s formerly secret bunker in Konjic into an
646 Ibid.
647 Mirza Ajnadžić, EFM Student Radio, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 07/03/11.
648 Amira Kresevljaković, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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exhibition centre as an attempt to deal with the past and its associated divisions in the
region. Before the opening in May 2011, the project coordinators organised roundtables
and lectures across the region, namely in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Belgrade, Mostar,
Ljubljana and Konjic, including experts from the entire region (ex-Yugoslavia and
beyond) as well as a curator from Belgrade and one from Montenegro. In terms of
regional cooperation, the organisers claim:
We believe that this project will be recognized as an important one for its potential to
promote better understanding between the nations of our region, as well as between the
region and Europe.649
In its subtle connection to peacebuilding, this approach reflects not only a
certain form of accommodation of the EU’s notion of regional cooperation, but at the
same time it translates it into the regional context of the (Western) Balkans, connecting
it to symbol-laden places and to the experiences of the people addressed by this arts
project. Peacebuilding through the regional cooperation space thus becomes a
translation between local spaces and those of the EU, with actors as described above
helping to make this space resonant among the people as well as reminding of its
contextual meaning.
At the same time, we can observe a certain degree of modification of the space
by a number of cultural organisations that translate a given space into a local context to
make it relevant on the ground. While for the EU, in the context of regional
cooperation, there is an emphasis on its judicial and economic dimensions (i.e. through
war trials and trade agreements),650 Pravo Ljudski, a human rights film festival, uses the
screening of documentaries to express their social engagement and critical stance
towards social and political developments. As the creative director of the festival
pointed out, Pravo Ljudski feels the need to promote young artists from the region. This
is not only to support them and their work, but at the same time to raise the interest of
potential audiences, against the background that the latter tend to be most interested in
films from the region, since those are considered ‘our films’.651 In that sense, the film
festival acts as a tool of mobilisation through which the rather abstract notion of
649 http://www.bijenale.ba/ (accessed 27/01/11).
650 European Commission, “Commission staff working document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010 Progress
Report, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council”, op. cit.
651 Kumjana Novakova, Pravo Ljudski, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 09/04/10.
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regional cooperation is translated into local spheres, and thus represents a tool through
which the EU’s space of regional cooperation can open up and start merging with local
spaces of agency. This idea can also be seen as incorporated by ‘Traduki’, a European
network of literature and books with a particular focus on South East Europe. Their
main work consists of doing interregional translations of the books the organisation
considers interesting for a country according to its specific needs. This is based on the
assumption that ‘you have to know your neighbour’, which in turn is the pre-condition
for their approach to fostering cultural exchange across the region.652 It also includes a
peacebuilding dimension in terms of encouraging cross–regional dialogue, albeit on a
societal level rather than through engagement with political elites, the level which the
EU tends to focus on. At the same time, although promoting books across the region,
this approach is not inattentive to the diverging needs within this region, often
promoting different versions of a book depending on differing needs and demands.653
The coordinator of the regional office in Sarajevo suggested that, for instance, the
literary needs in Croatia and Serbia differ considerably from those in BiH.654 In that
sense, Traduki attempts to foster regional cooperation, yet in a way that is responsive to
the various needs emerging within the region. The importance of taking into account
local needs reflects the ambitions of a number of actors that work towards regional
cooperation, whether this be intentional or rather accidental. In this context, the director
of the Children’s Theatre in Banja Luka pointed to the importance of responding to
children’s needs with their performances, at the same time identifying regionally cross-
cutting needs, which form the foundation of their international festivals in cooperation
with countries like Croatia, Serbia and beyond.655 This can be considered a powerful
translation of the regional cooperation space by connecting regional peacebuilding to its
associated needs and by making it more accessible to a wider audience, including
children, who are often marginalised in this respect. This shows very clearly that the
ways in which local cultural actors tend to deal with regional cooperation may be more
selective than the EU’s approach, yet at the same time they develop more specific
652 Hana Stojić, Traduki, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 21/04/10.
653 Ibid.
654 Ibid.
655 Predrag Bjelošević, Dječije Pozorište RS, Personal Interview, Banja Luka, 27/04/10.
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programmes targeted at different social niches and therefore vesting the notion of
regional cooperation with concrete social configurations.
MESS, a big theatre festival, incorporates a strong regional dimension. The
festival was founded in 1960 and became renowned as the most important national
festival in Yugoslavia, working with artists and companies in the entire country. In this
spirit, despite the social ruptures escalating in the 1990s, it became a space of cultural
resistance to the, screening films during the war, as well as being the first institution to
communicate with neighbouring countries after it.656 Even now, about 15 years later,
their production catalogue is reflective of numerous projects that are conducted in
cooperation with different countries in the region, and brings together productions from
various countries in the region.657 Although peacebuilding ambitions may not be
mentioned explicitly in the mission statement of MESS, it cannot be denied that it
includes a component of it, being in the position to mobilise a large audience to engage
in discourses related to social cohabitation and therefore translating discourses as they
refer to peacebuilding into an everyday context.
The EU’s regional cooperation space seems to find much more resonance on the
ground than the previously-outlined spaces. A variety of cultural actors are building on
it, accommodating and modifying it so it can be translated into local discourses. In that
sense, local discourses merge with the EU’s, which reflects a high degree of hybridity
between spaces. In fact, a common space seems to be emerging here, to which both EU
actors as well as cultural actors contribute, although in very different ways. While the
EU seems to focus on cooperation between economic and political elites, and partly
civil society actors, local actors have emphasised dialogue between cultural actors, their
audiences, and people more generally. This results in a symbiosis between actors,
during the course of which the EU provides the institutional, economic and political
background, while those cultural actors mentioned above translate this approach to
broaden the audience and thus participants of that space. The EU and some local
cultural actors therefore work on the same space of agency and talk about a similar
meaning of peace with respect to regional cooperation. The fact that cultural actors
656 Nihad Kresevljaković, MESS, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 01/04/10.
657 http://www.mess.ba/2010/en/program/catalogue (accessed 28/01/11).
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manage to mobilise larger audiences to talk about and work on regional cooperation can
be considered as beneficial for the EU’s ambitions in that sphere.
Human Rights
Similar to democratisation and regional cooperation, human rights form a
cornerstone of EU engagement in BiH. Generally speaking, the topic of human rights
seems to have remained in the domain of NGOs specifically focused on human rights
issues rather than being mainstreamed broadly in many sectors. In addition, there is a
perception that in BiH, human rights are very dogmatic and cannot be discussed or
negotiated by the people.658 Again, this alludes to the technical character of the EU’s
human rights policies and the fact that those are not very open to challenge, being part
of the Copenhagen Criteria. For many Bosnians, human rights do not have the power
that they are often imagined to have in terms of improving people’s lives, but they often
refer to human rights as ‘one of the mantras of the international community.’659
However, there are some cultural actors that have started working on human
rights, with the most prominent and visible example in Sarajevo probably being Pravo
Ljudski, the above-mentioned human rights film festival. Through the screening of
films that are related to human rights issues in a broad sense, they point to what they
consider problematic social developments, not only in BiH, but also beyond. They
organised a photo competition for young people (ZOOM 2010) dealing with human
rights issues. The associated events are meant to promote a culture of human rights and
democracy, which can be understood in a flexible and contextual way, while the
creative director made clear that they would never make a compromise on the meaning
of tolerance and dignity as the foundation of their work.660 Pravo Ljudski can be
considered an attempt to translate the EU’s human rights space into local discourses and
make them accessible to a wider audience. On the one hand, this is facilitated by the
fact that normally the tickets to the film screenings during the festival are free of charge
and most members of Pravo Ljudski work on a voluntary basis. On the other hand,
658 Confidential source, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 17/03/10.
659 Confidential source, E-mail conversation, 03/08/11.
660 Kumjana Novakova, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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human rights discourses are made accessible through the emotional approach of Pravo
Ljudski– as opposed to the EU’s technical understanding of human rights. In this
context, the organisation writes:
5th Pravo Ljudski, nurtured by its inspiring, enthusiastic, faithful, true and
human friends, is unremittingly developing. Excited, eager, enthusiastic, passionate,
tired (less), on our way to the new programmatic concepts and contents, we are
trembling amid the constant drive for exploration, (un)conditioned potentials for acting
and fear from ignorance.661
Pravo Ljudski modifies the EU’s human rights space by making it more
accessible to the public and translating its discourses into a language that is more
connected to people’s everyday lives. They also enhance the meaning of “human rights”
in terms of emotionalising it, giving the term new energy and enthusiasm. Since they
give meaning to the otherwise abstract term, their approach can be viewed part of local
peacebuilding.
Damir Nikšić, an artist from Sarajevo, who is based in Stockholm, is pursuing a 
similar approach in his particular way. In his exhibition “Oriental dream”, which was
hosted by the Duplex Gallery in Sarajevo in January 2011, he presents his vision of the
‘Bosnian Dream’:
A Fight for Human rights or for a piece of bread is a bitter fight. A fight for a
dream is a sweet fight, and a Bosnian dream is the sweetest dream, because it’s an
international dream, that the entire mankind should dream in Bosnia, and not Assirya
and Egypte, or Gog and Magog sic.662
This dream the artist develops here is a fight for human rights and for the
satisfaction of material needs. The way in which the artist presents it is not a dream
limited to BiH though, but includes an international dimension. What becomes obvious
is his approach to human rights not as a technical instrument, but as a smaller part of a
bigger dream for “the entire mankind”, again using an emotional and personalised
perspective on human rights.663 This approach in turn widens the potential audience of
the human rights space; it accords a particular meaning to it, which makes sense in the
661 Kumjana Novakova and Monja Suta Hibert, “Pravo Ljudski, 5th Human Rights Festival”, catalogue,
Sarajevo, 2010, http://www.pravoljudski.org/pdf/katalogPLJweb.pdf (accessed 28/01/10).
662 Damir Nikšić, exhibition invitation, email via Pierre Courtin, 19/01/11.  
663 Ibid.
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Bosnian context and connects to people’s perception of human rights in relation to their
personal experiences.
Yet, although there seems to be some degree of accommodation and
modification of the EU’s human rights space, it can also be observed the latter’s human
rights policies do in many cases fail to materialise concretely for the people. This is not
last a result of the EU working with the government as a main partner for the
implementation of human rights policies.664
It is sometimes unclear what the actual meanings of human rights are for a
specific cultural actor working with the term. The D-O ARK Underground project in
Konjic, for instance, claims to promote human rights and tolerance in terms of dealing
with issues related to the Cold War and their relationship with the past and future,665 yet
what this concretely means for the project and the meanings created around ‘human
rights’ is not made entirely clear. Such dynamics reflect the well–known problem of
prevailing donor discourses, which all too often prescribe a certain language for
organisations to gain access to their funding. At the same time, this points to the power
of donors to shape the meanings of the space of agency through their financial
incentives, at least superficially, while local needs and perceptions of human rights may
still differ from them. It has specifically been suggested that in the context of BiH,
human rights have to been seen in the tension between collective and individual rights,
which is part of the history of the country.666 The president of the Helsinki Committee
for Human Rights in BiH explained that, although the Bosnian idea of human rights
came close to the EU’s values, there were still some particular areas of human rights
that were particularly relevant for BiH, mainly in relation to (ethnic) discrimination,
minority issues and so forth.667 At the same time, he critiqued the neo-liberal approach -
shared by the EU – that emphasises privatisation policies and lack a social policy for
compensation in a “very wild market economy.”668 This reflects the degree to which
human rights are perceived to be in need of being tuned to the context in which they are
664 cf. European Commission, “Commission staff working document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010
Progress Report, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council”, op. cit.
665 http://www.bijenale.ba/ (accessed 27/01/11).
666 Jasna Bakšić Muftić, “Bosna i Hercegovina 10 godina poslije Dejtona- mogući pravac promjena”, 
Sarajevo, 2005, www.bh-hchr.org/Saopstenja/Jasna%20Baksic%20Muftic.doc (accessed 30/07/11).
667 Srđan Dizdarević, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo,
10/03/08.
668 Ibid.
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implemented. As the Human Rights Report of the Human Rights Centre of the
University of Sarajevo emphasises, the degree to which Bosnians know about and trust
in the protection of their human rights is limited due to a perception that the legal access
to human rights does not tend to materialise concretely for the people.669
Thus, generally speaking, the responses to the EU’s human rights space tend to
remain vague and limited. Not many cultural actors seem to build on it, which prevents
the space from taking hold among society. However, where cultural actors make an
effort to become involved in the human rights space by modifying it and translating it
into local contexts, creative energies are freed, which in turn help the discourses
materialise locally. Yet, more generally, the human rights space has become part of
local peacebuilding discourses only to a limited extent, still mainly emerging from the
donor sphere.
Institutions/Control
The elements and mechanisms of the EU’s approach to govern and control BiH
through its (sub-)institutions have been outlined above. I have shown that there are a
variety of institutional control mechanisms, ranging from directed civil society funding
to accession conditionality.
Some culturally engaged actors have welcomed elements of this space, pointing
to the advantages of moving towards the EU. This agreement seems to be based on the
EU’s bigger lines of engagement rather than on the details of the accession process
though. In this context, a film producer suggested that the EU is a great direction for the
country to go into, at the same time assuming that in ten years “we will be part of it”.670
He praised the ability of the EU to help the country envisage a brighter future, shaped
by transformations with respect to ecological awareness and the hope for BiH to make
progress in different fields.671 The EU is therefore a platform on which hopes can be
projected, as part of the vision of an open, peaceful and international BiH.
669 Human Rights Centre, “Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Sarajevo, 2009,
http://hrc.unsa.ba/hrr2008/PDFS/humanrightsinbih2008.pdf (accessed 01/08/11).
670 Namik Kabil, film producer, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 14/04/10.
671 Ibid.
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A staff member of the community development foundation Mozaik (funded by
the EU, N.B.) praised the EU as a landmark for organisations in BiH in terms of
teaching them how to professionalise through their control mechanisms and
procedures.672 Being involved in cultural heritage projects amongst others, Mozaik
generally holds a high opinion of the EU, with the executive director claiming that the
EU has the right to set the rules and procedures related to its presence in the country,
with Mozaik adapting to those so their finance and administration departments know
how to go about EU-funded projects.673 The interviewee even welcomed the idea that
the IPA funds have, since 2010, started to fund ideas coming from within the EU rather
than just from local partners, which she considered as beneficial due to her perception
that people’s ideas in BiH were not “good enough” to create successful projects.674 This
in turn shows how the EU is perceived (by some) as a patron that is more developed
than BiH and can therefore help the country and its society to make progress on
different scales. Yet to a certain extent, this represents a reproduction of the discourses
of ‘Balkanism’ and can be seen in relation to Bakić-Hayden’s ‘nesting orientalisms’ 
concept, pointing to the fact that compliance is not just a passive category, but reflects
the agency of local actors to appropriate discourses of Balkanism to ‘recycle’ them for
their own benefits.675
It becomes clear that there is a central financial dimension in the responses to
the EU’s institutional control mechanisms. The PR manager of the Museum for
Contemporary Art in Banja Luka pointed to their need for finances as well as
reputational backup which can be provided by funds from the UN or the EU: “The first
thing is to be strong here and after that we’ll have strength and can apply this for
something bigger, something greater. We have high hopes, that’s for sure.”676 This
shows that receiving initial EU funding is not just a technical means to help an
organisation go about its work, but it may also have longer-lasting effects in terms of
building trust in an organisation and giving its staff the courage to attempt to run bigger
projects. In that sense, the EU is seen as capable of strengthening actors and thus of
672 Vesna Bajšanski-Agić, Mozaik, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 24/03/10.
673 Ibid.
674 Ibid.
675 Milica Bakić-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia“, Slavic Review, vol.54,
no.4, 1995, pp.917-931.
676 Branka Šestić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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making transformation possible. When it places trust on a certain actor, the latter might
develop a higher self-confidence and undertake bigger projects. Those may indeed be
political and possibly partly beyond the control of the EU as funder, since specifically
with arts projects, meanings can be created and transformed in coded and not always
perfectly controllable ways.
With a less financially-oriented, but thoroughly positive view of the EU as an
actor in BiH, an activist of the social movement Dosta! suggested that the most suitable
peacebuilding actor in the country would be the EU in the light of its ability to establish
institutional structures as well as a functioning critical civil society.677 This is to some
extent in the interest of Dosta! in its attempts to find ways of giving the power of
politics back to society, while the group currently complains about a lack of strong
societal groups that would be in the position to challenge the views of the political
elites. In that sense, the EU’s policies to strengthen civil society go hand in hand with
Dosta!’s own ambitions to empower society. Due to a lack of trust in and legitimacy of
politicians within BiH, the EU appears as a last resort to restore guidance, at the same
time resisting domestic control mechanisms. In that respect, the domestic political
sphere becomes an internationalised sphere, with the EU representing a governing actor
to compensate for the failures of the public arena.
However, those positive responses towards some selected EU institutional
control mechanisms are not the only responses from local cultural actors. Indeed, there
also seems to be a certain degree of ambiguity towards those mechanisms. A film
producer, who is generally very much in favour of EU accession, confirmed that, on the
one hand, the EU was a great direction for the country to go in – partly against the
background that due to its geographical location, BiH will, according to him,
automatically become part of the EU in the foreseeable future.678 On the other hand, the
interviewee admitted that this would not solve all major problems BiH is currently
facing – in fact, poor people would still be poor.679 Yet this is not necessarily a critique
of the substances of EU control mechanisms in the country, but rather a claim that this
is due to a lack of rigidity on the part of the EU, which is called upon to put higher
677 Darko Brkan, Personal Interview, op. cit.
678 Namik Kabil, Personal Interview, op. cit.
679 Ibid.
175
demands and exert more pressure on local actors.680 Along those lines, a project
manager of a theatre company argued that the EU’s institutional approach is contested,
but since the EU is in the position to make rules, its expectations can be considered
realistic.681 This mirrors the extent to which the EU has already re-created and
reconfigured the public arena, making itself a central actor in it and drawing the
boundaries around what is imagined feasible. Peacebuilding and its associated public
spaces without the involvement of the EU therefore become almost unthinkable.
Gariwo, a Sarajevo-based NGO working towards more civil courage in everyday
life, has found a way in which the EU’s institutional control space can be negotiated.
The organisation created an opportunity for students to meet with a number of
ambassadors from the international community in BiH and created a space in which
issues such as EU accession could be discussed.682 This worked as a two-way process
and thus allowed for an event during the course of which students could communicate
their own needs related to EU accession and try to influence the associated decision-
making processes.683 Although this may have been on a very small scale, with the
effects of this not even being visible, this represents an attempt to negotiate institutional
control mechanisms and to implicitly claim peacebuilding back to local initiatives.
However, not all responses to this space are based on such forms of support and
constructive engagement. What can be observed as well is an increasing ignorance of
the EU’s policies. The latter can be seen as linked to disappointment with what the EU
has (not) achieved so far despite the big hopes that had been pinned on its role as a
peacebuilder in BiH. In this context, it has been suggested that the EU is not the answer
to everything, and since it appears incredibly hard to change social organisation
according to EU standards, many people do not believe in big changes nor in a ‘big
future’.684 This is in line with the argument that the EU will not be able to solve the
main issues of BiH - the country’s poverty issues more than anything else - so there is a
perception that despite a potential integration with the EU, BiH will still be the poorest
country in the EU.685 These responses reflect frustration and resignation vis-à-vis the
680 Ibid.
681 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 25/03/10.
682 Eleonora Emkić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
683 Ibid.
684 Branka Šestić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
685 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 25/03/10.
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EU’s presence in the country, the policies of which remain distant from the people and
therefore do not carry meanings relevant for their lives. A common peacebuilding effort
thus becomes hard to imagine.
Such responses lead to feelings of rejection among numerous cultural actors,
who are disappointed with the EU’s failure to meet its own initial targets. Perceptions
that the EU is distant from the people in BiH and issues with the need to integrate the
‘local’ with the EU’s requirements and standards686 are often voiced, in addition to
concerns regarding the approach of the international community more generally. A
programme manager of the Nansen Dialogue Center Sarajevo relates this criticism to
the fact that the institutions of the international community tend to lack contextual
awareness of the areas they are working in as well as a lack of knowledge about how the
subjects will respond to their policies.687 As the interviewee pointed out, such things can
only be learned on the ground, but are totally neglected in approaches that are based on
blueprints deprived of native knowledge, as it seems to be the case with the policies of
many big peacebuilding actors in BiH.688 In that sense, he suggested that with this
technical approach, the international community is unable to fight the causes of conflict
(since those have to be experienced with the help of local knowledge), but is limited to
fighting symptoms of the conflict.689 Against this background, the president of ACIPS
criticised the international community for not talking to representatives of communities
– which is difficult in BiH anyway since they do not have official representatives, like
‘elders’ – but only to ‘the men at the top’.690 This points to the question as to who can
speak legitimately on behalf of a certain community or nation, i.e. who is a legitimate
interlocutor or the EU to negotiate with. Yet its tendency to rely on the governing
authorities encounters resistance in BiH, where, according to Sarajlić –Maglić, the 
power-sharing mechanisms in the political system of BiH have allowed political elites
to monopolise the political space for themselves, while at the same time, subordinating
the interests of other actors to their own interests in that space.691
686 Eleonora Emkić, Gariwo, Personal Interview, op. cit.
687 Nebojša Šavija-Valha, Personal Interview, op. cit.
688 Ibid.
689 Ibid.
690 Sanel Huskić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
691 Denisa Sarajlić-Maglić, “Can BiH elites run the state?”, in Heinrich Böll Foundation, Office for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ed.), Bosnia and Herzegovina: Between EU-Integration Toolbox and
International Community’s Exit Strategy, Sarajevo, 2010.
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Specifically related to the EU, there is criticism of its machinery, which,
according to an interviewee, is based on a business approach and its aims to make
profit.692 There is criticism of the EU related to a perceived distance of people from the
decision-making centres, which, for the EU, is Brussels. In that respect, it has been said
that there have been issues with the Ambassador to the EU Delegation not reporting
things correctly from BiH to Brussels.693 This criticism is indeed part of a wider critique
of peacebuilding, which is often perceived as technical, distanced and business–
oriented, hence taking the abstract and institutional as a point of departure rather than
the everyday context in which it is deployed.
In fact, the distance between the EU and the diverse experiences of local actors
particularly becomes an issue for cultural actors outside the capital city. The director of
the Children’s Theatre RS in Banja Luka, for instance, complained that the EU was only
in Sarajevo, i.e. far away from their lives and activities.694 This in turn means that the
EU is unable to account for the dynamics beyond Sarajevo, which are often quite
different, and fails to take the peripheries of the country into consideration. There is an
acknowledgement within the EU that their engagement beyond the capital is only
limited, and although staff is encouraged to travel throughout the country, this often
fails due to the practicalities and time issues.695 This raises questions about the capacity
or inability of peacebuilding actors more generally to establish proximity to their
subjects and leads to questions about the extent to which a distance from the local
population may strengthen the peacebuilders’ control mechanisms, avoiding to include
possibly deviating local voices.
Yet, while local manifestations of rejection tend to remain passive in terms of
not actively seeking to bring about change, there are actors that actively resist the
institutions/ control space of the EU. The owner of the Duplex Gallery, for instance,
admitted that in the past he refused funding that was offered to him in order to avoid
getting trapped in the attached donor conditionalities as well as to remain flexible.
Instead, he wants to make his gallery a space of resistance to reverse the system where
small actors have to follow donor logics. His vision is to make his own gallery space
692 Nebojša Šavija-Valha, Ambrosia, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 23/03/10.
693 Confidential source, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 17/03/10.
694 Predrag Bjelošević, Personal Interview, op. cit.
695 Olga Baus-Gibert, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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highly resonant on the ground so that eventually the bigger funders will address him
rather than vice versa. According to him, this is how Duplex becomes a manifestation of
(hidden) power as well as an example of the possibility of making changes in a different
way, i.e. a way that does not follow the logics of money.696 This resists a version of
peace created by institutions as the main power-holders in favour of a subversive and
creative approach to peace.
Yet, while the Duplex approach can be said to be a form of hidden and subtle
resistance, the artist Nebojša Šerić Šoba has chosen a more public form of resistance, 
symbolised by a monument that most citizens in Sarajevo are familiar with. For a
project entitled “New Monument. De/Construction of Monument”, initiated by the
Sarajevo Centre for Contemporary Art, he designed a food can depicting “Ikar”, which
represents the humanitarian food aid that was handed out by the international
community during the war. This is not directly related to the EU, but to the international
community in general. However, the ‘EU’ and the ‘West’ are often thought of in similar
terms, so this monument – which was voted for by the majority of judges in the
competition and was erected in a little park in Sarajevo – represents a statement
concerning the perception of the West in BiH. The artist comments:
Political aid we have received from the West is the same as the one we received as
food: mysterious in content and with unknown ingredients, by mysterious manufacturer
and with an undetermined period of validity.697
698
696 Pierre Courtin, Duplex Gallery, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 23/04/10.
697 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, op. cit.
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As this section has shown, the responses to the EU’s institutions/control space
are highly nuanced and cannot be said to point to a homogeneous perception of this
space on the part of local cultural actors. This is certainly due to the complex and multi-
layered nature of this space, some elements of which are welcomed by specific actors
who benefit from them, while other elements are rejected and resisted in different ways.
Broadly speaking, a number of actors are translating the EU’s institutional control
mechanisms into local spaces and thus make them relevant. To a certain extent, this
reflects a desire to involve the EU as an instrument to put pressure on local authorities -
the political support of the EU can then be used to support and legitimise a certain
political agenda. It has indeed been suggested that the international community, and
particularly the EU, should exert more pressure and get more involved to stop divisions
within the country.699 On the other hand, there also seem to be voices that are more
sceptical towards the EU’s institutions/ control space, which is often perceived as poor
in contextual knowledge and practice as well as lacking contact with local actors. This
may also be a result of actors feeling that the engagement of the EU in BiH undermines
their plans and pushes the country in a direction that these respective actors do not agree
with. It does therefore not come as a surprise that a number of local cultural actors
prefer ignoring this space of agency or take an ambiguous attitude towards it. As a
result, only some parts of this space are translated into local spheres, while other parts
of the space are unable to connect to local spaces of agency. This reflects the extent to
which the EU’s ways of governing the country and its people are not straightforward,
but they rather build on a fragmented and often changing approach to member-state
building. This is due to the highly fragmented domestic political sphere, in which the
EU is viewed simultaneously as a partner for some actors and as a foreign imposition
for others. As a result of this polarisation of politics and society, the EU has sometimes,
albeit unintentionally, contributed to the production of further cleavages, thus
undermining its own peacebuilding mission. Such dynamics then impact back on the
EU’s approach in terms of having to adapt its conditionalities when resistance to them
was too high. The watering down of the measures required for the signing of the SAA
698 http://www.prometheus6.org/files/ikar_canned_beef.jpg (accessed 04/01/11).
699 Eleonora Emkić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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in 2008 is only one example of the EU losing its immunity as a result of local
resistance.700
State and Politics
In the previous chapter I argued that the EU is working in and on a state and
political space, viewing local authorities as somewhat problematic, but still using them
as the main partners for the EU’s relations with BiH and, more concretely, to facilitate
accession negotiations. The responses of the local cultural actors to this space
represented in this chapter are mostly indirect, not necessarily addressing the EU
directly, but challenging the fact that the EU does not question their interlocutors, while
many expect it ‘to know better’, and may then be disappointed if improvement does not
happen or is only limited. Such responses are not limited to the cultural sector, but are
quite widespread among the population more generally, where disappointment with
domestic governing elites is no exception. In fact, the term ‘država’ (‘state’) does not
tend to trigger positive reactions among people. Whenever we had a conversation
involving this topic - and not just necessarily in interviews, but also in private
conversations – people would complain about the malfunctioning system as well as of
the political elites being corrupt. People would also point out problems with the
bureaucracy in the country, which does indeed exclude the vulnerable (for instance
elderly, illiterate or disabled people) from getting access to state resources and
services.701
This disappointment with the state can lead to different reactions, with some
actors deciding to withdraw from the state/political space by ignoring it. A theatre
dramaturgist admitted that she never gets involved in politics at all, since “politics don’t
give us enough” and “there is no space for thinking individually”.702 She has therefore
decided to withdraw completely from that sphere, since it seems to be unresponsive to
her needs. This is not the only possible response though, which the example of the
700 Cf. Toby Vogel, “Bosnia removes last hurdle to pact with EU”, European Voice, 11/04/08,
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/04/713april/bosnia-removes-last-hurdle-to-pact-with-
eu/60279.aspx (accessed 01/08/11).
701 Ingrid Halbritter, Pharos e.V., Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 08/03/09.
702 Aida Pilav, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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SCCA shows. When setting up their “New Monument. De/Construction of Monument”
project, it was unavoidable for them to cooperate with the local authorities to negotiate
issues such as the location of the respective monuments as well as permits and so forth.
In these processes, the centre encountered the question “Who owns public space?” as a
crucial one, in that they found that often the authorities believed they did, so SCCA had
to negotiate with them over this question.703 Although there is no direct interaction with
the EU, both the EU and SCCA engage in the same space, and approach it from two
different sides. Their interaction is not based on personal contacts, but on their
engagement with a similar issues and involvement in discourses emerging in the same
space. SCCA is voicing its agency in this space by claiming part-ownership of the
public space. This clearly modifies the approach of the EU to public space, where -
apart from political elites as democratic representatives - civil society actors are defined
as key actors, while in practice art galleries and other cultural actors are not necessarily
included. On the one hand, one could argue that the EU’s institutional structures are not
apt to include cultural actors in its approach to the public sphere. Yet on the other hand,
those actors benefit from close contact to wider audiences and have a big influence on
them through the ways in which they create meanings. Having a meaning for its
‘subjects’ is essential for any policy if it is to take hold and to result in local ownership
in the long run. Therefore, marginalising cultural actors in the public space risks
undermining the EU’s peacebuilding ambitions in that many perceive them as distant
and meaningless.
Rather than negotiating the state/political space, other actors have voiced their
rejection of it. This can be directed at domestic circumstances on the one hand, or more
directly at the EU’s ways of dealing with it on the other hand. Domestically, a radio
journalist took issue with the fact that politicians fail to deal with what he calls the “real
problems”, such as health, education, adolescent delinquency and corruption.704 This
shows that the state/political space of agency, to which the EU contributes and with
which it engages, remains irrelevant for people’s everyday lives and is thus only weak
in terms of translating its meanings to the ground. This is partly a result of the fact that
the space is highly contested among actors, both internationally and domestically. To
quote one example, there seems to be a tendency for the Federation to view the RS as an
703 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, op. cit., p.9.
704 Adnan Čalkić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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artificial creation, which is contrary to what the people in RS perceive and again
different from the view of the Bosnian Croats.705 While this statement is still reflective
of the ethnic divisions deepened during the war, others have emphasised the necessity to
have only one president of the country, rather than three in order to be able to find new
alternative means to change society.706 This goes hand in hand with what the creative
director of Pravo Ljudski said about the political system of BiH, which she considered
as schizophrenic, arguing that despite its divisive tendencies, it has never been amended
or improved.707 This is an expression of the rejection of the state/political space. It is
indirectly addressed to the international community, including the EU, who pushed for
the current constitution in the first place, but who is perceived as unable or even
unwilling to amend it in its current state despite the growing international awareness
that the constitution created by the DPA has failed to create sustainable peace in BiH.
This critique has been more clearly vocalised by the president of ACIPS, accusing the
EU of being technocratic and unwilling to get involved in politics, not prepared to exert
pressure on local politicians.708 He argued that the fact that there is no ‘positive
vibration’ coming from the EU leads to frustration among the population, which may in
turn eventually be channelled into aggression and violence.709 These voices of rejection
show that there is a wide disagreement with the ways in which the state and its
structures have been set up as well as with the way that politics functions in BiH. This
in turn represents an indirect critique of the EU’s space of agency, given that it works
with those given structures and politicians, while there seem to be expectations among
Bosnians (and more for the Bosniaks than for the Bosnian Serbs) for the EU to use its
power to challenge this system rather than take it for granted. Yet, since this does not
appear to happen, a number of local cultural actors have developed their own strategies
of resistance to the ways in which the political sphere works, voicing what can often be
heard in wider societal discourses in a more fragmented way. A dramaturgist, for
instance, said that the Youth Theatre in Sarajevo relies on a cynical approach to the
political situation in BiH, which forms the basis of their plays.710 In a similar vein, a
705 Confidential source, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 17/03/10.
706 Aida Pilav, Personal Interview, op. cit.
707 Kumjana Novakova, Pravo Ljudski, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 15/03/10.
708 Sanel Huskić,, Student Presentation, op. cit.
709 Ibid.
710 Aida Pilav, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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journalist of the student radio station in Sarajevo explained that in their work, they talk
about politics in a satirical way in order to be close to young people.711 They thus use
the political situation in BiH as the basis of their programme, but they present it in a
comical and tragic way, at the same time being “very honest and very true”.712 In that
way, the contents of the state/political space are translated into local discourses, but
rather than conveying the very meanings of the space literally, those meanings are used
as the basis for a critique through a cynical approach to them. Numerous people have
pointed out to me that the best way to attract a large audience in a theatre is to address
societal issues –often related to the post-war context- through humour and cynicism,
which are common ways in BiH to deal with frustration and tragedy. In that sense, this
approach manages to personalise peace, transferring it to a new platform where it can be
discussed and negotiated – which is usually not the case in the traditional political
sphere of which many people have withdrawn.
Such a critique may also form the foundation on which artists base their work.
In this context, a project manager of the East West Theatre Company suggested that
politics is only words, not having a great effect, whereas his theatre company is able to
do concrete things.713 He derived this from their theatrical approach that reflects a
certain degree of responsibility to society by changing societal processes step-by-
step.714 This approach in turn mirrors a withdrawal from the political sphere, yet at the
same time serves as an alternative entry into the political sphere by taking a bottom-up
instead of a top-down approach. Through this approach, the theatre creates a way to
resist the political sphere, while acting in parallel spheres, thus minimising the
importance of the political and the state within its own physical space. A similar
development holds for the human rights festival Pravo Ljudski. Indeed, due to their lack
of connection with politicians, they are often seen as subversive by the latter.715 Such
strategies can have quite an impact in terms of raising the interest of more people than
the political sphere. The NGO Gariwo, for instance, created ways to resist certain
711 Adnan Čalkić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
712 Ibid.
713 Nermin Hamzagić, East West Theater Company, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 25/03/10.
714 Ibid.
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political processes by supporting students who wrote critical songs about politicians –
as an effect of this, according to a staff member, a university director had to resign.716
Interestingly enough, although young Bosnians are often accused of being
passive and not engaged, some of them seem quite powerful in resisting the
state/political space. The Youth Centre Abrašević in Mostar, for instance, derives its 
goals from the perception that public spaces are increasingly becoming hostages of
nationalist politics, segregation and discrimination.717 This is the background against
which Abrašević aims to create a zone where city memories and remembrances of the 
urban can be saved, thus acting as a space of resistance, memory, and public activity.718
Abrašević has indeed become a popular location for young people in Mostar - not only 
due to a lack of social venues in the city in general, but also because it provides a space
that is different from the political arena, less controlling and more responsive to the
needs of the local youth. Equally, the Youth Centre in Srebrenica contends that they do
not feel they have a say in the political sphere, using the space of the centre for people
to say what they think and fight for, where the development of alternatives can be
discussed.719 There seem to be a number of parallel developments across youth centres
in BiH, acting as centres of resistance to what they perceive an illegitimate public space.
Alter Art in Travnik, as its director suggested, particularly aims to engage in that
respect, not necessarily encouraging critical expressions, but much rather critical
actions, which the director considers as essential for the transformation of the
“mentality of people here”.720 In a way, those spaces only emerge in the way they are,
because actors such as the EU do not access them, while they remain free of censorship
and disciplining. They thus become venues in which the personal and the emotional can
be expressed. However, this also means that the public spaces as they are inhabited by
the EU in its engagement with political elites fail to connect to the former, which
impedes the development of a version of peace that includes a diversity of actors.
Peacebuilding is mainly acted out in the sphere of the state and politics, whereas its
alternative versions as they are developed in cultural arenas often remain unseen.
716 Eleonora Emkić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
717 Husein Oručević, “Defense of public space – defense of our future”, video-lecture at the OKC 
Abrašević’s Festival of Arts in Divided Cities, Mostar, 15/04/10. 
718 Ibid.
719 Milena Nikolić, Youth Center Srebrenica, Student Presentation, Srebrenica, 02/04/10.
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Thinking of alternatives is also the one of the ambitions of the Museum for
Contemporary Arts RS in Banja Luka. Since its staff members feel distant from
Sarajevo politically and culturally, the museum is trying to form a counter-centre in
Banja Luka, promoting their own artists and environment. In this context, their PR
manager stated: “We started to promote our scene, the Banja Luka scene, the RS scene,
because Bosnia is something else.”721 This is a matter of identity, not only to have
Banja Luka on the national and regional arts map through their exhibitions, but also
more generally to frame their identity as distinct from Sarajevo.722 With a similar idea in
mind, the arts centre Protok has been using its exhibition project “SpaPort” to revive the
local cultural scene in Banja Luka, as independent from the BiH arts scene.723 Those
initiatives represent a way of indirectly challenging a centralised state system from what
is considered the ‘periphery’ in relation to Sarajevo, and a system, which the EU is
pushing for. By emphasising a particular Banja Lukan or RS identity, the EU’s
centralising approach to peacebuilding in BiH is challenged and resisted, particularly in
RS. This corresponds to what the PR manager of the Museum for Contemporary Art RS
suggested with respect to their relationship with the capital city, namely that people
from Banja Luka do not view Sarajevo as the capital, only as a place where people have
to go to get their visas, while they would not go there “for fun”.724 At the same time,
this is not to imply that people in RS are necessarily and always in favour of deepening
the divisions between the entities of BiH. The director of the arts association Protok, for
instance, said: “I hope that my generation finds some new strategies and bridges the
gaps of national politics.”725 In that sense, one can see that the responses to the
state/political space that the EU works with are quite diverse, depending on the identity
and goals of the actor in question. What can be observed though is that cultural actors
tend to be sceptical of the space, challenging the ways in which the EU engages with the
Bosnian state and politics, often in an indirect manner. We can observe a form of
‘reverse translation’: many cultural actors seem to pick up on political topics, but rather
than just translating the respective meanings into local discourses, they translate them in
a way that conveys their scepticism, rejection or resistance. This in turn opens up new
721 Branka Šestić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
722 Ibid.
723 Radenko Milak, op. cit.
724 Branka Šestić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
725 Radenko Milak, op. cit.
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spaces in which people can discuss the meanings of politics and the state in a critical
and creative way, while at the same time withdrawing from the ways in which the EU
discusses politics. What this means concretely in the peacebuilding context is that we
see a growing distance between the state/ political space of the EU and the ways in
which the subjects of peacebuilding relate to that space. Interaction through the public
sphere thus remains more than limited and leads to a withdrawal of the general public
from political affairs and the state, which the EU, however, uses as one of the central
entry points to Bosnian society. Since there is not much domestic engagement in that
space, the EU fails to establish a dialogue about the meaning of the state and politics in
general, again undermining the very legitimacy that peacebuilding ideally rests upon.
This in turn raises questions about the extent to which cultural actors in their ability to
create and transform meanings for what is otherwise abstract, may act as a bridge
between public and private. Since they are immersed in an everyday context, they know
about what touches people, while at the same time being in the position to access wider
political discourses – if not in the language of the political elites, then in the subtle
techniques that art has at its disposal.
Travel
One of the new developments that come with EU rapprochement and eventual
accession is the benefit of easier travelling for Bosnians, with a big step being made
with the visa liberalisation agreements in 2010. The travel space finds a lot of positive
responses locally, and this is maybe particularly the case among cultural actors who are
often involved in international arts projects, depending on the possibility to travel.
Against this background, a project manager pointed to the lack of flexibility for the East
West Theater Company if its artists and producers are not free to travel spontaneously,
without having the reliability of getting a visa quickly when needed.726 At the same
time, the desire to travel is not just one of artists and cultural actors, but also of citizens
in general, and particular of young people, who lack the opportunity to travel, as a
726 Nermin Hamzagić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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museum curator from Banja Luka pointed out.727 This is a particularly big issue for
people outside Sarajevo, given that most of the embassies as well as the EU Delegation
are situated in the country’s capital. For people living in other parts of BiH, trying to get
a visa may become an even more difficult process, which may feel like ‘begging’728 and
therefore has a humiliating dimension to it. Until 2010, the inability to travel appeared
to many as a ghetto-like situation, with all neighbours being able to travel while
Bosnians were locked in their small territory, as a production assistant of the famous
film company ‘deblokada’ explained.729 Interestingly, this film company is involved in
discussions about the EU and the associated travel space, which they perceive as unjust
(giving preference to people with Serbian and Croatian passports), while at the same
time advocating for a more open and just future of travelling.730 This seems to be of
great importance specifically in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, where travelling
was one of the main positive aspects of people’s lives. The Museum for Contemporary
Arts in Banja Luka, for instance, reminds people of Yugoslavian times when it was
common for the museum to send curators on study visits to places within Yugoslavia,
but also to France, England, Italy and so forth.731 This reflects a vision of BiH as open
to the world, with people enjoying the freedom to move between spaces, and indeed
places.
In this context, the possibility of achieving an EU travel space appears as a
highly attractive one - that is, not necessarily in its current design that still seems to put
BiH at a disadvantage, but looking into the future when potential EU membership may
make travelling an equal opportunity across the entire region beyond the 90 day visa
liberalisation. Different actors emphasise the travel option as most important benefit of
EU accession for BiH citizens, promising a ‘better future’,732 or a wider space in which
“people can experience new things to make a positive change for their own country”.733
This in turn shows that, although many actors are not happy with the current travel
727 Branka Šestić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
728 Ibid.
729 Amira Kresevljaković, Personal Interview, op. cit.
730 See commentary by the directress of deblokada on
http://www.deblokada.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=37 (accessed
14/10/10).
731 Muzej Savremene Umjetnosti RS, “From the Gallery to the Museum. 1971-2006”, Banja Luka, 2006.
732 Radenko Milak, PROTOK, Email Conversation, 04/06/10.
733 Eleonora Emkić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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situation, they expect major improvements from eventual EU membership. The fact that
the EU uses this attractive prospect as a carrot for its own policy goals, yet at the same
time connecting it to local needs, reflects the extent to which there is a possibility for a
common space of agency to emerge.
However, not all responses to the EU’s travel space are unanimously positive,
but also ambiguous. Several cultural actors, who are generally positive towards the
travel space, also pointed to the limitations of the EU’s travel options, suggesting that
even with Schengen, there will be many people who will still be unable to travel, for
instance due to financial limitations.734 Apart from this more or less modest criticism,
there are also stronger forms of resistance to the travel space, an example for this being
the theatre festival MESS. In 2009, in the form of a public campaign, MESS made a
strong political statement against the EU, which was related to the travel context and
based on the perception that the Schengen policies were humiliating with Macedonia
and Serbia entering, while BiH was not.735 At this stage, i.e. before the Visa
Liberalisation Agreements for BiH in 2010, the travel space as created by Schengen was
perceived as lacking justice and putting BiH at a disadvantage. A ‘just peace’ was thus
not expected to emerge from the Schengen policies.
With similar thoughts in mind, in 2010 the film producer Jasmila Žbanić 
published a statement on her company’s website, directly accusing the European
Commission of leaving Bosniaks and ‘others’ in isolation, while lifting visa restrictions
for Croatian, Serbian and Montenegrin citizens.736 This is a widely spread perception,
mainly among those Bosnians who do not have double citizenship, so cultural actors,
such as Jasmila Žbanić, can use their popularity to voice such grievances that are 
otherwise not always heard. Not only do statements from rather famous art producers
shed light on the centrality of the travel and visa issue, but this is also reflected in the
UNDP’s Early Warning System annual report 2008, which shows that nearly half of the
population (42.2%) would emigrate if they could737 – not least due to political and
economic circumstances. This figure demonstrates the fact that people’s experiences of
734 Branka Šestić, Personal Interview, op. cit. and Selma Spahić, MESS and Bosnian National Theatre 
Zenica, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 03/03/11.
735 Nihad Kresevljaković, Personal Interview, op. cit.
736 Jasmila Žbanić, “European Commission Made Disastrous Mistake”, 
http://www.deblokada.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=37 (accessed
19/01/11).
737 Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Development Programme, op. cit.
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life in BiH diverge from their hopes and expectations, thereby questioning the success
of numerous peacebuilding efforts for the people.
The responses to the EU’s travel space are not homogenous, but they reflect a
broad tendency to approve the EU’s vision of making travelling easier, which can be
read as a sign that a common space of agency is emerging. Yet, the underlying needs
and motivations for the creation of such a space differ. On the part of the EU, a common
travel space mainly represents a way to ensure that other benchmarks are fulfilled by the
political leadership, while the ways in which the travel space is referred to by a number
of local cultural actors reflect the need to move in a free space and being liberated from
the geographical constraints on them. Yet, as both the EU and many local actors create a
similar meaning (free movement), although on behalf of different needs, a common
space is about to emerge, certainly with its heterogeneities and tensions. The power of
this seemingly centripetal space could be seen in 2010, with local resistance and
negotiation contributing to the EU’s push for and final implementation of the Visa
Facilitation Agreements. At the same time it is important to be aware of the fact that this
space might dissolve again when the EU is perceived as not following up on its
promises. This is particularly likely in the light of the ways in which the EU proceeds to
create this space – it is the gradual opening of the space across the region that creates
tensions, with Bosnians feeling they are the last ones in the region to be able to travel.
Thus, even within a space tensions may emerge, as do discourses about how to deal
with them. Although the travel space seems to have different meanings for the EU (a
carrot, at least before the Visa Facilitation Agreements) as opposed to local actors (free
movement, feeling more welcome in Europe), those meanings seem, to a certain extent,
compatible with each other, allowing for the respective institutional policies to succeed
more easily. The travel space therefore represents a space in which direct engagement
between local actors and the EU is possible. This has been visible during my fieldwork
in BiH in terms of EU officials being aware of the needs and interests of the people with
respect to travelling. It is not least the pressure from local actors that has accelerated the
passage of the Visa Liberalisation Agreements, pointing to local agency that has often
been underestimated.
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Future
The previous chapter has argued that the EU has tended to focus on the future as
a time dimension in its peacebuilding engagement, and more specifically with respect to
the accession process. A number of the local cultural actors investigated for this chapter
seem to challenge this approach, although there is a certain degree of acceptance of it.
The fact that some actors are ambiguous about taking the future as their main focus and
instead attempt to modify its associated space to make it work on the ground is
illustrated by the approach of the interreligious choir ‘Pontanima’. By uniting people
from different faiths as well as atheists, they work for a future in which “spiritual music
could heal and reconcile the people of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.”738 In this
context, the founder of the choir stated that
[p]eople in Bosnia tend to talk about the past, about the war. But we try to
turn people toward the future, and that’s what we sing about. People at Pontanima
have learned not to talk much, which is very valuable to me. They believe in the
message of music. We deal with the war, from the past, but to us, the war is not too
much of a preoccupation.739
This statement reflects the extent to which a focus on the future matters locally
as well, yet on the other hand this does not represent a mere adoption of the EU’s
approach, but rather a modification according to the contextual needs of the choir
members. They try to develop a vision of the future, in a subtle and personal way, not
thinking of the future in institutional terms (i.e. as EU accession), but in a way that
matters to the choir members directly and that is feasible. This has not always been easy
so the choir has developed a way to deal with the past and to link it to the future with its
own approach, while being aware of the fact that – particularly in the beginning – it was
rather difficult for some choir members to sing the songs of their ‘enemies’, i.e.
religious communities other than their own.740 In that sense, elements of the future
space are translated, but they are modified so they account for people’s lives and
personal experiences. Local peacebuilding efforts in fact often adopt a much more
738 http://www.pontanima.ba/pontanima.html (accessed 31/01/11). This vision also comes across clearly
in the choir’s rehearsals, which the author auditioned in spring 2010.
739 Ivo Marković in Namik Kabil, Vjernici, documentary, Sarajevo, 2008.
740 http://www.pontanima.ba/pontanima.html (accessed 31/01/11).
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personalised approach – as opposed to the EU’s rather technical focus on the accession
process – appealing to the emotional and the private dimension of peacebuilding. They
connect to what seems close to people as well as concrete, as opposed to abstract and
technical. It has been pointed out to me several times - by people from different
backgrounds who are not necessarily traditional audiences or creators of the cultural
scene in BiH – that Pontanima does create emotions with its audience and transgresses
boundaries in ways which would be unthinkable in the political arena of the country.
Thus, as a result of the disconnection of the formal political sphere from people’s lives,
actors such as Pontanima create a space in which political options and reconfigurations
can be experimented with.
Another example of local cultural actors modifying the future space is Ehlimana
Hrapović ’s proposal for the SCCA’s “New Monument. De/Construction of Monument” 
project. The artist proposes to use the Tito statue, which is currently located in the
courtyard of former military barracks in Sarajevo, and to add a mirror at which the
statue is staring. This in turn is meant to serve as a symbol and critique of the
‘retrospection’ and ‘introspection’ of Bosnian monuments by asking: “is it possible and
has it ever been possible to see the future?”741 The artist contextualises the future space
for the context of BiH and its history, suggesting a focus on the future, yet without
neglecting the past, which seems highly relevant for an outlook to the future. In that
sense, local peacebuilding, in its widest sense, becomes a complex interaction between
the past and the future, a way of looking at the flows rather than the ruptures between
them. This differs from an outlook on the future as dissolved from the past, building on
what the former EUSR Carl Bildt has suggested: “You must focus on the future. If you
only deal with the past you will never leave the past.”742
In contrast to that, there are actors that emphasise the benefits of the ‘socialist’
past,743 which can partly be seen as a reaction to the failure of the post-war peace
process, which has not managed to materialise for society and failed to satisfy people’s
741 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, op. cit., p.40.
742 Carl Bildt, cited in euinside, “Carl Bildt: Bosnia must look into the future not fight with the past”,
28/10/09, http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/carl-blidt-bosnia-should-look-in-the-future-not-fight-with-the-
past (accessed 03/08/11).
743 Sanel Huskić, Student Presentation, op. cit.
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needs.744 Against this background, there is frequent reference back to the pre-war
situation – and hardly ever towards the post-war peacebuilding context – which is often
viewed as a social situation based on respect for the family, school and home and
supported by the provision of social benefits.745 In an everyday context, even beyond
the cultural scene, there is indeed much reference to, and often even nostalgia for, the
past, and sometimes even pride with respect to the values of the former Yugoslavia.
This is certainly different depending on whom you ask as well as a generational
question (the younger generation not having experienced this era), but the past does
generally play an important role in the ways in which people look at the future. In that
sense, there is quite some resistance to the EU’s approach to time, which attempts to
start a new future, dissolved from, or at least reforming the past to make EU
membership possible.746 A programme coordinator of the Sarajevo Centre for
Contemporary Arts complained about the international community, and specifically
about the EU, due to their attempts to “jump over” the past by neglecting BiH’s
historical circumstances and neglecting the fact that change always takes time.747 The
interviewee suggested that there has to be a vision for the future of BiH, which must
however not be disconnected from the past, while positive elements in history can be
used to overcome trauma and thus contribute to peace in the future.748
Resistance to the future space that is being promoted by the EU equally becomes
clear with the work of the Abrašević Youth Centre in Mostar, which tends to build on a 
shared memory of Yugoslav culture, for instance by celebrating Yugoslav holidays in
the centre.749 Again, this reflects resistance to the idea that peacebuilding and its modern
problem-solving tools will be conducive to a better future750 and can be seen as a
reaction to the discourses of the EU. Those are eager to create a new society, dissolved
from its history and memory, with civil society being represented as a tool to promote
the separation from the past. Against this background, local cultural actors have started
thinking about how to connect the future to the past. Jasmila Žbanić’s films, for 
744 Eleonora Emkić, Personal Interview, op. cit., pointed out that a better future for BiH would imply the
satisfaction of basic needs, which is not yet the case.
745 Aida Pilav, Personal Interview, op. cit.
746 Cf. Olli Rehn, op. cit.
747 Asja Hafner, Personal Interview, op. cit.
748 Asja Hafner, Personal Interview, op. cit.
749 Katie Hampton, OKC Abrašević, Personal Interview, Mostar, 18/03/10.
750 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 10/03/10.
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instance, which are very popular in BiH, deal with unresolved issues of the past, with
‘Red Rubber Boots’ and ‘Esma’s Secret’ being two particularly prominent examples,751
which have been received with great interest in BiH.
These examples show that the ways in which the EU uses the future space of
agency does not closely connect to local perceptions of time. Although the latter do not
neglect the importance of the future, they tend to view it in connection with the past
rather than dissolved from it. The focus on the past can thus be considered a
manifestation of resistance to the exclusive focus on the future, as it is promoted by the
EU in its efforts to transform BiH into a potential member-state. As a result, we can see
a new space emerging in the discourses of some local cultural actors, namely a ‘past
space’, which will be outlined below.
Conclusion
I have shown that the responses to the EU’s different spaces of agency are
highly diverse, not just between the different spaces, but also within them. Those
responses are dependent on the identities, needs and interests involved. What can be
observed is that in some cases where the EU’s spaces fail to connect to people’s lives
and experiences, local cultural actors contextualise them and translate selected
meanings of the respective space into discourses that matter locally. In such cases, local
and EU spaces may merge into one bigger space, with a degree of hybridity emerging in
the interaction between local and EU actors. This does not mean that the respective EU
space is translated one-on-one – indeed it tends to get modified and adapted in the
translation process – but links and bridges are established, so the space shares a bigger
audience and opens up to more participants. This has happened in spaces such as the
regional cooperation or the travel space, which are less top-down than others, more
open to new participants and inclusive in nature. In such spaces the chances to have a
dialogue about peacebuilding, its elements and the associated vision of a peaceful BiH,
are much higher, which seems to be of mutual benefit. The example of the travel space
751 See www.deblokada.ba (accessed 12/08/10).
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shows that the incentivising carrot associated with it enhances the leverage of the EU on
the one hand, and it also responds to needs as they emerge in BiH on the other hand.
Although this is just a snapshot of a fluid and dynamic landscape of spaces, it shows
that peacebuilding efforts connect best to their subjects when actors move within a
common space of agency. At the same time, this contributes to the legitimisation of
peacebuilding actors, such as the EU, in terms of familiarising all sides with the
discourses of the respective ‘other’. Cultural actors seem to be particularly skilled at
inventing ways in which translation can happen, if at all, acting as gatekeepers to those
spaces. If they consider a space worthy of exploration, they may help open it up to a
wider audience, by engaging with the contents of the space in a creative way. This in
turn suggests that the decision of whether to translate the contents and meanings of a
space, as well as how this is done, is a manifestation of social agency. It has an impact
on boundaries between spaces, identities, representations, and thus the way in which
peacebuilding takes place. Again, with respect to the travel and regional cooperation
space, we can see a great deal of translation and linkages between the EU and local
actors. These are also the spheres in which the EU is most powerful, given that those
fields serve as an effective ‘carrot’ and attraction of the EU.
In other cases, where the EU space is too far from what cultural actors think is
relevant or is even perceived as counter-productive, those actors may ignore the space,
not translating it or resisting it by developing alternatives. If many of the EU’s spaces
and their meanings were translated into discourses that seem relevant on the ground,
this would augment the impact of the EU as well as its role as a potential peacebuilder
in BiH. Yet if its spaces remain on the sidelines of local spaces of agency, the EU’s
impact and transformational power will be limited. This is the case with spaces such as
the civil society or the democratisation spaces, which remain exclusive to numerous
local actors and have not managed to promote many positive developments in the
peacebuilding process. Certainly, the selected responses from the cultural sector are just
a small insight into what happens to those discourses in bigger arenas with a higher
number of actors involved. However, similar processes are at work in the EU’s
interaction with other actors, while the responses of local cultural actors can shed light
on the ways in which the power of translation impacts upon peacebuilding processes as
well as the meanings that are created in them. The EU is dependent on actors that are in
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the position to translate its highly abstract spaces in order to secure its reputation and
legitimacy locally. What seems to matter then is not the abstract content of a specific
space of agency, but rather what happens to this content in the social sphere. Against
this background, this chapter has aimed to outline a number of dynamics and processes
of selected spaces of agency, and what happens when they are contextualised on the
ground – yet without claiming to provide an exhaustive list of spaces or responses to
them. At the same time, this is not to argue that local actors restrict themselves solely to
responding to externally created spaces. On the contrary, I will go on to argue that the
processes of responding and translating described above may lead to the emergence of
local spaces of agency, which constitute a response to external dynamics, their
shortcomings and failures on the one hand, but also represent the exercise of agency,
freedom and creativity on the other hand. In such processes, local actors try to redefine
the boundaries of what appears feasible and thinkable in the peacebuilding context. I
suggest that those spaces are in the process of constituting themselves to reclaim local
agency as well as an (indirect) means to influence the peacebuilding process in more
subtle, less formalised ways, and in a manner that reflects diverse needs and interests
which have not been taken into account in the EU’s spaces of agency. Those spaces are
connected to the responses towards the EU spaces, but they are not limited to merely
responding. They rather represent a way of departing from external constraints and
developing counter-visions of peace as an expression of local agency. Against this
background, the following chapter will look at some selected spaces of agency that have
emerged locally.
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Chapter 7: Local Spaces of Agency
This chapter will look at spaces of agency that are emerging locally, building on
Castells’ project identity as outlined above. It therefore asks how local actors build their
identity through the redefinition of prevailing social structures. Their responses show
that local responses to the EU’s spaces are more than merely reactions, drawing on the
creativity of local actors who challenge boundaries around spaces and frames of
representation, such as peacebuilding. Instead, often unconsciously, they develop their
own visions of peace, as diverse as those may be, in a more contextualised and
personalised manner. The exemplary spaces that this chapter aims to illustrate – which
are not to be read as fixed nor as having stable boundaries – include a social
relationships space, a freedom space, an arts space, and a past space.
The Social Relationships Space
As chapter 5 has illustrated, the EU tends to frame social relationships in BiH
through its civil society framework. I have shown that this approach has encountered
strong feelings of rejection and even resistance on the ground, with the degree of
acceptance of the civil society space remaining rather low and vague. Numerous
Bosnians have in fact pointed out to me that they associate ‘civil society’ with NGOs
rather than as a tool or process through which they can make their voices heard. People
often emphasised their scepticism towards NGOs, given that the latter are perceived as
responding to donor demands, as opposed to emerging from certain social needs or
issues. At this point, we need to investigate the ways in which local actors frame
themselves and represent themselves as a society as well as their role in the context of
peacebuilding, yet without implying that society has developed one coherent self-
representation.
What can be observed is a tendency to personalise social relations. In that sense,
the focus is less on formal structures of interaction, though more on everyday life
experiences. A staff member of the Nansen Dialogue Center in Mostar explained their
approach as closely related to people’s personal experiences and focusing on their life
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stories to gain a better understanding of the current social fragmentations.752 Against
this background, the foundation of the work of the Nansen Dialogue Center is a position
close to the community surrounding them:
Nansen Dialogue is marked by the wish to provide a neutral and open space where
the different actors in a serious conflict can meet face to face in truthful and honest
communication. The aim is to break down enemy images, as well as to increase
understanding of each other's positions, interests and needs.753
Originally developed in Brazil, and having been used in different Bosnian
communities, the “Theatre of the Oppressed” provides another way of working on the
community level. A co-organiser of the project explained that in this theatre project,
young people, all amateurs, performed short plays of no more than ten minutes each, on
actual conflicts that affected their communities. This included various topics, such as
the situation of a couple from different ethnic backgrounds expecting a baby with the
parents being against the liaison, reflecting the very personal and social implications of
bigger conflict dynamics. With this background story in mind, the audience is then
called on stage to improvise and find ways in which such a dilemma can be resolved. In
many instances, the play did take several hours, but was considered a big success by the
organisers due to the positive reception in the respective audiences.754 This form of
theatre represents an interesting approach to social relations, since it shows the audience
that they are not just passive receivers of surrounding structures and problems, but that
they are actually able to impact on what is going on. Rather than imposing a format onto
society (‘civil society’ representing one such format), this approach opens up spaces of
creativity in which people are encouraged to think beyond limitations, by exploring new
possibilities of social coexistence, and of peacebuilding on a personal level. The EU,
however, finds it hard to interact with such looser forms of social organisation, given
that it chooses its civil society partners not necessarily according to their ways of
engaging with society and social needs, but according to whether they are influential
enough to engage in policy dialogues and to form a counterweight to the government.755
752 Elvir Djuliman, Personal Interview, op. cit.
753 http://www.nansen-
dialogue.net/ndcmostar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=390&Itemid=512&lang=en
(accessed 31/01/11).
754 Goran Bubalo, Catholic Relief Services, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 05/03/10.
755 Confidential source, European Commission, DG ELARG, Personal Interview, Brussels, 09/09/10.
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Yet contrary to the EU’s perception that people beyond the civil society frame
put up with acting as passive recipients of the peacebuilding process without any major
involvement in political affairs, there are more examples where actors have taken the
initiative to change things in the light of the failure of the state to do so. A member of
the ‘Propeler band’ explained that this music group started doing street art in the form
of music performances on the streets to be able to use the profits to support people in
need. For instance, they bought a wheelchair for someone in need who could not afford
to buy one himself.756 Not only do such events serve to gain access to broad audiences
by creating an open space that is accessible to many (‘the streets’), but it also reflects
alternative forms of social solidarity emerging beyond the civil society framework, in a
less professionalised and more improvised manner. This is in line with Dosta!’s
approach that aims to encourage society to get involved in social and political life with
the goal of creating a ‘social peace’, which is characterised by the fact that society
makes decisions itself rather than just accepting what is being imposed on it.757
Interestingly enough, what the interviewee translated as ‘social peace’ is originally
framed as ‘socijalna pravda’ (‘social justice’) on the website of the association, pointing
to the idea of justice as a necessary quality of social relationships.758 The fact that the
interviewee translated it differently in English, leaving the justice dimension on the
sidelines, is illustrative of the power of translation between spaces as well as the agency
to frame meanings according to a certain audience. It also shows that the concepts used
in the language of the EU or the peacebuilders more generally, does not necessarily
coincide with that of specific local actors in BiH.
Alongside with social justice, ‘solidarnost’ (‘solidarity’) is one of the key values
of Dosta! and an essential element of their work. These terms are not only crucial for
the work of his one organisation, but are also central to the work of the recently founded
political party Naša Stranka.759 These are just two examples out of many which reflect
the importance of the ideas of justice and solidarity with respect to social relations. This
may certainly be related to a specific political culture, the history of BiH and its
756 Damir Basić, Propeler band, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 31/03/10.
757 Darko Brkan, Personal Interview, op. cit.
758 http://dosta.ba/latinica/o-pokretu-dosta/ (accessed 28/07/11).
759 See http://nasastranka.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=262&Itemid=81 (accessed
28/07/11) and http://nasastranka.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=279&Itemid=2
(accessed 28/07/11).
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experiences with socialism in particular, yet what it shows is that the social
relationships space appears to remain largely immune to the civil society space.
Certainly, when I interviewed people in English, there was a tendency to resort to the
‘buzzwords’ of the international community (i.e. civil society, social peace, human
rights etc.). However, when speaking to people in their language or accessing websites
in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, I realised that the choice of words as well as the associated
meanings are different from how those actors present themselves to the international
community. Again, this reflects the extent to which certain spaces of agency may be
impacted upon by the discourses of the EU’s spaces of agency in terms of modifying
their representation to the outside. On the other hand though, there is no unconditional
acceptance of the EU’s spaces, but certain discourses and meanings remain behind the
facades, where external censorship and disciplining is less prevalent.
Such discourses that connect to people’s experiences (and the context they are
familiar with) indeed manage to mobilise large audiences, since they connect to the
personal experiences of many people and build on a language that derives from
everyday life. Cultural activities seem to be particularly suitable to the creation of a
social relationship space that is close to people’s everyday experiences. This became
obvious, amongst others, during a screening of the Bosnian film ‘Na Putu’ during a
theatre festival in spring 2010. After the screening, most people in the audience stayed
on to discuss how the problems illustrated in the film connected to their own lives and
social relationships. Such discussions were equally held during subsequent short film
screenings of the festival, reflecting the ability between artwork to address issues with
respect to social relationships and to engage the audience in related discussions. This
sometimes results in conversations about disrupted social relationships and how those
they affect people’s everyday lives in a post-conflict context. In contrast, NGO jargon
and its associated ‘buzzwords’ are often not capable of grasping the complex
experiences people face, which partly explains the lack of enthusiasm often found in
NGO meetings as they are organised by the EU. On the other hand, cultural activities in
spheres not accessible to (international) NGOs and donors often manage to trigger more
powerful emotional responses from the audience because they engage with certain
topics without the constraints involved in adopting professionalised discourses. Such
events are, for instance, common during the Sarajevo Winter Festival and attract large
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audiences. I myself experienced implicitly political discussions during events that were
held in the local language, attracting huge audiences in small venues where the audience
created palpable social bonds due to their emotional involvement in the event and its
topics.
In this context, the development of alternative forms of social cohabitation often
starts on a small scale, i.e. in smaller communities, as it is the case with the
interreligious choir Pontanima. A choir member praised “the fact that you are different
from others, and still you belong to a community. That is the greatness of
Pontanima.”760 This reflects a specific form of social cohabitation within the choir,
which may not be as easily feasible beyond the rehearsal rooms, but represents a way of
finding a personalised way of reconciliation beyond professionalised civil society
mechanisms. At the same time, this is not to imply that such forms of social
cohabitation are easy to live or to translate into a wider social scale. Yet it is a starting
point from which new developments can become thinkable and possibly spread into the
wider societal sphere. In this context, the choir conductor of Pontanima said:
It will take a long time. Especially since we have noticed the fact, that in the
broader sense, not just in Bosnia-Herzegovina, people will have to relearn not to fear
the different and unknown. (…) Anyone who starts thinking differently because of our
music we consider another stone in the spiritual bridge to the other bank.761
This represents a deviation from the EU’s approach to social change and
transformation, implemented through projects of a limited duration (often two or three
years),762 which tends to neglect the non-project nature of social change. Instead, there
seems to be an awareness among choir members that local peacebuilding does not
follow such logics, but is a matter of time and personal engagement. In that respect,
Pontanima’s work ties in with the statement that “our music scene is the most shining
example of us living together”763 and is somewhat similar to Ambrosia’s, an association
of artists, who challenge the current state of affairs (politically and socially) in BiH.
Their goal is to create an alternative (social and arts) scene, not through NGO
760 Mirsad Čičeklić in Namik Kabil, Vjernici, documentary, Sarajevo, 2008.
761 Josip Katavić in Namik Kabil, op. cit. 
762 See http://www.tacso.org (accessed 06/08/11).
763 Mirza Ajnadžić, Student Presentation, op. cit.
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mechanisms, but just by acting as “crazy artists.”764 In this context, their approach to
social life in BiH is not driven by donors, but by their own interests and visions for the
country.765 Again, this represents a space in which change becomes thinkable, in which
options can be explored and alternative paths to peacebuilding can be imagined through
experimentation rather than (external) prescription.
Along similar lines, the OKC Abrašević is trying to develop alternative forms of 
social cohabitation that move beyond ethnic divisions. This became particularly evident
in a discussion in the centre during their festival “Defense of Public Space, Defense of
our Future”.766 Young people, some of whom regularly spend time at the centre, others
who were new to it, discussed issues of social coexistence in Mostar, pointing to issues
of identity and needs as they develop within a social space. This, however, does not
imply that the view held by many activists in this centre is a highly romantic one.
Instead, there is an acknowledgement of identity conflicts, while there are ongoing
processes of reflection about how those can be dealt with. A lecture held during the
festival is illustrative of this:
If we take the approach of agonistic pluralism and perceive the public space as
a place for constructive struggle, it can be noticed that art in public space holds a great
potential which can be realized through production of spaces for potential
encounter/conflict, but also as a tool to articulate distinct positions.767
Against this background, it becomes obvious that the views of many artists or
actors involved in creative processes do not necessarily represent a tendency to idealise,
but they aim to find ways in which current conflictual social relations can be dealt with,
how they can be understood, and how they can be transformed. In that respect, they
create an imaginary space in which new approaches to peacebuilding become thinkable
and from where they can reach out into society if they find positive resonance there. In
the context of the social relationships space, we can see different constellations and
ideas emerging, connecting to the actors’ experiences in their everyday lives, which
they share with a bigger environment. This stands in contrast to the EU’s civil society
764 Nebojša Šavija-Valha, Ambrosia, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 23/03/10.
765 Ibid.
766 The author attended parts of the festival.
767 Anja Bogojević, lecture summary from project leaflet “Festival of Arts in Divided Cities”, OKC 
Abrašević, Mostar, 2010. 
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approach that has a tendency to support the creation of civil society through the
promotion of ideas that might not necessarily have existed before the onset of the
peacebuilding process. In addition, while the EU has often been accused of pursuing an
elitist approach to civil society, during the course of which professionalised, English-
speaking NGOs are privileged, actors like the Museum for Contemporary Arts in Banja
Luka aim to pursue a more comprehensive, grassroots-based approach. In this context,
their PR manager suggested that
[i]t is important to have different categories in society to be involved in, not
only for the elitist level of people, which is what we are trying to do (…)The museum
of contemporary art is not that kind of building, not that elitist thing, but for everyone
the same.768
It seems that this is not an approach that requires the subjects to adapt to the
institutions (which comes close to the EU’s approach), but a reverse process, during the
course of which the museum adapts to the people and their needs.769
At the same time, those needs and associated ideas may be highly diverse. As I
have suggested above, existing social relations are still strongly shaped by conflictual
tendencies, which form the basis of imaginations of social relationships. Yet the
presence of social conflicts and dividing lines does not mean that there are no visions of
a better social cohabitation in the country. Alluding to the socialist history of BiH, a
theatre dramaturgist talked about the importance of family in social life, which was one
of the cornerstones under Tito, but also a source of peaceful life.770 On a more political
level, a staff member of the NGO Gariwo suggested that (social) reconciliation would
also mean the presence of only one government, one state, one constitution, and one
nation with many religions,771 which in turn ties in with the EU’s vision of a unified
country.
What these rather incoherent processes show is that this emerging space is not
very coherent in its meanings in terms of suggesting a particular form of social
cohabitation that most people in BiH would agree with. There is disagreement about the
extent to which a centralised BiH is desirable, about the importance of social solidarity
768 Branka Šestić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
769 Ibid.
770 Aida Pilav, Personal Interview, op. cit.
771 Eleonora Emkić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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and welfare, about the role of religion and so forth. The social relationships space is a
rather fragmented space, with differing needs and interests being involved. What keeps
this space together in all its fluidity, however, is the fact that the discourses that emerge
around this topic interact with each other, while they may be in the process of
negotiating and developing alternative ways of living. There is a clear personal
dimension to this space, which reflects its focus on the everyday rather than an
institutionalised version of social coexistence. Generally, the number of actors
contributing to this space is high, given that it is quite open in terms of who can
participate in the discourses, both actively and passively. Cultural actors can use their
access to art techniques as well as to society through their position within it to develop
spaces in which options can be designed, presented and developed further.
The social relationships space of agency is shaped by bottom-up as well as top-
down processes that cluster meanings in a less coordinated, but contextually meaningful
way. This reflects an incentive for actors to participate in this space in terms of
discussing the meanings that are developed around social relationships in post-war BiH.
In that sense, the power relations of this space can be viewed as diffuse and fragmented,
power certainly abiding more with some actors than others, yet offering the possibility
for interested participants to get involved and challenge the discourses existing in that
space. These discourses and participation in them may happen in venues as they are
offered by the open space of the OKC Abrašević, through creative initiatives in a non-
professionalised way, or just by conversations and interactions on the streets. Against
this background, the social relationship space has a strong potential to translate its
meanings to a wider audience, as contested as those may be. Such dynamics make
peacebuilding much more accessible for people in that they feel part of the associated
discourses and contribute to the creation of meanings therein.
The Freedom Space
Chapter 5 has suggested that the way in which the EU runs its spaces of agency
is mostly in a controlled and top-down manner, in which participation is often limited to
passivity and reception, rather than input and modification. Against this background, the
following section argues that local actors have created a ‘freedom’ space in which they
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challenge the boundaries imposed upon them by liberating themselves from constraints
that they consider problematic, or they resist. A Bosnian media activist has indeed
suggested that “for every revolution, you need an idea around which people can
cluster”, alluding to the necessity of creating a space from which change can be made
possible.772 In this context, it has been argued that possibly the most important cultural
need of young people is “to express themselves with no limits and rules which are set
from particular institution or stereotype sic.”773
The above-mentioned free association of academics and artists, Ambrosia, is an
excellent example of actors carving out their freedom space. Their primary raison d’être
is the development of uncensored way of interacting, which is expressed in the
statement of one member: “Moj fetish je sloboda” (“My fetish is freedom”).774 The
group tries to implement this vision by producing their own ideas without making any
compromises, in that they experiment with different, mostly unconventional, art
techniques to imagine ways in which the current situation of BiH as well as its social
constellations can be transformed.775 This activism comes at a price though; since
Ambrosia is not set up as an NGO, it is not externally funded, while its members
contribute their private funds to keep the project going.776 However, this represents a
deliberate decision on the part of the group members, given that without major financial
contributions from outside – small grants at best - they can hardly be controlled, so they
dare acts of ‘real subversion.’777 In this spirit, they can reach a higher degree of
freedom, as they need not compromise with donor preferences, but can really focus their
creative work on what they think matters most.778 At the same time, the focus away
from donor demands does not mean that Ambrosia is keen to represent society – indeed,
the group members look at society as a countering force. As a member suggested, they
work on the development of a rebellious and critical counter-culture, counter-balancing
the mainstream and thus becoming central actors of social correction and
transformation.779 This is only possible because Ambrosia transcends existing social
772 Mirza Ajnadžić, Student Presentation, op. cit.
773 Demis Sinancević, Vizionarsko Društvo, Email Conversation, 25/08/10.
774 TV programme on Ambrosia, BHT TV, Sarajevo, 26/08/09.
775 Ibid.
776 Nebojša Šavija-Valha, Ambrosia, Personal Interview, op. cit.
777 Ibid.
778 Ibid.
779 Ibid.
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and political boundaries, i.e. boundaries of spaces, by voicing their agency in terms of
challenging what is thinkable in post-war BiH. Doing this, they become a powerful
social force in terms of impacting upon society from a critical perspective and in
developing options of social change. In this context, ‘powerful’ is defined differently
from the EU’s perspective in terms of referring to the agency to impact on discourses
rather than as being an interlocutor to the international community.
This in turn fosters the emergence of a freedom space, to which other actors are
contributing as well. Among those actors are chiefly youth centres in different parts of
the country. The Youth Center in Srebrenica, for instance, labels itself as a space of
resistance in which people can say what they think and fight for.780 The centre is a good
example of how agency can create a space of freedom by transcending existing
boundaries through creativity, given that directly after the war the building served as
nothing more than a public toilet. This, however, did not prevent young theatre activists
from building up a youth centre in which they can realise their visions and develop
alternatives to social life in Srebrenica.781 The centre has now become an inviting space
in which young people can express their needs in a way that is different from politics,
but through their own ways and approaches.782 This is very similar to the OKC
Abrašević in Mostar, which has been built up from ruins by young people from the city. 
Again, those young people have created an ‘open space’ in which they can make use of
their freedom in terms of limiting external control mechanisms and pressure from
outside.783 A volunteer to the centre pointed out that the youth who regularly spend time
there have an ‘amazing sense of ownership’, and feel that this space is theirs.784 Against
this background, the Abrašević centre has become a space of resistance, in which people 
can have discussions that they would not necessarily be able to have beyond the centre –
in fact the centre connects people and discourses that would not come together
beyond.785 This is also expressed through their radio programme, which is non-profit
oriented and in which people are free to say whatever they want to.786 In that sense,
those youth centres become new spaces, both physically and ideationally, escaping
780 Milena Nikolić, Student Presentation, op. cit.
781 Ibid.
782 Ibid.
783 Katie Hampton, Personal Interview, op. cit.
784 Ibid.
785 Ibid.
786 Ibid.
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control mechanisms that are present in wider societal and political discourses by
transcending the boundaries of what is ‘sayable’ and ‘doable’, creating possibilities of
action. This certainly involves a ‘risk’ on the side of the organisers, since they do not
know what their members will make of the platforms they are providing. This risk,
however, is part of the reason of existence of those centres, and helps them survive by
supporting the development of alternative visions of the future in a less restricted
manner. At the same time, those are open spaces and therefore easily accessible for
interested people, who may feel better represented there than in the political arena. It
seems that ‘ownership’ is crucial to the creation and maintenance of the space. Having
built the rehearsal room and studio in the youth centre Alter Art in Travnik by
themselves, the local youth have made it their own, using it as a platform where social
relationships can be (re-)configured.787 Indeed, this feeling of ownership seems to
translate into the work of the centre in that the youth feel responsible for its
development and have a stake in its activities. This represents a crucial difference to
projects implemented for or funded by the EU, which often prescribe the respective
ideas and goals and therefore fail to create a feeling of ownership among the actors
implementing them. The ownership and freedom to design the development of a certain
programme or idea therefore seems to be at the roots of how people relate to it as well
as its sustainability.
The notions of freedom and ownership are also the reasoning behind what the
artists Nermina Omerbegović and Aida Pasić proposed for the “New Monument. 
De/Construction of Monument” project, which was voted for by consensus. The
monument in itself is just a pedestal to be erected in a park in Sarajevo. Its location,
however, is one of the main characteristics of the monument, based on the assumption
that “parks were always the place where people would gather and meet for socializing
and chatting.”788 The pedestal is intended to serve as a platform for open talk and free
speech, a space where people can voice their opinions.789 The artists view this as a
critique and incentive to encourage free thinking “in a society represented only as a
collectivity”.790 They argue that their pedestal symbolises the conquest of social space,
787 Darko Saračević, Personal Interview, op. cit.
788 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, op. cit., p.100.
789 Ibid.., p.100.
790 Ibid., p.100.
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thus acting as a tool through which external control is reduced in importance through a
focus on free thinking and speaking.791 The artists view themselves as the ones that
create this freedom space, but the exercise of agency is handed over to those interested
in using it, thus addressing a large audience that may, at least symbolically, take over its
concrete design.
This stands somewhat in contrast to Damir Nikšić’s ‘Oriental Dream’, as a 
design of what he calls a ‘Bosnian Theology of Liberation’ (BTL). His dream is more
concrete in what it imagines freedom to be like:
BTL insists on the tradition and the pedagogy of the oppressed, on spirituality
and humor, on agit-pop approach in the treatment of the dream, of freedom in order to
compress strongly the lines of sweet dreamers into a monolith Bosnian knot, or a
European navel knot of the old world, into one and only Bosnian dream which is also
African, Asian, European and American.792
In addition to his allusion to the connections between BiH and other continents
where this dream of freedom emerges, Nikšić has a clear political take to his notion of 
freedom, relating it to what he imagines social life to be like, namely “the joint work,
common food table, where the honorable, hard-working and peaceful guests are invited,
a food table, where the vultures, predators, demagogues, explorators, canny, wolves and
hyenas aren’t welcome.”793 Thus, for Nikšić, freedom is not a notion of anarchy in 
terms of ‘all do what they want’, but is strongly related to social life. In that sense,
freedom is conceptualised here not so much in terms of the tradition of ‘liberalism’ as a
political strand of thought, but rather relates to its social dimensions and its basis in
everyday life. This in turn casts light on the diverging meanings of freedom being used
by the EU, compared to those meanings that matter in a local context. Indeed, the EU’s
understanding of ‘freedom’ differs considerably, mainly relating to the internal market
and its four freedoms of movement (of people, goods, services and capital) as well as in
its connection to security and justice as the assumed basis of free movement.794
This reflects the extent to which local visions of freedom are contextualised and
thus different from the EU’s notions. Yet it becomes clear that cultural and art work is
791 Ibid., p.100.
792 Damir Nikšić, op. cit. 
793 Ibid.
794 See http://europa.eu/pol/justice/index_en.htm (accessed 06/08/11) and
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/framework/treaty_en.htm (accessed 06/08/11).
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an efficient tool for constructing meanings around this space, in terms of making the
abstract term ‘freedom’ (N.B. that freedom is also at the roots of liberalism, yet with a
different meaning and viewed as playing out in a specific political setting) accessible to
a wider audience. As a result, the freedom space becomes an open space in which
different conceptualisations of social life and peacebuilding can be experimented with.
As I have shown above, some artists understand their role as providing a platform on
which people can voice their own imaginations of freedom, while others have more
concrete ideas about the contents of the freedom space. Generally, the freedom space of
agency tends to be quite inclusive, as it is particularly the case with the work of the
cultural youth centres in Mostar and Srebrenica, which are open to people that are
otherwise marginalised in society and provide a space in which alternative ideas can be
discussed. Those venues are shaped by bottom-up processes and are thus hardly
accessible to donors or governing institutions, given that they are sometimes
deliberately hidden to be able to preserve their autonomy and freedom. As a result, such
spaces often differ considerably from the venues in which civil society meets as well as
from the latter’s way of working, which is, however, just what shapes the freedom
within such spaces. Unlike typical donor–funded civil society organisations, actors
within the freedom space tend to resist external control and often sacrifice financial and
other security to be able to assume a critical and challenging position in society. This is
what makes them so attractive to some, and so frightening to others.
The Arts Space
My particular focus on local cultural actors means that a focus on the ‘arts
space’ suggests itself. Indeed, what the connections of this space to other spaces, such
as the freedom space, show, is that it serves as a central tool to bring meanings across to
larger audiences. However, the arts space is not only a tool used within other spaces of
agency, but rather contains meanings itself. However, it is sometimes perceived as
weak, immature and in need of tutoring by the international community.795
795 Radenko Milak, op. cit.
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As outlined above, the EU has tended to treat culture at best as a sphere in which
society can be transformed, while at the same time referring to Bosnian culture as in
need of development.
Yet, gradually a new, or even old, cultural self-confidence seems to be (re-)
emerging among Bosnian artists and the wider society. A journalist, for instance,
suggested that the only good thing that BiH still has was culture, since “it is the only
thing that makes us feel like normal human beings.”796 The importance of art became
obvious throughout my fieldwork. Most cultural events I attended, including theatre
performances, concerts, film screenings exhibition openings, festivals, gathered large
audiences - most of them were highly attended – and made people engage with related
social and political questions on a different level. In such events, it was not unusual for
people to have tears in their eyes and to share their emotions, while there is a high
degree of enthusiasm to be felt – usually on both the side of the performers and the
audiences. For many, arts represent a space in which they can express themselves, their
needs and realise their potentials. It connects the private to the public and makes the
subjective, everyday experiences of people relevant on a wider scale. The film ‘Ja sam
iz Srebrenice’ (‘I am from Srebrenica’), directed by Ado Hasanović, is just one example 
where personal, everyday experiences are the basis of a more general message relating
to the quality of public life, i.e. the town of Srebrenica viewed as a limiting and
liberating space. Srebrenica is therefore portrayed as an ambiguous space, depending on
the particularities of people’s everyday lives as they are situated in the town.
By talking to a number of cultural actors, it became obvious that cultural work is
closely connected to the ways in which people deal with their everyday lives. This
approach is, amongst others, reflected in the work of the Swiss Cultural Programme that
views culture as everyday life culture, “as life itself”.797 Along those lines, a project
manager of SCCA suggested that arts are always about life and the current moment798,
rather than abstract ideas. In that sense, the arts space can be considered as particularly
insightful as regards the meanings of peace and its everyday life dimension, given that
artists take up social issues, possibly distort and represent them, whilst upholding
connections to the origins of their ideas. The ways in which the arts portray and
796 Nidzara Ahmetasević, Phone Interview, op. cit.
797 Bertan Selim, Personal Interview, op. cit.
798 Asja Hafner, SCCA / pro.ba, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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represent ‘peace’ or ‘society’ can tell us a lot about the discrepancies between different
imaginations as well as telling us where bridges between them may lie. The fact that
cultural actors are very close to and integrated with social topics is particularly evident
with the work of theatres. An interviewee involved in the programming of different
theatres in BiH emphasised the importance of connecting with society, addressing
topical problems and framing them in an emotional way.799 This requires the use of
frames, such as the family or “everyday political issues” to be able to fulfil critical
social functions.800
The representation of social processes is also one of the cornerstones of the film
producing company ‘deblokada’, which earned its name through its activities of cultural
resistance during the siege of Sarajevo in terms of ‘unblocking’ social and political
tensions that had accumulated during the siege.801 As their bulletin claims, deblokada
views the residues of the war as still embodied in political, economic and social
blockades.802 Against this background, deblokada’s approach to arts is a response, a
form of social consciousness, which analyses the remnants of the war.803 This is based
on the assumption that “film can engender change”804 and thus actively impact on the
post-war and peacebuilding dynamics in the country and region. The main producer for
deblokada, Jasmila Žbanić, argues: “I am interested in characters who seem to be 
functional on the surface, but who, in fact, hide the hard experiences of life deep inside
themselves.”805 This statement shows that arts have the potential to be very close to life
and the diverse experiences people may have, and at the same time possess the power to
create new meanings of those experiences and thus to deploy a transformative potential.
In a similar vein, the “New Monument. De/Construction of Monument” project of the
SCCA aims to create new meanings of existing locations, thereby making use of their
transformative potential.806 In that sense, cultural agencies can offer ways of working
with surrounding structures, as well as channelling them into something new and
creative. This goes beyond the EU’s approach to arts, which, as several EU officials
799 Selma Spahić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
800 Ibid.
801 Amira Kresevljaković, Personal Interview, op. cit.
802 Nebojša Jovanović, “Deblokada” Deblokada Bulletin, Sarajevo, not dated.  
803 Ibid.
804 Ibid.
805 Jasmila Žbanić, interviewed by Nebojša Jovanović, “Deblokada” Deblokada Bulletin, Sarajevo, not 
dated.
806 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, op. cit., p.13.
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have suggested to me, is based on a view that culture is not as big a priority as human
rights or democratisation, for instance, given that the latter are assumed to form the
foundation of the former.807 In addition, culture as a field is not part of the SAA and is
therefore only a secondary goal to the EU.808 This in turn reflects how the EU does not
consider culture as an essential sphere of politics and has not made it a central space of
agency as far as its engagement in BiH is concerned.
However, a PR manager from Banja Luka praised cultural centres as places
where one can talk in a different way about politics in BiH, but also about issues
relating to Europe and the world.809 Her museum makes use of this potential, realising
the importance of focusing on people in general rather than on elites exclusively. This is
related to the history of the museum, which in its beginning in the late 1970s organised
meetings with artists on the streets, brought arts to the streets, and consulted citizens
about how to set up paintings and graphics in their homes.810 Again, there is an
emphasis on the connection between arts and the people as well as their lives,
symbolised by the fact that the arts space (here: the paintings) entered the private sphere
(here: the homes of people). The museum is aware of this, suggesting that
the Museum broke barriers of usual attitude to museums as “houses of silence”, and
took radical place as other republic cultural institutions and totally approached its role
and place of the museum in this region [sic].811
This mirrors the extent to which cultural actors have, in many instances, adopted
a central role in people’s private and social lives, as opposed to numerous peacebuilding
actors, who have limited their engagement to the institutional and technical realms,
therefore remaining distant from people’s actual experiences of peace. To the contrary,
the Duplex Gallery in Sarajevo has become a space in which visitors discuss political
issues, their visions of peace and social life on an ad hoc basis. I have witnessed and
participated in political discussions in the courtyard of the gallery, where artists and
visitors often stop by to have a coffee or a cigarette. Those informal gatherings
frequently result in political and substantial discussions. To connect to people’s lives,
807 Vladimir Pandurević, Personal Interview, op. cit.
808 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 24/03/10.
809 Branka Šestić, Personal Interview, op. cit.
810 Muzej Savremene Umjetnosti RS, « From the Gallery to the Museum. 1971-2006”, Banja Luka, 2006.
811 Ibid.
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and particularly young people’s needs, is also the main objective of the cultural NGO
Vizionarsko Društvo. This is the background against which its director organised an
exhibition project, ‘Barake’, using an abandoned space of two barracks to start a ‘real
Cultural Revolution’.812 The director referred to Barake as a ‘socio-political
experiment’, emphasising that it attracted all kinds of people, who “tried to express
themselves on any possible way [sic]” by pursuing diverse arts disciplines.813 He
underlined that Barake offered a space for future professionals in any field, not just arts,
to express their “emotions, rage, love, politeness”, which he considers as a central
cultural need of young people, which the NGO tried to support.814 This project then led
to processes during the course of which people could experiment in communicating
their cultural needs in an ironic, satirical, critical and responsible way.815 In that way,
the arts project ensured a connection to its audience, who could become its active
participants at the same time and feel represented by it. Similar dynamics can be found
in the approach of the arts association Protok in Banja Luka. In its approach to create a
new arts scene that changes the perceptions and functions of arts in society, their project
SpaPort, an exhibition of contemporary arts that investigates Yugoslav history in the
light of current developments, emerged from the needs of the local cultural scene.816
According to the director of Protok, it represents “an art which talks about problems and
which clearly and critically poses questions vis-à-vis socio-political realities.”817 Arts
therefore fulfil essential functions in a society, relating to people’s identities and
transformative agency with respect to wider political questions.
What can also be observed is that the arts space tends to connect to real places
rather than just abstract, imaginary spaces that can be used anywhere. Again, this makes
such spaces more accessible to people than the abstract spaces of international
peacebuilding, which cannot be clearly situated in a certain locale. Not only is this true
for theatres, with the Theatre of the Oppressed being tied to a concrete community in
which oppressive structures prevail, but it is particularly evident in a theatre project that
was staged in the Duplex Gallery in Sarajevo in 2010. The project, entitled
812 http://www.vizionarskodrustvo.com/unpluged.html (accessed 03/02/11).
813 Demis Sinancević, Vizionarsko Društvo, Email Conversation, 25/08/10.
814 Ibid.
815 Ibid.
816 Radenko Milak, op. cit.
817 Ibid. Translation by the author.
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‘Theydream’, is a form of site-specific or environmental theatre, which aims to engage
the audience by using the physical constraints of a site as part of the performance.818 In
that sense, the theatre tries to establish a close connection to people’s lives by playing in
‘appropriate real-world settings’ rather than an abstract theatrical space.819 Again, this
reflects the importance of linking arts to the perceived social realities on the ground,
which in turn points to the relevance of the arts space in the context of peacebuilding.
Most artists are aware of the transformative power of arts, with the director of Protok
stating that their local cultural scene is independent of politics and institutions, thanks to
the openness of people who lead initiatives and dialogue.820 As contested as this
statement may be, it reflects that art provides a space different from the political arena,
in which voices can be heard and legitimacy – in the sense of connection to the
audience - re-established.
The French cultural centre André Malraux has realised this transformative
power of arts in relation to social affairs and is using its own cultural approach to
influence social developments and peacebuilding in the wider sense. From their French
perspective, they want to assist BiH in eventually becoming an EU member by
supporting “a democratic, civil and intercultural Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to
develop a living and vivid cultural space.”821 In this context, the centre fosters civil
society exchange initiatives to help BiH find its place in Europe.822 There are a number
of projects that the centre runs to achieve this, examples of which would be debates on
European cultural perspectives for BiH as well as book presentations and so forth.823 In
that sense, the centre uses the arts as a tool through which discourses about the
rapprochement to Europe are channelled as well as to achieve broader societal change.
This in turn is certainly linked to the identity of the centre, which can be viewed as
situated both in relation to the EU’s membership areas as well as to BiH, where they
have their local office. It therefore becomes clear that the ways in which art is used and
filled with meaning are heavily dependent on the identity of the actor in question.
818 Saša Krga, Azra Ibrahimović, Sanela Hasanović, Elma Selman, Šefko Obućina, “Theydream”, email 
via Pierre Courtin, 03/09/10.
819 Ibid.
820 Radenko Milak, op. cit.
821 Centre André Malraux, op. cit.
822 Ibid.
823 Ibid.
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These examples can certainly only shed light on a small niche of dynamics
within the arts space, and must thus not be considered exhaustive. However, there are
some patterns emerging, i.e. processes that seem to be active in this space. In general,
the arts space tends to be open and interested in being close to the people. The audience
can become participants if they are interested in doing so, and thus impact on
transformational processes within this space as well as of the spaces it interacts with. On
the other hand, the concrete implications of this can hardly be quantified and may not be
as high as the potentials, since participation in this space requires an active interest of
those who might potentially be addressed by it. If they are interested though, there are
manifold opportunities to voice their needs and transform them into creative projects,
which can be communicated to a wide audience. Given that there is no central ‘control
mechanism’ that decides whether an artwork will be included in the space of agency,
the latter is mainly shaped by bottom-up processes, which thus give essential insights
into social dynamics. In that sense, the arts space may represent an important element of
a bigger social relationships and peacebuilding space, in its ability to communicate the
needs of a wide variety of people in a fairly uncensored way. Against this background,
it is surprising that arts have only been granted a marginal position in international
peacebuilding policies, despite their potential to bring the personal and the emotional
back into the picture. The reluctance to engage with cultural partners is probably a result
of their more fragmented and – in an EU understanding – less bureaucratically
professionalised way of working, which makes the cultural sphere less ‘suitable’ to act
as a partner of the EU. Although there seems to be a growing awareness within the EU
about the importance of culture as a possible gateway to society and the need to engage
in cultural events, it has been said that this is heavily dependent on whether people in
institutions have a sense for it as well as the concrete event in question.824 An EU
official suggested that artists are not necessarily suitable recipients of EU funds due to
their ‘artistic souls’ as well as their lack of capacity and/or willingness to comply with
EU guidelines.825 This very much reflects an instrumental view on peacebuilding in
which local society is imagined as in need of the help of the international community,
rather than an awareness that there is mutual dependence, while the EU needs
legitimacy and the cooperation of local actors itself to be able to implement its agenda.
824 Confidential source, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 29/04/10.
825 Confidential source, Delegation of the EU to BiH, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 22/03/10.
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The arts space has therefore developed its own transformational strategies beyond the
EU’s spaces. This distance, however, also undermines the power of the EU within BiH
in that it fails to cooperate with those who could help contextualise its policies. This is
not to argue directly that the EU should transform its policies to populist ones at all
costs, but to point at the need for it to rethink its approaches and implications for the
subjects of peacebuilding. This certainly involves debates about the need for the EU to
establish legitimacy for its policies in BiH, which is, however, internally contested.
While some officials did not consider legitimacy a key area in which the EU should
engage, others emphasised the need for the institution to strengthen its connections with
the people. In that respect, there is certainly a risk of arts being instrumentalised for the
legitimisation of certain policies, while on the other hand, it may help the EU
understand the complexities of everyday social life – if it is interested as an institution at
all.
The Past Space
An investigation of the future space promoted by the EU has shown that there is
a considerable degree of resistance to it. Against this background, I argue that there is a
local space emerging that deals with the past and develops complex interactions with
the future space. In this context, referring to the humanitarian disaster related to the
siege of Sarajevo, a journalist suggested that “in 1992, I lost the word ‘future’ from my
vocabulary”.826
Indeed, many cultural actors deal with issues that are related to the country’s
past and history. This is sometimes based on the perception of a need to strengthen the
cultural and social heritage of BiH,827 and/or a nostalgic view back on the times of the
former Yugoslavia, which, culturally speaking, was flourishing, with Sarajevo being
particularly famous for its music scene.828 It is observable that a number of cultural
actors still refer back to the Yugoslavian arts scene in their approaches. Protok’s
SpaPort project, for instance, uses this as a point of departure, eager to invite artists
826 Nidžara Ahmetasević, Conference on ‘Delivering Just and Durable Peace?’, Sarajevo, 04/09/09.
827 sMagdalena Schildknecht, Personal Interview, op. cit.
828 Zijad Pekmez, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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from the space of the former Yugoslavia.829 This, however, does not reflect an uncritical
engagement with the past, but rather tries to investigate its issues and how those impact
on the present. The director of Protok remarked that “our society has serious problems
with the non-resolved issue of the past, the silence, and preservation of the truth.”830
Against this background, cultural actors can step in to deal with this, with Protok, for
instance, addressing traumatic themes and using places from the close and distant past
to point to the different meanings of one historical event.831 By engaging with the past
and its meanings, cultural actors develop the power to transform the past and how it is
dealt with in the present. A film producer defended this approach, claiming that BiH
does not deal enough with remembering and the concept of (a healthy) memory. Yet he
considered this a necessary step that should be taken through alternative ways rather
than through psychoanalysis, which may be problematic due to its claims that
everything can be explained.832 Here, institutions like theatres may be able to provide an
alternative way of addressing the past. A dramaturgist suggested that a theatre is in the
position to comment on history and to address dramatic feelings in relation to it, based
on the need for a psychological clearing of emotions on the part of the people.833
Cultural actors can therefore build on their position as ‘critical voices’ of society to
articulate what they perceive as problematic developments more easily than others, and
transform them into irony, cynicism or humour, all of which find a lot of resonance in
society. Again, this represents a toolkit that is unfamiliar for most professionalised
NGOs and donors, given that it is not amenable neither to measurement nor to the
project format as required by the EU.
It becomes clear that the transformative potential of arts takes effect in a
diachronic time-dimension, i.e. when there is a reference to the past, which can then be
reinterpreted in terms of what this would mean for the future. This is in line with the
goals of the OKC Abrašević in Mostar, with a volunteer of the youth centre explaining 
that Yugoslav culture represents a shared memory of Abrašević, where Yugoslav 
holidays are still celebrated.834 At the same time, this is not limited to a nostalgic and
829 Radenko Milak, op. cit.
830 Radenko Milak, Email Conversation, op. cit.
831 Radenko Milak, op. cit.
832 Namik Kabil, Personal Interview, op. cit.
833 Aida Pilav, Personal Interview, op. cit.
834 Katie Hampton, Personal Interview, op. cit.
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passive consideration of the past, but it represents an attempt to deal with the past in its
intersection with the present and future. The centre approaches this, despite generally
providing a space for mainly young people, by maintaining links to older generations in
Mostar, many of whom associate the place with their memories in the past.835
Connecting those different generations through the centre then also means connecting
the past to the present and the future via inter-generational discourses. This certainly
reaches a wider and more diverse audience than most internationally set-up NGOs,
which are, as Hammami suggests, mainly run by middle-class, English-speaking young
professionals.836
The OKC Abrašević’s “Art in Divided Cities” project, addressing issues of 
social life in Mostar, is reflective of the intersection of the past and future and
can in the end be interpreted as a repeated invitation to civic and ethical
responsibility in an insecure field where the forces of globalisation and post-socialist
transition intersect, like a step which in a simultaneous look backward and forward,
attempts to draw attention to a recognition of the basic parameters for orientation in our
specific transnational “reality”.837
This quote reflects the extent to which Abrašević and other cultural actors 
engage with the past in its complex interplay with the present and the future. This
engagement takes place in two different manners: Exploring the benefits of the past as
they may be used to creatively construct the present and the future on the one hand, or
deconstructing those elements of history that impede the construction of the present and
future on the other hand. The “New Monument. De/Construction of Monument” project
pursues the latter path in its ambition “to deconstruct the realities of transition in post-
socialist, particularly in post-Yugoslav countries, so that our time could be thought in a
new and creative way”.838 This is based on the assumption that arts are able to revise
history and historical memory, so that it is possible to overcome the past with the help
of artwork that is assumed to be free from ideology and power abuse.839 This is
particularly relevant considering the centrality of discourses about the past and its
835 Kristina Čorić, OKC Abrašević, Student Presentation, Mostar, 09/03/11.
836 Rema Hammami, “Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo: From NGO Politics to Social Movements?”, Middle
East Report, no.214, 2000, p.27.
837 Project summary from project leaflet: OKC Abrašević, “Festival of Arts in Divided Cities”, Mostar, 
2010.
838 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, op. cit., p.12.
839 Ibid., p.12.
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meaning for the present, not only in the cultural, but also in the wider societal discourse
in relation to peace and peacebuilding, where transformation and change are viewed as
inextricably linked to BiH’s experiences from the past.
The bunker in Konjic mentioned above is an interesting symbolisation of such
transformative potentials, given that the artists involved in the project symbolically and
physically turned a space that had originally been built for a nuclear war into a space in
which creative energies can be deployed. A defensive space is thus made offensive
through a transformation of purpose. The project contends:
The bunker was a place to provide shelter and sustenance for a limited number
of people during a brief period of time during a potential catastrophe. The exhibition
could therefore become a "simulation of life" in restricted circumstances of the notion of
pure "survival", with all its accompanying political and psychological (personal/intimate)
experiences and insights.840
This mirrors the extent to which the past can serve as a source of inspiration for
contemporary projects that deal with it in different ways, each having their particular
take on it, but transforming it so it makes sense in the present. The power of actors to
transform meanings becomes obvious as a manifestation of the agency to re-imagine
and re-present certain visions for BiH and its people.
The artist Sanjin Selimović takes this up with his contribution to the “New 
Monument. De/Construction of Monument” project. He suggests the erection of a stone
at the place of the Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination site, with an inscription (in the
local language):
This is where once some Austro-Hungarian throne successor and his wife
passed by.
Nothing special happened.
This museum is dedicated to that event which has never happened.841
This represents a radical approach to transformed history, which the artist calls
“erased history” in that it retrospectively changes the relationship between the winners
and losers of history.842 Just through the eyes and work of the artist, history becomes
840 http://www.bijenale.ba/selektori.html (accessed 03/01/11).
841 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, op. cit., p.73.
842 Ibid., p.73.
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reversed, transformed, equipped with new meanings in relation to the present. At the
same time, this is a reflection of the power and agency of the every member of a space
that dares to create new meanings within the space, since those meanings have the
potential to be channelled into wider discourses and impact on other members of the
space as well as on other spaces. This is in line with Bhabha’s view on the borderline
work of culture:
Such art does not merely recall the past as social cause or aesthetic precedent; it renews
the past, refiguring it as a contingent ‘in-between’ space, that innovates and interrupts
the performance of the present.843
In that respect, artists’ approaches to renewing the past can be quite diverse,
open or subtle, public or hidden, yet at the same time symbolically very powerful. A
subtle approach to contemplating the past is the famous monument designed by Braco
Dimitrijević, located in a park in Sarajevo. It consists of a white stone with the 
inscription (in several languages) “Under this stone there is a monument to the victims
of the war and Cold War.”844 This monument recalls the victims publicly, while at the
same time keeping them symbolically hidden under the stone and thus commenting on
the public culture of commemoration and forgetting in relation to those wars.
845
843 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, op. cit., p.10.
844 Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, op. cit., p.26.
845 photograph by the author
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Such artwork does have a meaning for peacebuilding, given that certainly most
Sarajevans have come across this stone monument at some point. Even if they do not
think about it directly, it can still be said that the ‘past’ is a very common point of
reference in local discourses, which are distilled into something visible and touchable
through this monument, which thus keeps the associated discourses alive.
The past space can be said to emerge in response to the future space that tends to
be promoted by the EU (as well as numerous other actors, particularly within the
international community), and is a very powerful one, given that it refers to people’s
common experiences rather than an abstract and unknown (EU-) future. It therefore
includes an everyday life dimension, which makes it easy to connect to almost everyone
in the country, benefitting from a wide audience and interest. This in turn promotes its
transformative capacities, in that actors working on that space use elements of the past
to shape them in a way they can be used for their concrete goals in the present and for
the future. Although this space is open to everyone as an audience, its actives roles are
mostly taken by people who have the interest, time, and willingness to creatively think
about the past and its implications for the future as well as their own and other people’s
identities in the latter based on the former. Yet, since most people have a specific, often
ambiguous, relationship with the past, the audience of the space is rather wide, which in
turn enhances its transformative capacities and its relevance in the context of
peacebuilding missions. It seems that local versions of peacebuilding imply the need to
engage with the past, to build on certain values, while rejecting others. By all means,
contextualised peacebuilding necessitates a critical examination of the history it is
situated in as well as how this may serve as a platform from which the future is
developed.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on some spaces of agency that local cultural actors
produce in the peacebuilding context in BiH. I have investigated four exemplary spaces
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that seem to be emerging locally, and in which actors voice their agency by determining
and constantly challenging the contents and boundaries of their spaces. These spaces,
namely a social relationships, a freedom, an arts and a past space, tend to be open to
large groups of participants who can find both passive and active roles in there, so
bottom-up dynamics are prevalent. This represents a way of creating ownership of
spaces, which is not necessarily given within the EU spaces, so local actors have started
to create spaces in which they can voice their needs, based on their identities, and
negotiate their visions of peace. Those more localised spaces of agency are, in contrast
to the EU’s spaces of agency, often connected to physical spaces, such as cinemas,
museums and theatres, as platforms in which discussions and debates can be held with a
high degree of (artistic) freedom. At the same time, this raises questions about the
reasons why the EU ignores those spaces, or, at least, does not engage with them
directly, given that they seem to be gatekeepers to understanding the personal and
everyday dimensions of peace and peacebuilding. Certainly, taking local spaces of
agency into account would not make peacebuilding an easier task, considering that
those local spaces are fragmented, contested and in constant movement. As this chapter
has shown, a broad social consensus about a certain discourse cluster seems utopian, so
homogeneity can only be superficial, a result of control and coercion. However, what
these spaces reflect is their potential to engage and connect, to personalise and
emotionalise what is technical and abstract. They can encourage discourses about the
meaning of peacebuilding as well as its associated subjectivities, which is why those
spaces have the potential to connect to the very substance of social transformation.
Against this background, it seems that the EU is creating its own pitfalls by ignoring
what is central to agency and change, although barely visible on the social and political
surface.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
This experimental and exploratory thesis has investigated the complex processes
of interaction between the EU and local cultural actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina by using
a “spaces of agency” framework that spotlights forms of political agency that are both
product(s) of and productive of cultural activities. It has done so against the background
that peacebuilding in BiH seems to have failed both BiH’s citizens and partly also the
EU, with the latter not living up to the high expectations set for it by various sides. The
thesis has argued that one of the main obstacles facing the EU’s memberstate- building
and peacebuilding strategy is their engagement with the “local” via a professionalised
and “civilised” notion of civil society. The latter has been used as a gatekeeper to gain
access to local dynamics, leading to a narrow, actor-centred and mono-dimensional
notion of agency in the public realm. The thesis has shown that this assumption is at the
root of international engagement in BiH, and more specifically of the EU, as it has
developed in response to the 1990s war and changed during the post-war peacebuilding
process. I have argued that the notion of civil society has gradually narrowed
throughout the EU’s post-war engagement. This in turn has led to a limited engagement
with society, focusing on a few selected actors, while many others have been excluded
and have therefore avoided working with or even talking about the EU. Yet, taking into
account that, despite the lack of direct interaction, the EU and local actors still interact
in indirect ways through discourse clusters, I have suggested that their interaction can
be framed through a spaces of agency concept, investigating imaginary spaces centering
on certain discourse clusters. The spaces of agency concept is inspired by Lefebvre’s
notion of space, with representational spaces (espace vécu) alluding to the symbolic and
political character of spaces in terms of how they impact upon people’s everyday lives.
Although spaces of agency can be considered imaginary and discursive spaces, the
thesis has shown that, just like geographical spaces, they have certain infrastructures as
well as particular audiences. I have used this concept to account for actors’ multiple and
situated identities and to shed light on a variety of mutual responses when spaces
interact. Such responses are diverse, ranging from accommodation and acceptance to
rejection and resistance, illustrating the complex and ambiguous nature of peacebuilding
interaction. I have suggested that agency is manifested through the challenging of
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boundaries, audiences and contents of a space and between spaces, as well as the ability
to translate meanings from one space to another. I have also argued that institutional
ethnography represents a useful methodological tool to investigate the ways in which
institutional discourses impact on people’s everyday lives. However, institutional
ethnography may be limiting as a methodology unless it is extended to investigate
multiple ways of interaction, i.e. not exclusively the ways in which institutions impact
on people’s daily lives, but also how people re-transform institutions based on their
everyday life experiences, with the ‘exceptional’ and the ‘trivial’ critiquing each other,
just as Lefebvre has suggested.
Based on this methodology, the spaces of agency framework has provided the
foundation of an analysis of some selected spaces in which the EU has been heavily
involved, partly on its own, partly in interaction with other actors in BiH and beyond.
What this investigation has shown is that, despite their fluidities and fragmented nature,
processual patterns can be derived from the interaction of spaces of agency. The EU’s
spaces, for instance, largely tend to be public spaces open for participation, while their
actual design and development is reserved for EU actors. Most of those spaces tend to
be top-down in nature, and selective about the actors that are in the position to
contribute to them. The EU’s spaces are thus to a certain extent reflective of its own,
rather introspective, accession agenda and hardly flexible to respond to demands for
modification and contextualisation. This is the case, for instance for the democratisation
and human rights spaces, both part of the Copenhagen Criteria and therefore not open to
interpretation and challenge. This is based on an underlying assumption that the EU
knows best how to cope with such issues (and notably ‘better’ than Bosnian actors),
which in turn is illustrated in the language the Commission uses when referring to
democratisation in BiH, with the key words to describe local conditions being
‘problems’, ‘failure’, ‘very little progress’, ‘difficulties’ etc.846
Local responses to those spaces are highly diverse, including dynamics such as
acceptance, cooptation, compliance, ambiguity, negotiation, rejection and resistance. It
appears that the travel and regional cooperation space have found positive resonance
among cultural actors in BiH and therefore get translated into local spaces more easily
846 Cf. European Commission, “Commission staff working document Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010
Progress Report, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament
and the Council”, op.cit.
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due to their connection to the agendas of many Bosnian actors while the
democratisation, human rights, civil society, future, institutions/control or state/politics
space seem to remain more distant from the needs and interests of many Bosnians. The
latter remain on the sidelines of local spaces, or when they are integrated, then only in a
very modified version. For instance, as I have outlined above, the civil society space is
only relevant to a few selected, mostly professionalised NGOs, while actors feeling
excluded from it have withdrawn from it, channelling their energies into alternative
spaces that are less accessible to the international community. A striking example in this
context is the Duplex Gallery, with the director aiming to challenge the donor-system
by not responding to conditionalities, but developing the gallery’s vision beyond those,
although this might threaten the basis of existence of the gallery.
Local cultural actors have produced their own spaces not only in response to the
EU’s spaces but also as part of a concrete engagement in the creation of spaces of
agency related to peacebuilding. Examples given were the arts, freedom, past and social
relationships spaces. They are complex, contested and constantly subject to challenge,
but generally reflect a close connection to the everyday contexts in which they are
situated. In that respect, they carry important meanings for the ways in which peace is
imagined locally, and how this would relate to international/the EU’s engagement in the
country. Yet since those spaces are not professionalised according to the needs of the
EU and therefore do not represent convenient policy inputs – they may not have a
clearly articulated policy agenda nor do they respond to the EU’s formal demands to
project organisation– they tend to get sidelined, having to survive beyond the public
sphere of international peacebuilding. Actors engaged in the arts space, for instance, are
only rarely included in peacebuilding debates, as numerous civil society meetings
hosted by the EU reflect. At the same time, even those excluded actors impact back on
the work of the EU, often challenging it openly. This is, amongst others, the case with
the event organised by the theatre festival MESS that challenges the Schengen regime
through a public demonstration around imaginary walls. This is based on the perception
that the Schengen regime puts Bosnians at a disadvantage in the region with respect to
travelling. Several individuals working in the EU Delegation have stated that they were
aware of such manifestations of resistance – possibly one of the reasons for which
progress with the Visa Liberalisation Agreements was rather quick.
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Such processes during the course of which local agencies impact upon
institutions may take place in public, as the MESS event shows, but more often they
take place in a disguised manner, so translation processes between spaces of agency
often remain overlooked, while it is taken for granted that peacebuilding and its
associated institutions should be created by the EU, with the population needing to
adapt to them. However, there seems to be much more subtle influence on the ways in
which bottom-up processes impact upon the meanings that are created within spaces of
agency, infrastructures of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the articulation of needs
and interests. What is political is therefore not only what seems political in the public
sphere, but also what is happening in alternative spheres or at the intersection between
public and private spaces, initiated by actors that do not necessarily represent
themselves as political actors. An interviewee from the cultural centre in Travnik, for
instance, emphasised that the centre was neither involved in political work, nor
following a nationalist ideology, although being quite involved in the social life of the
community, and therefore in political processes.847 The centre has in fact linked its arts
projects to issues concerning the local community in terms of using arts for therapeutic
purposes to socialise marginalised children back into society.848 This shows that, in
response to what seems to be a highly illegitimate political sphere as far as elite politics
are concerned, cultural actors have assumed political functions as a result of being
situated in an everyday life context as well as their specific understanding of it. This
may, in many cases, be an uncomfortable situation for the EU, being used to engaging
with professionalised civil society actors according to its own understanding and
struggling to find mechanisms with which less professionalised actors can be included
in peacebuilding and member-state building. As a result, this approach creates cleavages
between the EU and local society, undermining interactive peacebuilding and neglecting
important voices in the public sphere. The latter then partly move to disguised and
hidden arenas, where they feel they are heard and can make a difference. Processes of
interaction between different spaces of agency can help us cast light on how those
hidden arenas impact upon the visible and public arena, and vice versa. Again, this ties
in with Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life, in which he notes that public life has
penetrated private life, at the same time calling for letting the private access the
847 Vildana Kalčo, Centar za Kulturu Travnik, Personal Interview, Travnik, 02/03/11.
848 Ibid.
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public.849 The MESS event outlined above is therefore illustrative of the interplay
between public and private spaces, in that it took place in public (on the streets) and
took up a political issue, connecting it to feelings of humiliation as experienced by the
people on a private (personal) level. This reflects the capacity of cultural actors to
translate meanings of spaces of agency both to the local and to the EU context,
benefiting from their position in society from which they can take critical stances
towards social and political developments. They can therefore be considered key actors
in the creation of peacebuilding legitimacy. Living and working in an everyday context
of the post-war situation in BiH, they speak the language of the people and are able to
distil fragmented statements into bigger discourses that relate, implicitly or explicitly, to
peacebuilding. In this respect, they shape spaces of agency considerably, in that they
impact upon the meanings created therein and thus subtly change the ways in which
people relate to those spaces of agency. My fieldwork has repeatedly shown that the
language cultural actors speak differs considerably from the ways in which the EU
relates to cultural activities, framing it in an abstract and technical language that is
distant from people’s everyday lives. In a similar vein, the analysis of selected spaces of
agency has outlined the extent to which meanings are different between some EU and
local spaces, while others are more compatible and translatable.
The ambitions of cultural actors as outlined in this thesis can thus help
understand the (de)legitimation of peacebuilding policies, which represents complex
and nuanced processes that are in continuous flux and open to challenge. It shows that a
connection between spaces of agency, and, most importantly, the translation of
meanings between them, contributes to a higher degree of peacebuilding legitimacy.
Since local cultural actors seem to be quite active in the subtle translation of meanings
between spaces, they can be considered central ‘knots’ between spaces, which in turn
reflects the need to look at peacebuilding legitimacy from a perspective transcending
what has traditionally been conceptualised the formal political sphere, i.e. the political
institutions and the elites working in those. Instead, what this example shows is that a
variety of actors, some of which may not even be visible in the public sphere, can help
create structures of legitimation by translating meanings between spaces, while they can
also undermine the legitimacy of peacebuilding processes when meanings are not
849 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of everyday life, vol.2, op. cit., pp.4, 70.
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transported between spaces and thus remain locally irrelevant. In that sense, the EU’s
human rights space may not have an important meaning for many Bosnians as such, but
with the help of actors such as Pravo Ljudski, the human rights film festival, or the
exhibition centre in Konjic, a venue that is close to many people’s memories, the human
rights space becomes more relevant and locally meaningful. Even if it may be limited in
terms of audience, a certain degree of legitimacy may thus be created.
So if we focus on those peacebuilding processes of interaction, what can we
derive from them? Why and how do they matter for the ways in which we look at
peacebuilding? How do they tie in with or challenge the existing literature?
In brief, there are four sets of insights and associated questions that open up
from this analysis:
 A reconsideration of the meaning of agency in the peacebuilding context
 The de-immunisation and de-authorisation of peacebuilding spaces that have
been considered a panacea for the reconstruction of war-torn societies,
particularly from the liberal peace perspective
 A conceptualisation of hybridity and hybridisation through the interaction of
discourse clusters within spaces of agency
 The (political) role of cultural actors in peacebuilding operations
First, it can be argued that peacebuilding interaction via the spaces of agency
concept allows for a nuanced view on the ways in which policies and their
implementation are constituted in a dynamic manner. Moving beyond merely direct
interaction processes, the concept is able to include a variety of actors, whether they be
active and visible in the public sphere, or whether they be working underground beyond
what is traditionally characterised as the “political”, or between those extremes. Agency
is thus no longer equated with visibility and direct control, but it reflects the ability to
impact on meanings and audiences within certain spaces, and across spheres (e.g.
hidden vs. public spheres). This may happen from the standpoint of a wide range of
actors, who might not even be aware of their influence and power when translating
meanings – or refusing to do so – to a wider social audience. As the thesis has outlined,
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the ability to translate meanings between spaces, and to possibly modify them, can be
crucial in the creation of legitimacy for certain policies. The regional cooperation space,
for instance, has found rather positive resonance among society, not least due to the fact
that cultural actors have taken it up and partly translated it to a wider audience. This is
somewhat similar to the travel space, which has started to merge with a local travel
space and has therefore been greeted with greater legitimacy, representing one of the
spaces that have enhanced the EU’s legitimacy in BiH. Other spaces, like the
democratisation space, have struggled to connect to local discourses and have only
marginally been taken up by local actors, undermining the legitimacy of the EU’s
engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. People indeed question the right of the EU to
‘teach them democratic behaviour.’850
At this stage, I assume that some readers will look for a clearer categorisation of
those spaces - they may ask about boundaries as well as a clearer typology of interaction
between spaces. They may also wonder about the extent to which this thesis can help us
understand peacebuilding, given that it focuses on cultural actors, i.e. a comparatively
small section of the population. However, it has to be said my aim was not to provide a
clear, representative and fixed landscape of spaces, given that this is about fluid,
dynamic, subjective and fragmented processes. Since spaces of agency, as I
conceptualise them, are highly transversal, translocal as well as in a constant process of
adaptation and resistance, it seems impossible to ever cement them to a specific content.
Against this background, what this thesis has tried to outline is the complexity of (often
indirect) interaction, which is never just black or white, usually never just resistance or
acceptance, but much more nuanced and often ambiguous. At the same time, this
reflects the extent to which peacebuilding is fragmented, composed of a variety of
spaces of agency, some of which have managed to connect better to Bosnian society,
while others have faced more resistance. In that sense, peacebuilding can be broken
down into a number of spaces of agency, with the EU seemingly relying on traditionally
liberal spaces, yet adding some spaces as they connect to its own identity (the regional
cooperation space and the travel space being examples of this). At the same time,
cultural actors are only a small sector of many other actors (religious, economic, etc.)
interacting with the EU’s spaces and creating their own. Yet they represent more than
850 This is a statement I heard a lot during my fieldwork in BiH.
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just a tool to understand the processes of interaction between spaces – although this is
one aspect of their role – but they are also interesting content-wise, implicitly
representing political as well as powerful manifestations of agency due to their ability to
translate meanings in creative ways.
Second, what this thesis has outlined is the extent to which peacebuilding
institutions, the EU in this case, and their spaces of agency are not immune to challenge
nor do they hold the ultimate authority over what happens to their policies when they
are contextualised. This investigation shows how the EU’s spaces, or seemingly
universal liberal spaces, are no longer exclusively controlled by their traditional agents,
such as international organisations, or international NGOs. There is rather a tendency of
those spaces to break down in some cases, or to become localised gradually. The
regional cooperation space, for instance, has been expanded in local discourses to
include cooperation not only on the political and economic, but also on the cultural and
personal level. This is a modification the EU has started to account for, for instance
through its People-2-People Programme, including a slightly broader range of actors
than professionalised civil society actors, such as actors engaged in cultural arenas.
In the interplay between agency and structure, the latter can be viewed subject to
challenge and transgression. Again, pointing to the agency of supposedly powerless
actors, the breakdown or modification of entire discourse clusters (the EU’s
peacebuilding framework representing one example) shows how local ownership over
liberal spaces has developed, yet often resisting their universalising and standardising
nature, but adapting and contextualising them according to the needs identified by local
actors. Such changes have already become visible, with the EU being governed by local
actors rather than exclusively vice versa. One example in which a change in discourses
has eventually developed into a change of policies is the European Union Police
Mission aiming at police reform to centralise the political structures of the country
through a multi-ethnic police force. This has been linked to a number of centralising
measures, but has at the same time often been considered a failure despite –or because
of – the heavy conditionality attached to police reform.851 Due to much resistance from
a diversity of actors within BiH (often referring to the need for ethnic groups to feel
851 Tobias Flessenkemper, EUPM, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 11/03/09.
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protected852, while a police force on its own possibly represents a symbol of protection)
there are now voices within the EUPM calling for the removal of conditionality politics
generally and pointing to the inability of the EU to tackle problems related to
nationalism.853 The EU has therefore gradually shifted its approach towards a lighter
version of reform as a response to the subtle influence of local actors. Another example
of where local actors’ responses have impacted on the EU’s approaches concretely is a
growing awareness within the EU that its bureaucracy is not suitable to interact with the
people and that it does not have an approach “to win hearts and minds.”854 In that sense,
individual EU officials have emphasised the need to engage with a broader notion of
civil society, for instance building on the “soft power” and motivational capacities of
local professors of religion.855 This can be considered a response to the local resistance
to the EU’s technical and often de-emotionalising approach to peacebuilding. At the
same time, other EU officials have now started to rethink their practices of intervention.
Due to the failure to implement police reform fully as a result of local resistance, an
EUPM official noted that there is a growing tendency to think about “leaving the people
alone.”856 Such changes in response to local agency are only partly visible and often
inscrutable, but they reflect the extent to which institutions themselves are not immune
from external influence. Similarly, individuals throughout EU institutions in Sarajevo
start emphasising the need to engage with local people beyond formal mechanisms that
are tailored for the elites, to get involved in diverse cultural activities to create a two-
way dialogue.857 In that sense, the EU’s notion of peace and peacebuilding is constantly
being challenged and redefined by local actors, who have been developing strategies
and mechanisms to make it their own.
Third, the spaces of agency concept allows for a new take on the notion of
“hybrid peace”. Hybridity is, against this background, no longer just a result of actor-
interaction, but part of the very processes that take place in the everyday context of
peacebuilding. It is therefore not merely an actor–centred concept, but becomes visible
852 Lejla Somun-Krupalija, Personal Interview, op.cit.
853 Tobias Flessenkemper, EUPM, Conference on ‘Delivering Just and Durable Peace?’, Sarajevo,
03/09/09.
854 Confidential source, EU official, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 29/04/10.
855 Ibid.
856 Tobias Flessenkemper, EUPM, Personal Interview, Sarajevo, 20/04/10.
857 Different confidential sources from different EU institutions in BiH, Sarajevo, March and April 2010.
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within spaces of agency, which are shaped by local and international dynamics to a
higher or lesser extent, while agency is situated in relational terms. This means that
hybridity in one space may play out very differently from the ways in which it works in
another space, producing contextualised processes according to certain discourse
clusters. As the previous chapters have shown, on the one hand the EU and local
cultural actors seem to complement each other with respect to regional cooperation,
with the former facilitating its political and economic dimensions, while the latter
engage in cultural cooperation. On the other hand, hybridity plays out differently in the
future space, which, for the EU means ‘progress’ in terms of approaching eventual EU
accession, while for many local actors, the future is only relevant in interaction with the
past. Those discourses interact through spaces of agency, partially accepting and
partially resisting each other. In the light of the spaces of agency concept, hybridity then
represents a way of interaction, the quality of which is specific to a certain discourse
cluster rather than to a general peacebuilding operation.
Fourth, some readers may wonder about the extent to which cultural actors, as
they are the main focus of this thesis, matter in the peacebuilding context at all. Their
audiences cannot claimed to be representative of society as a whole, nor can cultural
dynamics help us understand everything. They certainly speak to some topics more than
to others, including certain sectors of society more than others. I am certainly not
claiming that cultural actors are superior to other forms of organisation in BiH, but, with
respect to peacebuilding agency, they represent a case study with which the power of
actors that are not traditionally considered peacebuilding actors can be investigated.
They show how the supposedly non-political (the cultural) can become political and
develop subtle, but meaningful agency in the peacebuilding context. Cultural actors are
often considered alternative arty types, who do not understand the political implications
of their work and allegedly lack the capacity to respond to donor requirements. As a
result, actors like the group of artists ‘Ambrosia’ have decided to withdraw from the
donor-recipient system, funding their activities privately to avoid having to sacrifice
their visions to bureaucratic application requirements. At the same time, although
withdrawing from the donor-recipient funding system, those actors are nevertheless
influential and indeed often political, through the creation and perpetuation of specific
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meanings in a political context. As the exemplary spaces outlined above have shown,
cultural actors did manage to fill abstract spaces with contextualised meanings,
challenging institutionalised structures and contents of spaces when they fail to connect
to the very context in which they are deployed. At the same time, cultural actors can
also help connect the EU’s spaces with local spaces, by building bridges between them
and translating their associated meanings mutually. The regional cooperation space is
reflective of this, with the institutional dimension being complemented with a cultural
and personal one by diverse artist groups. In a similar vein, the EU’s focus on the future
has been enriched by a local past space, which has been linking the country’s future to
its past. In that sense, many actors tend to link social identities as they are envisaged for
the future of BiH (such as a European identity) to corresponding experiences in the past,
for instance by referring to Bosnians’ identities as Europeans not only in the future, but
also in the past and the present.858 Therefore the fact that cultural actors have long been
considered as marginal within the peacebuilding literature (or as instruments to
legitimise peacebuilding and conflict transformation at best)859 demands justice for
those actors, who are much more complex than how they have long been portrayed.
The negligence of cultural activities has downplayed cultural actors’ ability to mobilise
social energies, which form a necessary input into a localised, or hybrid, version of
peacebuilding. The OKC Abrašević is a good example of this, reaching deeply into the 
local community in terms of cooperating with schools, fan clubs, NGOs, cultural groups
and so forth.860 In addition, the cultural centre is about to build an e-community as well
as producing a TV show that reaches a large audience, given that it is integrated with
the most watched TV station in Herzegovina.861 Finally, the OKC Abrašević can be said 
to be the only place in Mostar that is open to everyone, which makes it highly attractive
to all sorts of people.862 The centre reflects the power to translate from the cultural to
the political and vice versa. In fact, one of the coordinators clearly explained voting
patterns of the people who socialise in the centre, as well as how this was linked to their
858 Confidential source, Student Presentation, Sarajevo, 17/03/10.
859 Cf. David Chandler, “Race, Culture and Civil Society: Peacebuilding Discourse and the Understanding
of Difference”, Security Dialogue, vol.41, no.4, 2010, pp.369-390.
860 Kristina Čorić, Student Presentation, op. cit.
861 Ibid.
862 Ibid.
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hopes and fears with respect to the future of BiH.863 In that sense, the centre serves as a
venue for political discussions as well as debates about the quality of peace, people’s
expectations and possible contributions to it. The meanings created during the course of
such discussions are then translated beyond that space, into the wider community and its
political life. This in turn reflects the power of cultural actors, who appear particularly
skilled at such processes of creative translation. This seems equally true for the Bosnian
National Theatre Zenica, which is very well known among the local community and is
one of its centres of gravity.864 Its director suggested that “without the theatre, nothing
would go on in Zenica”, pointing to the ability of culture to free creative energies.865
This is neither to suggest that, in general terms, more traditional civil society actors or
NGOs are unable to provide such services, nor to demonise technical approaches to
peacebuilding per se. Indeed, there are numerous positive examples where
professionalised NGOs have triggered positive developments, the educational work of
the Nansen Dialogue Center in schools in Mostar being one prominent example.
However, my argument points to the often-neglected ability of cultural actors to
challenge what the international peacebuilding discourses have long taken for granted as
well as the agency located in seemingly marginal arenas of social life.
The analysis conducted in this thesis inevitably raises questions related to the
nature of the EU’s engagement in BiH as well as the conclusions this analysis may
suggest for the success of the former. Indeed, although the thesis is not striving to be
prescriptive, it may suggest certain policy implications to the EU.
First and foremost, what this thesis suggests is that the EU has not been equally
successful in all of its areas of engagement. This means that the EU can learn from its
own successes and failures in the first place. As it has been pointed out above, it seems
that the regional cooperation and the travel space can be counted as the more successful
ones in the EU’s engagement in BiH, so those spaces can help us understand the
conditions of success – at least from a local perspective (or rather: local perspectives).
Generally speaking, what those two spaces have in common is the fact that they respond
to what can be considered needs and interests of many people. Indeed, particularly in
863 Kristina Čorić, OKC Abrašević, Email conversation, 26/04/11.
864 Hazim Begagić, Bosnian National Theatre Zenica, Personal Interview, Zenica, 09/03/11.
865 Ibid. Translation by author.
234
the spaces occupied by cultural actors, travelling seems to be a pressing need. This is
certainly linked to the fact that cultural actors have an interest in establishing links with
colleagues and institutions beyond BiH To a certain extent, this may be due to the fact
that cultural activities are often not framed with respect to a national context, but
transcend the boundaries of states in their ambitions. On the other hand, the need to
travel can also be seen as linked to the situation in the former Yugoslavia where the
possibility of travelling, not just within Yugoslavia, but also abroad, was one of the
main perceived benefits for the people. Against this background, the Visa Liberalisation
Agreements have encountered positive resonance as they come close to what people
have long been proud of. It has to be said that this is not limited to cultural actors – who
may be particularly dependent on travel opportunities – but the related discourse has
also been penetrating wider sections of the population. Similarly, regional cooperation
ties in with people’s experiences in the former Yugoslavia, which served as a major
frame of reference of identity. Therefore, promoting regional cooperation tends to be
seen as beneficial on part of both the EU and local cultural actors as it responds to their
respective subjective visions of peacebuilding. The fact that the EU and local actors
consider those spaces as relevant then points to the necessity of engagement in areas
that matter locally as well, rather than exclusively focusing on the priorities set in
Brussels. The travel and regional cooperation space seem to be spaces in which this
mutual interest has been particularly evident.
Second, what these examples show is that the EU seems to be most successful
when its peacebuilding efforts complement those of Bosnian citizens in that they
provide a structural frame (a network of regional cooperation: the legal framework with
respect to travelling) in which local dynamics can unfold. The EU seems particularly
strong with respect to the structural dimensions of peacebuilding in the cases where it
provides frames that can be filled with more concrete meanings locally. If the EU uses
its power to provide a structural context of action that is perceived as relevant locally, it
seems that diverse actors do engage in the creation of meanings within that frame. They
therefore engage in discourses, translate meanings between actors and thus make sense
of the otherwise abstract structure. Against this background, it seems that the EU may
want to build more on the synergies that thus emerge.
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Third, in order to understand local dynamics in a more sensitive way, the EU
needs to unpack its concepts in terms of their underlying meanings. In cases where the
EU has attempted to engage on a political level, it has often taken the meanings of its
own concepts, such as human rights or civil society, for granted. However, to be able to
benefit from the synergies that may develop between local and international actors, it is
important to engage in a discourse about the diverse meanings of certain concepts. As a
result, peacebuilding must be unpacked in the light of its meanings and be open to a
number of underlying assumptions and expectations. This is not to say that the EU
should necessarily and completely give up on its own concepts, but to argue that an
engagement with the competing versions and visions of peacebuilding as well as its
constitutive elements will help create common spaces of agency in which meanings can
be discussed. This in turn will not only be beneficial for local actors to channel their
views into the policy-making process, but it will equally help the EU translate its
concepts into local contexts to make them meaningful and relevant. The challenge here
will be to find adequate strategies and venues for those discourses, as well as the
interlocutors that can be particularly skilled at translating meanings back and forth. The
role of cultural actors highlighted in this thesis sheds light on just one group of actors
that may be in the position to engage in such a role.
It needs to be said that the framework developed in this thesis is applicable not
only to this specific case study, but also to interaction processes more generally. Indeed,
the ways in which actors form their identities, needs and representations can be
conceptualised around spaces of agency, with specific identities developing in the
context of a certain discursive space, while this may differ from how the actor defines
itself in a different space. This in turn allows for taking account of the complexities of
identity–formation within a structural environment, which shapes the boundaries of
action on the one hand, but is always open to challenge on the other hand. Having said
that, future research may want to try to apply this framework to a different case study,
or to a different set of actors within the same case study, in order to identify comparable
dynamics in peacebuilding settings. This may help us to understand why some spaces of
agency can be translated more easily from the international to the local context or vice
versa, and why others remain rather isolated and fail to connect to other spaces. This
may also help identify concrete mechanisms of translation, their impacts on the
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legitimacy of peacebuilding as well as their (in)ability to connect to local imaginations
of peace. Future research may also want to investigate the correlations between the
design of a space and its ability to connect to others in relation to the question of
legitimacy. As it seems to emerge from this thesis, this is dependent on a number of
factors, such as the quality of the discourse cluster, its flexibility, the users and
infrastructures of space, its representational practices, its openness to translation, as well
as its audiences. The assumption here is that such processes are highly fluid and
context–dependent, requiring peacebuilding actors to engage with society beyond the
visible in the public realm and to respond to the associated needs. This opens up more
questions relating to the landscape of spaces more generally:
 How do external peacebuilding spaces impact upon the local landscape of
spaces of agency in terms of their mutual relationship?
 How may this create new cleavages and bridges, and how does it contribute
to the modification of societal constellations between local spaces?
 How can legitimacy emerge in the interaction of spaces?
 Which forms of interaction would one find in peacebuilding contexts, in
which peacebuilding actors, such as the EU, are considered more or less
legitimate, where there is less ignorance of and resistance to them, but rather
constructive engagement between different actors?
In relation to those questions, this thesis has provided a case study with which I have
analysed the potential of cultural agency to offer a critique of the EUPF. This critique
can be considered constructive rather than destructive in that it outlines knots and
bridges between the public and the private as well as between the institutional and the
everyday. It reflects the extent to which cultural agencies are powerful, in influencing
both institutional policies and their subjects through complex translation mechanisms
between spaces of agency. The critique of the EUPF offered by cultural actors in BiH
points to the limitations of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding due to its distance from
the everyday context of the Bosnian people on the one hand. On the other hand, the
critique revitalises the promise of EU peacebuilding in that it shows how the latter can
be made relevant among the people, yet may at the same time also remain distant if the
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necessary translation mechanisms are lacking. The thesis has therefore broken down the
often-assumed clear boundaries between the institutional and the everyday, pointing to
their interlinkages and interaction through spaces of agency. I therefore conclude that
EU peacebuilding cannot be viewed as isolated from local actors and structures, but it
depends on those if it is to move out of its current deadlock.
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Appendix A: Oručević, Husein, “Defense of public space – defense of 
our future”
Video-lecture at the OKC Abrašević’s Festival of Arts in Divided Cities, Mostar, 
15/04/10.
Defense of public space - defense of our future
Living in a divided city, in a city torn into two nationalities, each of which aspires to
take the other piece of land, the other half, the rest of the city, unfortunately also
implying a complete parallelization in the city as a whole.
Public spaces owned by the city are hostages of nationalist politics. They do not
develop civil virtues or dialogues; rather, they are seeds of further divisions and
antagonism. They develop politics of segregation and discrimination on all fields of
organization in the local community. Even the school system, from preschool education
to the university system of study, is impacted by this hatred and division.
Some of the public spaces, buildings, are to us an image of the activities of nationalist
politics, by which buildings in the city are named. They add a nationalist prefix,
Bosniak or Croat. If the name does not carry a nationalist mark (Croat or Bosniak), then
they gladly give the schools names of significant individuals from the sphere of (one)
religion, by this limiting their own story, making it mono-ethnic and discriminatory.
The names of streets are changed as well; today for anyone who is well acquainted with
historical incidents in the Balkans, it will be clear in which part of the city of Mostar
one finds oneself simply by the name which the street bears.
The whole bloody history of Mostar and the Balkans, the names of fighters and
warriors, ideologues and heroes (ordinarily only of one nationality, while for the other
side these individuals are called war criminals or murderers) are present in the street
titles of today's Mostar. Violence is felt in every step in the city.
Alongside the nationalist "rampage" in the titles of administrative, cultural and other
city institutions which negate the public good, there has also appeared this "McWorld"
which seeks new "uncultivated dollar fields", unconquered spaces which "cry out" for a
consumerist world prepared and ready for the unethical (read: inhumane) media
campaign which follows it. "McWorld" enters Mostar and BH and, with the uncreative
and antagonistic politics of nationalist parties, establishes the "rat race".
Will the balloon burst-- and when?
From yesterday, Croats, Muslims, Serbs, divided, belligerent and wounded, have begun
to be transformed into buyers and sellers. Shopping and supermarkets have been
exchanged for citizens initiatives and public spaces, Agoras, places of meeting and
dialogue.
Buildings of public significance are being prepared for privatization, or they are already
sold, but the citizens do not even know. The ruined buildings possessed by the city are
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not renovated because authorities on all levels of political engagement know neither
what to do with them nor in which way to manage them. They sell valuable historical
buildings for a trifle, and lacking any sense of the civil and urban, on the occasions
when they do not auction them off, they allow the facades of splendid, very old
buildings to be hidden by the messages of "McWorld", enormous posters which become
a purpose of itself and "big profits", ignoring the violence which this procedure
executes on the stranger coming into the City, walking the streets of the City, the
passerby who must carry away the trace of the City, this procedure which in the end
destroys, negates the citizens of Mostar.
Not to mention the violence towards the individuals inside these buildings, who work
and are even educated in these darkened spaces shadowed by the "Great-New
Emperor", quaking in his boots. McWorld is here. The people have no strength to
oppose the global emperor in his hunt for global ideas of profit. Profits and benefits are
only for the chosen.
The cosmopolitan idea of the city in Mostar lost its battle with aggressive nationalist
politics. They have ravaged the city and its characteristics. They have destroyed the
places of memory and identity, trying to establish new, "even older" and more
distinctive identities, which no one living remembers, neither the Mostarians dispersed
around the world nor the ones divided in the City. Mostar is no longer a city in which
any citizen, or member of any national, religious or subcultural group, feels at home.
Thus did Abrašević – autonomous zone, “Home on the borderline”, move into action to 
save the remaining city memories, remembrances of the urban. Everyone remembers the
building of Abrašević. Here Mostarians learned and played, fell in love, but also lifted a 
voice for different solutions and for cosmopolitan ideas, which alone can save the city
and citizenship. We were forced to enter the judicial process with municipal authorities
in order to keep at least one space of memory and public activity. We won the case, and
we will continue in the spirit of searching for alternatives in today’s Mostar, which I
described in this short introduction, to a discussion about the way in which defense of
public spaces can defend our future, the future of the City.
On the gate of the City, walking in the City, flying above the City;
About borders, agoras, bridges, and a few other more-or-less important stories.
In the book Post polis, Introduction to philosophy of the postmodern city, Ewa Rewers
separates our view of the city spectacle into three perspectives.
The first she called the perspective of the pilgrim, who stands at the city gates, at
its threshold. “To know the city from its threshold means to ask the question: What is
the city? What does it mean to live in the city? How does he suit his name?”
A small Istrian town by the name of Kastav has its own Municipal Loggia, or as some
would say, Agora. The Municipal Loggia is located outside of the old city walls,
immediately before the city gates. It dates back to 1571 and is uniquely constructed. It
was built as a place for holding assemblies and city festivals as well as for resolving
various legal matters and disputes. Right on the threshold, at the gates of the city, is this
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Municipal Loggia. Those who wished to enter it, for reasons of security, or even for
trading, visiting or lodging, were required to come each day to the Municipal Loggia of
Kastav and to ponder, to converse about the city. This form created an “urban voluntary
quarantine” – the space of agreement; in the loggia which actually arose as a space of
conversation, the two worlds are touching, meeting one another, inhabiting, imbuing
one another. The two worlds in no man’s land (in the land of agreement – of
conversation) or on the land imagined – organized that it become at once entrance and
exit, a space which leads us in both directions, outside-inside-outside. Back in the
disorganized space without remembrance, wandering and unpredictable, or even in the
space of memory, as some have named it, closer to the space of eternity – of the city.
Kastav had its own “bridge” across which one must pass, the “bridge” of initiatives, its
own Loggia. To be satisfied with conversation and the desire for vitality in the city,
which means to spend some time in the Loggia, enables the “other” to shorten the
border, the threshold of the City. The borderline of Kastav – Loggia, made famous by
Simmel’s idea about the non-existence of borderlines, or the existence even of
borderlines which in themselves carry at once two strategies – rapprochement and
separation.
Kastav as a city did not receive its name according to its democratic Loggia.
The other city which I will mention began from a bridge, arose on a bridge. Many
asked, which was first, the bridge or the City?
Before the bridge was built, many points by the river had already sprung up, busy. But
only one of these points would later become a City, the point from which the bridge
arose.
According to Hiedegger, the Bridge was first anyway, but my city in fact materializes
from its contemplation. Mostar as a city arose on the bridge, known as the Old Bridge.
The bridge opened a perspective on crossing to the other side, freedom of movement,
the human desire to sweep away obstacles to one’s steps. The bridge is here a bond, but
also a borderline. The bridge is the ideal solution for man’s freedom of movement,
going further without stopping, the bridge bridges that which was yesterday un-bridged.
The bridge is situated in the ideal. The bridge is on the borderline between two points
which are connected, and the city springs up. The bridge is a tool, the conversation of
hands and technology, and not the abovementioned “urban Kastavian quarantine”. The
bridge is a miracle which time fades, and it ceases to be ideal. It fades, and borderlines
will take its place. This will occur through strategies of separation, despite the idealized
desire of man, in the beginning, for rapprochement – unlimited movement towards…
The transformation of the bridge into a borderline has its own destructive, conflicted
side, the side of separation. The bridge is a mixture of the idealistic and the destructive,
the final human domain. And Mostar, which is a city-bridge, because it arose from a
bridge, had the characteristics of a city of finalities. In it are interwoven rapprochement
and separation, conflict and contact, vitality, life energy, the world. Progress and
destruction, disappearance. The goal is of course to rationalize the emergence of such
characteristics, but I believe also that by them it is possible to restrain these forces.
Mostar made breakthroughs by bridges, yet by destruction returned to the river-bottom,
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to the hell of division and separation. Today the bridges of Mostar have been renovated,
but the city is divided. It could be said that the whole world has gotten bogged down in
one small Mostarian valley.
Borderlines and bridges, in all happiness are not all that is left, and which make up a
City, because that would be a bleak picture of a succession of conflicts and contacts,
their continuous warring, and it would be the end of my humble reflections.
We enter the city, we walk about the city, we move away from the threshold, from
borderline and bridge. We have passed both the Loggia and the bridge, let us walk about
the city.
However, we will not lack instructions: Do not forget that we are still strangers, the
others who enter the City, those who should acquaint themselves with and understand
this City. Leaving the bridge and the Loggia behind us does not mean that we will not
meet them in the very center of the City, nor does it mean that we will not need them in
solving and understanding the rhythms, dynamics and development of the urban tissue.
Returning to Ewa Rewers and her view of the city spectacle, we come to the
strategy of the pedestrian, the walker.
“The pedestrians of the city streets ‘write’ with their own bodies according to
individual principles.”
Arrival in a new city, meeting the city. Where to start? Where to go? To master this
space, the map of memory and organizational movement, the freedom of movement, no
longer as a stranger but rather as… a walker in the streets of the City.
Where does this stranger, this “other,” feel safe? What is he looking for when he meets
with the new organism in which he must spend some time, or indeed stay forever? Does
he perhaps have friends, do they have time for him?
Personal connections of course exist, but human nature is seeking, curious; it is the
desire of each of us to understand and organize the space of movement just as it suits us.
Actually, in this organization of space “just as it suits us”, appears an important, the
most important, segment – the attribute of the city: Public space, the place where the
city encounters itself, where its lines of personal organization meet, the groups which
the city has nursed by its own history and touched with its remembrances, where the
contemporary moment confronts that which is called the city.
There in the public space, in meetings with “strangers – others” as they are called by the
inhabitants of the City, it will not be difficult for the stranger, “the other”, for the one
who comes from another land or another city, different groups enter into the space of
the Agora, dialogue, cultural and sociological mixture, and will find themselves as one
who is in the right place, among “one’s own.” We never feel alone when we are in these
sorts of spaces – Public spaces of art and social meeting. We are gathered together by its
strength of contact and dialogue through the various forms of communal codes which
such places offer us.
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My “City” today is my individual web of attributes of the city, cosmopolitan spaces of
“autonomous zones – islands” of the lonely, in the boundless sea of incommunicable
spaces sufficient in themselves and in their small, closed groups. The created web has
enabled me, or at least has not prevented me from, contact with the other and with
others.
Today as I live in another city, to myself yet unknown, in Poland, I discover the web of
“my city”, I seek the attributes of a city known from before. Actually I am seeking the
places of contact, of ideas, of art, groups which the city formed through its own unique
history. Actually, in these places one best becomes acquainted with the universal value
of the city as well as its specificity/diversity.
The abandonment of the city space (in and of itself an “autonomous zone – island”)
pleads for us animate it. These zones, abandoned, ruined, are not simply zones which
must be renovated, which need street lights, or renewal of spontaneous-economic
activity: parking, malls or even streets and giants of traffic infrastructure. They need to
dedicate time to understanding the situation they are in – neglect and detours. Here lies
the answer to the city, to its future and the need for openness to the other which at one
time, much as we do even today, strolled and filled a part of the urban map of memory
and significance.
There are a great number of tyrants-hardliners in the city which we are visiting, despite
the kilometers of long travel (which in the city is not very visible, because it is implied
that the city as an urban whole has no problem with fast and effective movement from
one of its parts to another) and anyway I rarely wonder why the road has so many
detours. Why have we left some people out? Why do we ignore some? Are these mines
which we ourselves have placed? Some places have been left to gape open, that they
warn us of the wounds (this same real walker will encounter them), the
misunderstanding of a group or groups which once dwelled in these now ruined spaces,
on the whole left on purpose to become communicational currents of this “well
organized urban transportation”, sidestepped. Today's communicational detour
represents neglect, the lack of connectivity in the web of the urban - disregard. We visit
the "settlements of memory" to keep them before our eyes, and above all, that we might
not ask questions. Because questions require answers. For many today, neither
questions nor answers are important, because ordinarily only the law "There is no
alternative" is valid to them, and they have no time for reflection. "Time flies, we have
no time for such things," "Time is money," "Who cares about that, today in the 21st
century?"
Actually including those spaces which are brushed aside, forbidden, those about which
one keeps silent, which are regularly ignored, are the main wounds (the centers of
possible change) of the divided environment, of the cities. The observant walker, but
also the one who is less observant (but still a walker), will encounter those sorts of
"holes" in the city, spaces which were left neglected, and will wonder, "What happened
here?, Why is it ruined and not repaired?, Why is it neglected?"
On contemplating various cities and settlements, parts of the city, I have learned that
each of them has some "wound", a space which begs to be known, that its story be
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returned to it, that it become possible again to remember it. Without this work on the
story, the memory, we lose something which will someday again come in another form,
and become again problematic, perhaps even a new tear in the city. The borderlines
which are visible, those abandoned spaces, which are pushed aside from the eyes of
most of the citizens, are autonomous zones of memory, but also zones of forgetfulness -
"the problem which doesn't exist" (I do not see, therefore it does not exist.) All that we
want to ignore, which we do not want to see, carries with it the times and the
development of the city, so if you also want civilization...
"...because if the city is imagined as a bank of memories which, as a rule, by far
overcomes the memory of only one people, race, language - then what can all that
mean, what it all brings is the scattering of that precious deposit of "anthropological
memory"? Does it not bear away one good, perhaps even one better part of the human
being in general?" - as Bogdanović would ask.  
Are they not those drives to destroy, which see only forgetfulness, and later, also wars,
as the solution? For city-haters, as for those who hate cosmopolitan living,
remembrance, conflict is only of one type - war, yet contact - one truth. The everyday
creation of fear, even fear of war, freezes all attempts at contact - (greater) truth.
Borderlines are spaces of conflict but also points of contact. They are brushed aside into
the darkness, into the windowless ruins which only the light of day each day
spontaneously discovers. They remain unnoticed and unrecognized, they have no story
or it is passed over in silence. They leave a part of their contents - "there where the wind
lives", until the moment when someone does not notice and does not begin to describe
and work on them - initiating an archaeological remembrance of the space.
It is not easy from the lights, the flashing-blinding neon lights, to step into the dark
spaces of the unknown. They are set apart by the light - blinded, darkened. Gathered
around what dazzles, we will never know the other side, the "dark" side, which can
teach us once again to recognize the light, to be in the light; not dazzled, not blinded.
As though to be born again.
To gather in the light those who once made up a part of the light of the city, which has
surrounded us this whole time, though we did not see it.
Removal from the eyes of the walker, forgetfulness, once created a ghetto in the time of
the Second World War. Those spaces, closed for the walker, controlled, kept from
exchange, removed, and then after some time also forgotten - emptied. And by this,
excluded from the currents of the city. Lost forever? Brushed aside, as though they had
never been.
We have the same case today in the already mentioned autonomous zones of art, and its
capacity for re-socialization in divided cities. Politics divides them, placing them in the
situation of long-classified spaces without light, in ruins, but also in the ruin of
memories which should be forgotten as soon as possible. The fear of today's citizens
(but not of the walker, because the divided cities do not allow this) of these unlighted
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spaces, ruined, but surrounded by a vast sea of lighted and dazzling advertisements
mixed with a sound-forest, speaks of the problem of poisoned visuality and false
security which is hidden behind a cloak of big lights and cameras on our streets. There
is no mystery, and therefore no curiosity. The fear deepens because there is no contact,
we no longer know one another, but we purchase safety through big lights, instead of
through conversation and agreement, familiarization. The night has become darker than
it has ever been before. The brushed-aside, forgotten spaces are silent, almost deaf,
unlit, like some house of horror which one should visit but return to the known as soon
as possible, in the safe sea of the glittering city. We do not feel safe without the
plugged-in cameras and screens, but the noise supplants our feeling of activity and life.
Arrival in the autonomous zones, the journey to them, seems utterly bleak, like
blindman's bluff without a whisper, or a long flooded muddy road which has no end.
However, just as in some virgin forest full of restless, lurking wild animals all around
us, a undreamed of space is discovered, a clearing, which points to a "spring", an
unfailing, great river with a rambling current and banks of meeting. Here people also
live.
How to make accessible the flooded road of the bluffed "blindman", the brushed-aside
space, to make it safer and without fear for those who approach? How to shorten,
civilize, soften the crossing between the two, with the intention of sharing different,
created worlds? How to connect them? How to introduce them to one another? One sure
panopticon, the other seeking security in decency, agreement, conversation. One
dazzling, blinding, the other flooded, barely visible. One homogenous, uniform,
recognizable; the other diverse, plural. One nationalist, built from hatred; the other
curious and open, but hidden from the eyes of the walker.
If these were the characteristics of two men, instead of two municipal spaces, which
characteristics would you want to preserve, to protect?
Instead of the enclave, ghettoization, which is considered the "place of transition" "of
the other", because in the structure is contained the works of a recognized body of
emigrant remembrances, remembrances of the other, the stranger; the time has come for
diverting transitions in the direction of "autonomous zones - islands", public spaces, in
the direction of the space of exchange and offering different visions of community.
Emigrants, foreigners, "the other": where are they born?, What do they bring with them,
what cargo of memory?, What sorts of stories of evil in this world?, What kinds of fairy
tales and myths do they bring with them into the cities?
Into the cities, yes.
To them cities are the main arrival stations. Cities are found on the road of connections
and urban infrastructure of the contemporary world, in them are the virtual highways
developed. In this mixture in which we find ourselves, how to stay ourselves and to
offer ourselves to others.
Only the one true city may protect and secure humanity for these unknown people, who
come to us and leave a part of themselves. They bring cargo unknown to us or
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undiscovered, the cargo of reality which already today knocks on our doors or hides in
the darkness of forgetfulness, the unlit places of the third world. Here beside us the
borderlines are being developed, whose exiles have already reached us, in meeting with
our city...
...Exile obliges us to be born again, to open one dimension in time and space which can
be used to find the true weight of things. We must open our eyes: that we can help to
change reality, we must begin from what we see... Exile, to which it is understood one
comes only after some great defeat, not simply a painful experience. Close one door but
open another; this is the punishment but at the same time, freedom and responsibility.
There is one black but also one red face... sounds the conclusion of E Galean, quoted
from his work "Homeless."
This new birth is a new discovery of the world, or a first contact with it - birth. In any
case, whether it is a case of rebirth or simply birth, reality is seen differently, more
clearly. The newly heterogeneous reality of the city is essential.
The city cannot be surprised by anything, and it cannot be, inasmuch as it is created and
organized as a city, a space of cosmopolitan values.
Assimilation, multiculturalism, separation, integration... all questions which are posited
in fear of the other, not knowing him.
And always a mistake.
The wrong question.
The results of failure, the visible divisions. As an emigrant comes to know the
achievements of the city, not of one nation, not of one religion, not of only one
part/settlement, but of all nations and religions and cultures and others. Often we mutely
encounter the "brushed-aside" emigrants, and with them the poor, in the suburbs or the
city institutions which are presumably still common to all. Far away are they from our
eyes, brushed aside, invisible, we do not know that they are here. At least for a long
time we did not know them. They come to us because we did not want to approach them
or to try to understand their world.
We thought that a crust of bread would ensure that this newcomer, stranger, would
already be a part of our world and our cosmopolitan (read, economic) story.
Presumably, along with this, the stories about our cities today.
We did not create these spaces, these essential agoras of meeting, these which will truly
show us all that the city possesses in its interiors, and by which we will tomorrow come
into contact, encounter. The agoras encourage people to begin to speak about
themselves that they would reveal a part of themselves to us.
To emigrants, strangers, the others, we must open the door to meeting with the city, the
common spaces of the city which give them support and a feeling of belonging. They
have passed the threshold of the city, we opened the door to them. They now make up
yet another piece of the collage in which the city must ensure its development.
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We dare not leave them abandoned to themselves and dependent only on themselves
and those similar to them (the poor, the homogeneous.)
At that time frustrated groups are born, which, instead of being curious about the other,
enter into his spaces with a destructive energy. First impacted are the open spaces, those
which attempt to build up a different sort of city from that which is today torn apart,
divided. Interest in the other has the strength of childlike curiosity to accept, but there is
another unconscious side of curiosity - childish, irrational brutality. The aggressor
reaches to the other side, destructively trespassing the borderline, entering the home of
the other and hurriedly destroying whatever he wants.
We come to the place of meeting-conflict, on the borderline. The spaces which are
either places of conflict or places of reconciliation - dialogue.
Whether they will fulfill the function of one or the other depends on us, it depends on
preserving the city. It depends on preserving the public spaces on the borderlines, on
their encountering what is already clearly defined and being encountered as a whole,
group, ghetto.
The third perspective emphasizes the privileged position of viewing: »of Ikar, the
sunny or divine Eye, blazing above the city, freed from movements of earthly things,
independent of the current of street movement.«
To look down on the world from above, to describe it, means to understand it. To
consider the development of the city, to plan its directions means to sketch out and to
realize ideas. The city has become a priceless new vocabulary, which similar to poetry
can open new solutions in the human, lost and fragmented field of vision. The city
expert, the city-builder, Bogdan Bogdanović sees the city as a major technical tool: 
The city in itself is a major technical tool, superior in relation to all previous tools - but
also because of this, and yet even more so, what the city immediately shows itself to be
is a new "tool of thinking". Only after the phenomenon of the city, and from then on,
man could see himself retrospectively, that the entirely tangible could state the currents
of his own fate, just as it could explain also the fated stage of his cities. In principle,
before the phenomenon of the city, man was an ahistorical being, and not only because
of these two phenomena, "city" and "writing", on the whole overlapping, but rather
because the city itself, as soon as it appeared, was one kind of powerful, super-
linguistic writing - a complicated and precious ideography.
Large, contemporary cities are lost to us in the field of view, regardless of how high on
the nearby mountain we climb, but a bird's-eye view does not allow us to see all that has
emerged in the city in the last decades. Satellite pictures scan the streets in the search
for all that is aesthetically dazzling, and by the brightness of the streets, control and
protect us from ourselves. In these pictures there is recorded not one trace, nor sound,
nor even one humanly delineated story from the space of the City.
...why was the city given to us? Wasn’t it so that we could make it our own and enjoy it
how we choose and as we can? And that case is legitimate. However, a gift of this rank
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imposes an obligation. I suppose that the City is given to us, above all else, that we
would be enriched by the advantages of civil wisdom in order to understand ourselves
better. Actually, we have received a marvelous toy! We gaze into it: and see ourselves.
We place it between ourselves and the world: we see the world, the universe, the whole.
It turns out as though the City were colorful, illuminating device, one could almost say:
a tutor, a cognitive model... In the older Near Eastern cosmologies, "the world" and
"the city" were often born suddenly and in succession. Two series of phenomena, on one
side: city/civilization/environment, on the other: nature/world/cosmos, inseparably
connected in the consciousness of archaic man.
On the borderlines of divided cities
What sort of infrastructure will the borderlines of divided cities need in the future?
Thoroughfares, passages, tunnels, bridges... or control points, barbed wire, mine fields?
Both one and the other are well-tried to us. Both one and the other are parts of our
infrastructure, "historical enterprises" and architectural ideas how spatially to continue
this road which does not stop (which steps forward) and how to make an end to that
road (to stop - to stop the "other").
I must use this metaphor "bridge on dry land". Therefore there is no river, there are no
visible obstacles, but there exists a real wall or canyon, a chasm which is present as a
division in the minds of the inhabitants.
This "bridge" which, in an architectural sense, does not look like a real bridge, because
in and of itself, it has the habit of a construction intended as something else. This sort of
construction is located on the borderline of two or more bodies which sees in the same
place (a point of contact on the borderline) the ends of "mine" or "me", this
Construction fulfills the function of the abovementioned architectural or infrastructural
constructions, constructions whose function naturally is worth translating into the
language of society, politics and culture.
Passages; to secure undisturbed extension of movement, not based on what is existing
between the wall in their minds. Especially if on the borderline a building functions as a
passage in which one enters from one place, while its exit is on the other side. Such a
space fills the function of security, because “the other”, from one or the other side of the
borderline, not on the exposed position, is not visible; he crosses unhindered to the other
part of the city. Curiosity about the other must today, at the beginning of the process of
destroying the division, be protected. Curiosity should give security, to encourage it to
“come out”.
Tunnels; passages which seem safer to us for crossing to the other side. With these, that
the infrastructure of the entrance and exit to the tunnel, or many of them, would need to
be deep inside the ghetto, in the depths of the territory of the “other”. The interior of the
tunnel more closely resembles the spaces of an underground city, a labyrinth which
leads everywhere, and not only one-way or two-way, to one or the other side.
Consequently, such a tunnel-space does not fill the function only of crossing an
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uncrossable boundary, which is of course our goal, but also of opening other entrances
and exits in parts of the city which, until now, were not connected by this kind of web-
labyrinth underground.
Bridges and “Bridges on Dry Land”; an unusual idea, that one can live on a bridge,
not only cross over on a bridge. When you live on a bridge, all passersby who cross
over become guests to you, become indeed your own guests, because you live in middle
of the bridge. A bridge-home. In this case there do not exist merely passersby (although
they will always be the most curious), to those, crossing over the bridge will be only an
extension of the path to the goal which they intended to reach. Who will live on a
“bridge”? Who is capable of living on a bridge? Who will guard this sort of “bridge-
home”? By which values will the “bridge-home” be decorated? From all that is in
question, tomorrow it will depend whether or not the borders will be less visible. The
bridge-home teaches us and prepares us to cross over to the other side, for the one
whom we will meet in the other part of the city-world. Our unease will be diminished
and our fear of that which we know only a little or perhaps not at all.
The tradition of life on a bridge, a bridge as a space of the city, is not strange in the
Balkans. All social groups inapprehensively dedicated a bridge-space (no one’s,
although belonging to us all), they performed and they participated in the colorful
spaces which ennobled them for their return to their own small, often closed, groups.
Enriched by the other and in contact with the other, they return back to their own cities,
villages, without fear that they will there come across someone whom they have not
already met, with something with which they have never been acquainted, ready, rather,
tomorrow to encounter the unknown. One such space-bridge is best described in the
works of Ivo Andric:
“On the bridge and beneath it the boys play, their first loves are born, they work and
quarrel; on the stone walls the merchants exhibit their wares, the world sits, discusses
and sings, the beggars and the lame gather. The travelers reach the gate and pass it,
stopping for weddings, and also for funerals; invitations and announcements are
placed, even for those condemned to death. Here, before anywhere else, arrives news
from the district, those which are auspicious and those which are unpleasant, this is
also the place where eminent people meet to speak about their affairs. In difficult times
here people meet from three laws, from three sides of Višegrad – the imam, the priest
and the rabbi – to understand one another’s opinions and to come to a decision
together about city matters.”
All the ideas mentioned have come out of my years-long battle against the division of
Mostar, against the ideas and divisions which even today keep some of the cities in the
world in the jaws of division and of constantly threatened war and conflict. Thus, I have
chosen for the end some photographs of the borderline, the street of the Boulevard
(Bulevar), which divides Mostar into east and west. Additionally there are also some
public spaces which are prepared for privatization or which are intended for demolition.
For the end I wish to say that for Mostar, today is not too late to initiate the process of
creating community. It is not too late at least to establish infrastructure/architecture
which will serve as a “bridge on dry land” for communication between the two parts of
the divided city of Mostar.
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Revitalizing the Boulevard and the street of A. Šantića would be an attempt to mitigate 
to an extent the consequences of the politics of division, which have ruled and rule as
evil forces in Mostar. Renovation of the Third Elementary School as a building whose
function should not be changed, complete reconstruction of the Mostar Gymnasium,
support for the cosmopolitan idea of the UWC project, building one university library as
a space of gathering and meeting for students of Mostar, renovation of the residential
buildings which will return life to the central zone, as well as the renovation of
Abrašević – the first building which truly represents a place for open dialogue with all 
the abovementioned themes in this presentation, which for years has warned about the
“ruin” of the idea of the city and its cosmopolitan values through continuously
destroying ideas of public space – the AGORA and its significance for the future of the
city, and its openness to new challenges which today’s world brings. I reintroduce the
Boulevard (BULEVAR) as a “bridge on dry land” by which we could heal one great
“wound” of the city of Mostar, and in doing so, to give the CITY the strength to
overcome accumulated tensions and fears.
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Appendix B: Dosta! website,
http://dosta.ba/latinica/o-pokretu-dosta/ (accessed 16/08/11)
Aktivistički pokret građana DOSTA! 
Misija:
„DOSTA!“ je aktivistički pokret građana Bosne i Hercegovine koji se bori za 
dostojanstvo građana BiH, utiče na aktiviranje i angažiranje ljudi na rješavanju akutnih 
problema društva i želi da stvori aktivnu i svjesnu građansku opoziciju u BiH kroz 
javno izražavanje građanskog nezadovoljstva, aktivnu i direktnu participaciju što većeg 
broja građana, te direktni uticaj na društveno-političke procese. Pokret ovo radi sa 
angažovanim grupama i pojedincima, te organizacijama i institucijama koje dijele
vrijednosti i načela pokreta. 
Problemi:
• Inertno i pasivno građanstvo 
• Kritičan nivo građanske participacije u javnom životu 
• Nepostojanje snažne i nezavisne aktivističke građanske inicijative u BiH 
• Neodgovoran i ignorantan politički aparat 
• Alarmantno socijalno i ekonomsko stanje i veliki broj pitanja koja treba riješiti
• Kritičan položaj ugroženih populacija u BiH 
• Osjećaj nemoći građana BiH da bilo kako utiču na odluke koje ih se tiču 
• Nekvalitetna komunikacija građana sa vlastima i političarima uopšte 
Ciljevi:
• Stvoriti i omasoviti angažovanu i kredibilnu građansku inicijativu za javno izražavanje 
građanskog nezadovoljstva 
• Osnaživanje uloge građana u procesu donošenja odluka kroz iniciranje i jačanje 
građanske participacije 
• Prepoznati ključne socijalne i ekonomske probleme građana BiH i angažirati javnost 
na njihovom rješavanju
• Uticati na odgovornost političkog aparata i institucija na svim dijelovima BiH i na 
svim nivoima vlasti
• Na kreativan, angažovan i beskompromisan način utjecati na razvoj građanske svijesti 
o moći aktivne i masovne participacije kroz reagovanje na tekuće probleme i insistiranje 
na rješavanju istih
Pravila ili principi djelovanja:
• Pokret mora biti nezavistan od svih političkih partija, incijativa, kao i od nevladinih 
organizacija i bilo kakvih institucija
• Članovi pokreta moraju biti disciplinovani i predani. 
• Pokret mora biti otvoren prema različitim tipovima ljudi, interesa i aktivnosti, ukoliko 
one odgovaraju ciljevima i vrijednostima pokreta
• Pokret mora biti javan i dostupan svima
• Pokret ne pravi nikakve kompromise sa bilo kakvim instancama vlasti ili političarima, 
nego beskompromisno insistira na ostvarenju svojih ciljeva i zahtjeva
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• „DOSTA!“ je pokret građana BiH i jednako je dostupan svima 
• Svaka aktivnost pokreta ne smije ni u kojem slučaju biti protiv vrijednosti i ciljeva 
pokreta
Vrijednosti:
• Povjerenje
• Solidarnost
• Beskompromisnost
• Istrajnost
• Socijalna pravda
• Dostojanstvo
• Osviještenost građana 
• Apsolutna moć glasu naroda 
• Bez nacionalizma i isticanja nacionalnih interesa
• Kreativnost
• Popularizacija
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Appendix C: Žbanić, Jasmila, “European Commission Made 
Disastrous Mistake”,
http://www.deblokada.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=
37&lang=en (accessed 16/08/11).
European Commision Made Disastrous Mistake
The European Commission’s decision not to propose lifting visa restrictions for citizens
of Bosnia-Herzegovina will, in my opinion, have disastrous consequences for the future
of my country, its citizens and the future of the European Union.
Because visa restrictions no longer exist for Croatian, Serbian, and Montenegrin
citizens, the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including those of Bosniak and “Other”
ethnicities, are placed in isolation, while the choice of “belonging” to neighboring
countries is encouraged (Bosnian Croats have the right to Croatian and Bosnian Serbs to
Serbian passports).
European bureaucrats are misleading the public by claiming that Serbia and Montenegro
have fulfilled the conditions for visa liberalization while shifting the blame for visa
exclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina exclusively on incompetent local politicians while
ignoring the fact that the partition of Bosnia -Herzegovina, and keeping it out of the EU,
are those nationalist leaders’ goals.
Mr. Olli Rehn must be aware that his speech following the publication of the European
Commission’s decision provided encouragement for nationalists to abandon nationalist
rhetoric and start taking action for the total destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Instead of strengthening the Bosnian passport, as one of the rare symbols of unity of
today’s Bosnia -Herzegovina, the European Commission has fully degraded its value,
“sanctioning” Bosnian citizens. In this way, they deepen the fears and the sense of
isolation and strengthen the belief that aggression and war crimes are something worthy
of award – all factors on which nationalists in our country thrive.
We have been denied a basic human right, the right to the freedom of movement, but we
still have the freedom of thought and we think that the members of the European
Commission have made a terrible mistake, because their recommendations are in
conflict with all human and moral values of the European Union which should guide
them in their work and for which they should be held accountable by their citizens.
Jasmila Zbanic,
Internationally awarded film director
Citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina and holder of B&H passport
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Appendix D: Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, “New
Monument. De/Construction of Monument”, 2006”
http://www.scca.ba/deconstruction/about_new_monument.php?lang=en (accessed
16/08/11)
ABOUT NEW MONUMENT
The "New Monument" is the last chapter of the "De/Construction of Monument"
Project, initiated in 2004. The goal of the realization of the 'new monument' – i.e.
the art work in public space – is the continuation of 10-year long program practice
of the Sarajevo Center for Contemporary Art, i.e. of the support for those art
projects which publicly and openly raise issues related to our time and start a direct
dialogue with citizens in a new and untraditional way, both in form and in content.
The 'New Monument' is an attempt at re-defining the notion and form of
materialization of monuments (as we know them), their function, connotation and
message they convey. That is why we have put the 'New Monument' in inverted
comas.
The meaning of the multi-disciplinary "De/Construction of Monument" project
was to demystify and de-mythologize the past, to deconstruct the realities of
transition in post-socialist, particularly in post-Yugoslav countries, so that our time
could be thought in a new and creative way. The foundation and the starting point
of the Project were the material remnants of the monuments from different periods
of our recent or distant past, as well as newly erected ones. They represent a
materialization of ruling political, ideological and esthetic values, and, as such,
they are an ideal material for critical analysis of the state in numerous areas, from
philosophy to history, education and art.
In the course of the Project, besides the seminars, panels, lectures, film screenings,
the interventions in public space and exhibitions were organized too. The focus of
artistic actions was also put on the thematic elaboration of different symbolic
aspects of monuments, tacking the issues of their meaning and purpose. In the first
part of the project, entitled "Public Art/Art in Public Space", a series of artists'
presentations to show various contemporary artistic "practices" were organized,
ranging from 'monuments to a negative past' by Jochen Gerz, to 'anti-monuments'
by Braco Dimitrijević and Sanja Iveković. This was a 'pedagogical' overture for 
artists (particularly those who attended various programs during 2004 or
participated in them) into the final phase of the project entitled 'New Monument',
consisting of a public competition, exhibition of received material, voting of the
audience for the best New Monument idea and the work of an international jury –
selection of works for realization, production, and installation in public space.
The final phase, the realization of New Monuments, the interval between the
production and the installation (from September 2005 until the end of 2006) was
spent on requesting the permits for monument's locations from the municipal and
city authorities, on the basis of duly submitted documentation. The communication
with the authorities relating our entry into public space is an exceptionally
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important part of the whole story about art in public space. That is why I am
quoting here a excerpt of the text of the "De/Construction of Monument" project.
"The process of realization, besides the construction, implies also negotiation with
local (municipal, city and cantonal) authorities relating the location, permits etc.
 New monuments will be offered to the city as a gift, alongside the obligation of 
their installation and maintenance. This will be a test of how the relationship
between governments and civil initiatives functions and an answer to the question:
Who owns public space? "(November 2003)
After more tan a year of searching and waiting for the permits, the result is as
follows:  Communication is reduced to written and telephone calls, on the one 
hand, and "silence of administration", on the other. It exists in neither the
bureaucratic, nor in the written form. It is almost impossible to get directly in
touch with the authorities, with the "owners of public space". The experience so
far has been reduced to the conclusion that this is the case of total lack of
responsibility and interest for the initiatives launched by local organizations and
cultural institutions (both governmental and non-governmental) that relate to the
supporting and promotion of domestic artists. Only the calls from the "higher
places" can, although reluctant, lead towards certain results… Here one usually
says at the end of every story: things will get better.
Dunja Blažević October / November 2006 
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